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Wal-Mart and the Separation
of Banking and Commerce
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.
During 2005–2006, Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and several other commercial firms
applied to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for permission to acquire
FDIC-insured industrial loan companies (ILCs). Those applications were opposed by
business groups, labor unions, community activists, and members of Congress. In January
2007, the FDIC imposed a one-year moratorium on all acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms and asked Congress to determine whether such acquisitions should be prohibited.
As the FDIC noted, acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms raise three important
policy issues, which are addressed in this Article. First, commercial ownership of ILCs
conflicts with the policy of separating banking and commerce, which has been generally
followed in the United States since 1787 and has gained strength over time. Banks have
frequently tried to engage in commercial activities, and commercial firms have often
attempted to gain control of banks. However, federal and state legislators have repeatedly
passed laws to separate banking and commerce when it appeared that either (i) the
involvement of banks in commercial activities threatened their safety and soundness, or (ii)
commercial firms were acquiring large numbers of banks. ILCs represent the last
remaining exception to the policy of prohibiting commercial ownership of banks.
Second, acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms will produce serious risks for our
nation’s financial system and economy. Commercially-owned ILCs will extend federal
safety net subsidies to the commercial sector, and ILCs will have strong incentives to make
loans and investments that benefit their commercial affiliates. Commercial ownership of
ILCs therefore creates a competitive imbalance between commercial firms that own ILCs
and those that do not. Commercially-owned ILCs are also vulnerable to contagious losses
of confidence resulting from problems at their parent companies. Accordingly, federal
regulators may feel compelled to arrange “too big to fail” bailouts of large troubled parent
companies of ILCs.
Third, the FDIC does not have authority to exercise consolidated supervision over
commercial owners of ILCs. Any grant of such authority to the FDIC would have adverse
consequences. Mandating FDIC supervision of commercial parent companies would
significantly increase the federal government’s interference in the general economy. FDIC
supervision of commercial owners could also impair market discipline by causing market
participants to expect FDIC support for such owners during financial crises. For all these
reasons, Congress should prohibit further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms.
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Wal-Mart and the Separation
of Banking and Commerce
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2005, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. applied to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to obtain federal deposit insurance for a
proposed industrial bank, which would be named “Wal-Mart Bank” and
would be chartered under Utah law. As described in Part II.A of this
Article, the primary activity of the proposed Wal-Mart Bank would be to
act as a sponsor for the processing and settlement of credit card payments,
debit card payments, and check payments made by customers at Wal-Mart
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I would like to thank Anna
Gelpern, Patricia McCoy, and participants in the Wal-Mart Matters symposium sponsored by the
University of Connecticut School of Law in October 2006, for their helpful comments on a preliminary
version of this Article. I would also like to thank Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference in the Jacob
Burns Law Library, for her excellent research assistance. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article
includes developments through February 26, 2007.
On March 16, 2007, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. announced that it was withdrawing its application to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Utah Department of Financial Institutions for a
federally-insured industrial bank. See Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. At the time of Wal-Mart’s
announcement, this Article was already in the editorial process, and it was therefore not feasible to
revise the Article. For two reasons, however, Wal-Mart’s decision does not change the Article’s
purpose or analysis.
First, Wal-Mart evidently has not abandoned its plans to enter the banking business. At the time
Wal-Mart withdrew its application, Wal-Mart said that it was not giving up its plans to expand its
limited menu of consumer financial services to include products such as home mortgages, home equity
lines of credit, other consumer loans and investment products. Wal-Mart stated that it intends to offer
such products in conjunction with financial service companies that are its “partners.” Id.; see also Rob
Blackwell, Post ILC, Wal-Mart Discusses Strategy, AM. BANKER, Mar. 19, 2007, at 1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File. It appears that Wal-Mart withdrew its application because it
concluded that the application (and the widespread opposition thereto) increased the likelihood that
Congress would pass legislation to prohibit acquisitions of industrial banks by commercial firms. See
Blackwell, supra; Eric Dash, Wal-Mart’s Bank Plans Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. Wal-Mart therefore may have withdrawn its application
in order to forestall an immediate threat of adverse legislation. In a subsequent interview, Wal-Mart’s
president, H. Lee Scott Jr., indicated that Wal-Mart had not given up the idea of acquiring an industrial
bank. Mr. Scott said that “[w]e are looking at how can we get another bite of that apple,” and he also
replied, “Oh, no,” when asked whether the possibility of an industrial bank charter was a “dead issue”
for Wal-Mart. Joe Adler, In Brief: Banking Still on Wal-Mart’s Agenda, AM. BANKER, Mar. 29, 2007,
at 20, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (reporting on an interview of Mr. Scott on
Fox News).
Second, despite Wal-Mart’s withdrawal of its application, several other commercial firms,
including Home Depot, still have pending applications to acquire industrial banks and plan to pursue
those applications. Thus, the question of whether further acquisitions of industrial banks by
commercial firms are consistent with the best interests of our financial system and our national
economy remains a significant issue for Congress to resolve. See Blackwell, supra.
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stores. In addition, Wal-Mart Bank would offer certificates of deposit to
charitable organizations and to individuals through deposit brokers.
Wal-Mart declared that Wal-Mart Bank would not open any branches
or deal directly with the public. Nevertheless, if Wal-Mart’s application
had been approved, the world’s largest retailer would have owned an
FDIC-insured depository institution with powers equal to those of
commercial banks (except for the ability to offer checking accounts
payable on demand). In view of Wal-Mart’s past efforts to acquire fullservice depository institutions, many commentators predicted that WalMart’s proposed industrial bank would eventually seek to open branches in
Wal-Mart stores and to exercise the full range of financial services
authorized by its Utah charter.
Wal-Mart’s application provoked intense opposition from a broad
coalition consisting of community bankers, officials of the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB), labor unions, retail stores, community activists, and
members of Congress.
Wal-Mart’s opponents advanced numerous
arguments, including the claim that a major commercial firm should not be
permitted to acquire an FDIC-insured institution. In July 2006, as
discussed in Part II.B, the FDIC responded to this widespread opposition
by placing a six-month moratorium on Wal-Mart’s application and all
other pending applications to obtain federal deposit insurance for industrial
banks or industrial loan companies (ILCs).1 Shortly thereafter, the FDIC
invited the public to comment on twelve policy issues related to
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial (i.e., non-financial) companies.2
In December 2006, more than a hundred members of Congress asked
the FDIC to extend its moratorium so that Congress could consider
proposed legislation that would prohibit commercial firms from acquiring
ILCs.3 On January 31, 2007, the FDIC extended its moratorium for an
additional year with respect to pending applications by Wal-Mart, Home
Depot and other commercial firms to acquire control of ILCs. At the same
time, the FDIC lifted its moratorium with regard to pending applications by
financial companies or individuals to acquire ILCs. The FDIC decided to
extend its moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms
because (i) the FDIC determined that such acquisitions raise special policy
issues, as federal law does not permit commercial firms to acquire other
1
For purposes of this Article, unless otherwise indicated, (1) the term “deposit insurance” means
federal deposit insurance administered by the FDIC; (2) the term “ILC” includes any ILC or industrial
bank that is eligible for deposit insurance; and (3) the term “commerce” or “commercial” refers to
companies that are primarily engaged in non-financial lines of business.
2
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Industrial Loan Companies and Industrial Banks: Notice
and Request for Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 49,456, 49,456–57 (2006) [hereinafter FDIC Request for
Comment].
3
Bernard Wysocki Jr., On the Shelf: How Broad Coalition Stymied Wal-Mart’s Bid to Own a
Bank, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.

2007]

THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE

1543

types of FDIC-insured depository institutions, (ii) the FDIC believed that
Congress should be given additional time to consider whether to adopt new
legislation with respect to commercially-owned ILCs, and (iii) the FDIC
was concerned that its current supervisory regime might not be adequate to
identify and control the risks created by such institutions and their
commercial affiliates.4
In extending its moratorium on commercial acquisitions of ILCs, the
FDIC stated that the comments it received on commercially-owned ILCs
raised three major questions. First, does commercial ownership of ILCs
conflict with a general U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce?
Second, do commercially-owned ILCs present risks to the U.S. financial
system and the broader economy that are greater than the risks posed by
financial holding companies? Third, does the FDIC have adequate
supervisory powers to control the potential risks created by commerciallyowned ILCs, despite the FDIC’s lack of consolidated supervisory authority
over the commercial parent companies?5
Part III of this Article analyzes each of the three major policy
questions identified by the FDIC. Part III.A examines the history of
federal and state legislation in the United States regarding the authority of
banks to engage in commercial activities and the ability of commercial
firms to own banks. Since the Republic’s founding, banks have frequently
tried to engage in commercial activities, and commercial firms have often
attempted to control banks. However, legislators have generally sought to
separate banks from commercial businesses. Indeed, legislators have
repeatedly imposed legal restraints on bank powers and have prohibited
bank affiliations with commercial firms when it appeared that either (i) the
involvement of banks in commercial activities threatened their safety and
soundness, or (ii) commercial firms were acquiring large numbers of
banks. The policy of separating banking and commerce has gained
strength during the past half-century. On four occasions since 1956,
Congress has adopted anti-affiliation laws when it realized that commercial
firms were making widespread acquisitions of banks or other FDICinsured depository institutions.
ILCs represent the last remaining
exception to the general policy prohibiting acquisitions of banks by
commercial firms.
As discussed in Part III.B, there are at least three reasons why further
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms are likely to create serious risks
for our nation’s financial system and general economy. First, the
ownership of ILCs by large commercial firms will spread federal safety net
4

See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for the FDIC’s actions).
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Moratorium on Certain Industrial Bank Applications
and Notices: Limited Extension of Moratorium, 72 Fed. Reg. 5290, 5291–92 (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice].
5
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subsidies to the commercial sector of the economy. Second, as shown by
the financial history of the United States and other nations, commerciallyowned ILCs are subject to conflicts of interest that will encourage them to
make loans and investments to benefit their commercial affiliates. In
combination, the extension of safety net subsidies to commercial firms and
preferential lending by commercially-owned ILCs will threaten the
solvency of the deposit insurance system and will create a competitive
imbalance between commercial firms that own ILCs and those that do not.
Third, commercially-owned ILCs will be subject to contagious losses of
confidence resulting from problems at their parent companies. Federal
regulators will therefore be inclined to support a troubled commercial
parent company whenever the failure of its subsidiary ILC might cause a
significant disruption within the financial system.
Consequently,
commercial ownership of ILCs will increase the likelihood of federal
bailouts within the commercial sector of our economy.
As explained in Part III.C, the FDIC currently does not have authority
to exercise consolidated supervision over commercial firms that control
ILCs. Moreover, any decision by Congress to designate the FDIC as
consolidated regulator of such firms would have at least four negative
effects. First, the FDIC lacks the experience or the specialized expertise to
identify and control the risks created by commercial owners of ILCs.
Second, FDIC supervision of commercial owners could impair market
discipline by causing market participants to expect that FDIC would
support those owners during financial crises. Third, attempts by the FDIC
to control the activities of commercial affiliates of ILCs would
significantly increase the amount of governmental interference in the
general economy. Fourth, large commercial owners of ILCs are likely to
enjoy substantial political influence, which they can use to extract costly
subsidies or forbearance measures from both Congress and the FDIC.
II. WAL-MART’S APPLICATION AND THE FDIC’S MORATORIUM
A. Wal-Mart’s Application for an ILC
In July 2005, Wal-Mart applied to the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions for permission to establish a wholly-owned ILC known as
“Wal-Mart Bank.”6 At the same time, Wal-Mart applied to the FDIC to
obtain deposit insurance for its proposed ILC.7 Under Utah law, an ILC

6
Ann Zimmerman, Wal-Mart Is Trying to Establish Bank Again, This Time in Utah, WALL ST. J.,
July 20, 2005, at C4, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
7
Becky Yerak & Josh Noel, Wal-Mart Plan Has Bankers on Edge: Applications Filed to Run
Bank in Utah, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2005, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHTRIB File.
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must obtain and maintain deposit insurance from the FDIC in order to
conduct business.8
Wal-Mart’s joint application to Utah and the FDIC stated that the
proposed Wal-Mart Bank would engage in a very limited set of activities.
Wal-Mart Bank’s principal function would be to serve as the depository
institution sponsor for the presentment, processing and settlement of (i)
credit card payments and debit card payments made by customers at WalMart stores and (ii) checks tendered by Wal-Mart customers that are
electronically converted for payment through the Automated Clearing
House (ACH) network. Thus, Wal-Mart Bank would provide Wal-Mart
with direct access to the payments system and would enable Wal-Mart to
stop paying fees to the banks that currently process payments made to WalMart by its customers. Wal-Mart’s application stated that Wal-Mart Bank
did not “currently” propose to provide payment processing services to any
person other than Wal-Mart.9
In addition to processing payments for Wal-Mart, the proposed WalMart Bank would offer certificates of deposit to nonprofit charitable and
educational organizations and to individuals through deposit brokers.
However, Wal-Mart declared that Wal-Mart Bank would not offer any
retail banking services at its main office, would not open any branches, and
would not make any loans.10
Notwithstanding the limited scope of the proposed ILC’s activities,
Wal-Mart’s application triggered intense opposition from a wide spectrum
of opponents, including community bankers, FRB officials, labor unions,
grocery and convenience stores, community activists, and members of
Congress.11 The FDIC held three days of public hearings and received
testimony from nearly seventy witnesses, most of whom opposed WalMart’s application.12 The FDIC received more than 13,800 written
comments on Wal-Mart’s application, again mostly in opposition to the
application.13 Fifty members of Congress filed written comments opposing

8

UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-3(4)(b) (2006).
Wal-Mart Bank Application, Vol. I, at 6–7 (2005) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
10
Id. at 10; Letter from Jerold G. Oldroyd, Counsel, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., to Carol Saccomonto,
FDIC San Francisco Regional Office (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
laws/walmart/walmartletters.pdf.
11
Wysocki, supra note 3, at A1.
12
See Wal-Mart Bank Federal Deposit Insurance Application: Public Hearings (on file with
Connecticut Law Review) (providing written statements and oral testimony of witnesses) [hereinafter
Wal-Mart Hearings]. By my count, of the sixty-seven witnesses who testified at the public hearings,
fifty-five opposed Wal-Mart’s application, nine supported the application and three were neutral (viz.,
former Senators Jake Garn, Jim Tozzi and Michael H. Richmond).
13
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Moratorium on Certain Industrial Loan Company
Applications and Notices, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,482, 43,483 (Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter FDIC Moratorium
Notice]; FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5291.
9
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14

Wal-Mart’s application, and nearly a hundred members of Congress
asked the FDIC to impose a moratorium on any consideration of WalMart’s application and other pending applications to acquire ILCs.15
Some opponents argued that the proposed Wal-Mart Bank would
present a significant risk to the U.S. payments system even if its functions
were limited to those set forth in Wal-Mart’s application. One witness at
the FDIC’s public hearings warned that a large-scale failure by Wal-Mart
Bank to settle payments transactions on behalf of Wal-Mart could disrupt
the payments system and inflict serious losses on other financial
institutions and their customers.16 According to another witness, a largescale default on payments by Wal-Mart Bank could create a systemic crisis
because Wal-Mart currently accepts about 140 million electronic payments
per month and the proposed Wal-Mart Bank would process more than
$170 billion of transactions per year.17 Another opponent argued that WalMart Bank would face significant potential conflicts of interest if it became
the primary processor of payments for Wal-Mart. Under current ACH
rules, a bank that initiates an ACH debit transaction on behalf of a
merchant must monitor the merchant’s creditworthiness and also must
reimburse the receiving bank if the transaction was not authorized by the
receiving bank’s customer.18 The opponent claimed that Wal-Mart might
conceivably pressure Wal-Mart Bank to ignore credit problems at WalMart or to initiate unauthorized ACH debit transactions for the purpose of
generating improper transfers of funds to Wal-Mart from receiving banks
and their customers.19 Congress expressed similar concerns about potential

14

See Letter from Jo Bonner, U.S. Congress, to Martin Gruenberg, Vice Chairman FDIC (Mar.
24, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Letter from Artur Davis, U.S. Congress, to Martin
Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC (Mar. 23, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Letter from
Byron Dorgan, U.S. Senate, to Martin Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, FDIC (Apr. 10, 2006) (on file
with Connecticut Law Review); Letter from Barney Frank, U.S. Congress, to Martin Gruenberg,
Acting Chairman, FDIC (Apr. 19 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Letter from Barney
Frank, U.S. Congress, to Martin Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, FDIC (Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with
Connecticut Law Review); Letter from Rep. James A. Leach, U.S. Congress, to Martin Gruenberg,
Acting Chairman, FDIC, (Mar. 27, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Letter from 45
Members of Congress, to Martin Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC (Mar. 16, 2006) (on file with
Connecticut Law Review).
15
Wysocki, supra note 3, at A1 (reporting that ninety-eight members of Congress sent a letter to
the FDIC on June 8, 2006, requesting that the FDIC issue a moratorium).
16
See Testimony on Behalf of America’s Community Bankers Before the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart Hearings, supra note 12, at 4–5 (Panel 3, Apr. 10, 2006) (written
testimony of Kenneth J. Redding, President and CEO, UniBank) (on file with Connecticut Law
Review).
17
See Terry J. Jorde, Written Testimony on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of
America Before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart Hearings, supra note 12, at 4
(Panel 3, Apr. 10, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
18
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 18,888, 18,891 (Apr. 12, 2001).
19
See Letter from Thomas M. Stevens, President, National Association of Realtors, to Sheila C.
Bair, Chairman, FDIC (Oct. 10, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
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risks to the U.S. payments system when it prohibited further acquisitions of
“nonbank banks” by commercial firms in 1987.20
Many opponents also alleged that the proposed Wal-Mart Bank, if
approved by the FDIC, would eventually seek to exercise the full range of
banking powers authorized by its Utah charter. Those critics pointed out
that Wal-Mart had previously made three attempts to establish full-service
bank branches within its stores.21 First, Wal-Mart tried to acquire an
FDIC-insured thrift institution in Oklahoma, but that acquisition was
barred by Congressional legislation in 1999.22 Second, Wal-Mart applied
for permission to form a joint venture with TD Bank USA, an FDICinsured thrift institution owned by Toronto-Dominion Bank. However, the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) denied Wal-Mart’s application after
determining that Wal-Mart’s employees would be directly involved in
operating the TD Bank branches that would be located in Wal-Mart’s
stores.23 Third, Wal-Mart tried to acquire an ILC that was chartered under
California law. However, the California legislature passed a law in 2002
that prohibited commercial firms from acquiring California-chartered
ILCs.24 In 2003, Colorado’s legislature passed a similar law prohibiting
acquisitions of Colorado-chartered ILCs by non-financial companies.25

20
As discussed infra in Part III.A.3.c, Congress passed legislation in 1987 that barred further
acquisitions of “nonbank banks” (i.e., FDIC-insured banks that refrained from either accepting demand
deposits or making commercial loans). The Senate committee report on that legislation declared that
the “nonbank bank loophole threatens our nation’s payment system by giving large diversified
[commercial] firms direct access to that system.” S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 10 (1987), as reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 489, 500. The report warned that
[a] nonbank bank cannot, as a practical matter, independently evaluate the credit of a
parent or affiliate and resist that company’s orders to make payments that would
create overdrafts . . . [with the potential to] precipitate the failure of the nonbank
bank, resulting in loss to the FDIC, the [FRB], and the nonbank bank’s depositors
and creditors.
Id. The report also quoted FRB chairman Paul Volcker’s concern that a nonbank bank would be likely
to have “token capitalization . . . relative to both the size of the parent and to the very high dollar
volume of transactions [funneled] through the bank.” Id.
21
See Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., Written Testimony on behalf of the Sound Banking Coalition Before
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart Hearings, supra note 12, at 5 (Panel 6, Apr.
10, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Arthur C. Johnson, Written Testimony on behalf of
the American Bankers Association Before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart
Hearings, supra note 12, at 7–8 (Panel 3, Apr. 10, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Jorde,
supra note 17, at 5–6; Douglas S. Kantor, Written Testimony on behalf of the National Association of
Convenience Stores Before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart Hearings, supra
note 12, at 4 (Panel 6, Apr. 10, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
22
See infra notes 266–70 and accompanying text.
23
Rob Blackwell, Industrial Charter Could Be Wal-Mart’s Way In, AM. BANKER, Apr. 17, 2003,
at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File; Rob Blackwell, Wal-Mart, TD Venture Hits
Regulatory Wall, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
24
Nicole Duran, Nixing Wal-Mart’s Bid to Buy Bank, Davis Cites GLB, AM. BANKER, Oct. 2,
2002, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
25
Laura Mandaro, In Focus: Wal-Mart’s Industrial Charter Odds Look Better in Nevada, AM.
BANKER, May 9, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
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Since 2003, Wal-Mart has offered a variety of financial services to its
customers in partnership with various financial institutions. For example,
Wal-Mart currently offers check cashing, money orders, electronic bill
payments, wire transfers, stored-value cards, and co-branded credit cards.26
Analysts have predicted that Wal-Mart has strong incentives to expand its
menu of financial services because its growth rate in traditional retailing
markets has slowed in recent years.27 In addition, Wal-Mart has often used
short-term partnerships with outside providers as a way to learn how to
offer new products under its own Wal-Mart brand. Thus, if Wal-Mart
succeeds in acquiring its own bank, many commentators believe that WalMart would want to incorporate its current offerings of financial services
within that bank.28
The proposal by Wal-Mart Bank to offer certificates of deposit to
nonprofit organizations and to individuals through deposit brokers further
indicates that Wal-Mart Bank has a long-term strategy to offer retail
banking services.29 Wal-Mart Bank is not required to accept deposits from
the public in order to obtain deposit insurance from the FDIC. The
proposed ILC could qualify for deposit insurance simply by accepting one
or more non-trust deposits in the amount of $500,000 from Wal-Mart or
another affiliate.30 Wal-Mart Bank’s desire to offer deposits to the public
suggests that it is seeking to lay the groundwork for a broader retail
banking strategy.
In addition, it seems highly unlikely that Wal-Mart Bank would be
content to pursue the very limited business plan set forth in its application
over the longer term, because that plan would not generate significant
26
See Steve Cocheo, Always Aggressive, Always Wal-Mart, ABA BANKING J., May 2003, at 29,
available at LEXIS, News Library, ABABJ File; Robin Sidel & Ann Zimmerman, Can Wal-Mart Cash
In on Financial Services?, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
WSJNL File; Supercentre Banking: Wal-Mart and Financial Services, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at
65, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File.
Wal-Mart has signed leases that allow independent banks to operate branches in more than 1100
of Wal-Mart’s stores. See Jane J. Thompson, Written Testimony on behalf of Wal-Mart Financial
Services before Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart Hearings, supra note 12, at 6–7
(Panel 1, Apr. 10, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review). However, former Rep. Thomas Bliley
alleged that Wal-Mart could break many of those leases by paying the equivalent of a year’s rent.
Bliley, supra note 21, at 6. Another critic noted that Wal-Mart discontinued its lease programs with
independent banks during 2001–2003, while it was pursuing its unsuccessful plan to operate branches
in partnership with TD Bank USA. See Cocheo, supra.
27
Cocheo, supra note 26; Wendy Zellner, Your New Banker?, BUS. WK., Feb. 7, 2005, at 29,
available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File; see also infra notes 398–99 and accompanying text
(describing Wal-Mart’s slowing growth rate in the U.S. during 2006).
28
Cocheo, supra note 26; Zellner, supra note 27.
29
Wal-Mart Bank Application, supra note 9, at 1, (discussing Wal-Mart Bank’s proposal to offer
certificates of deposit).
30
See FDIC General Counsel’s Op. No. 12, Engaged in the Business of Receiving Deposits Other
Than Trust Funds, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,568, 14,568–69 (Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/00bizdep.pdf (discussing the minimum amount of deposits that a statechartered bank must hold in order to be “engaged in the business of receiving deposits other than trust
funds” and thereby qualify to obtain deposit insurance under 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1)).
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profits. Jane Thompson, President of Wal-Mart Financial Services,
testified that the anticipated annual revenues from Wal-Mart Bank’s
proposed business plan would be only $10 million during its third year of
operation.31 Given Wal-Mart’s well-known focus on the bottom line, it
seems improbable that Wal-Mart would choose to incur the very
substantial costs it has already spent in prosecuting its application for WalMart Bank if the Bank never intended to expand its operations beyond the
narrow limits set forth in the application.
In November 2006, Wal-Mart’s Mexican subsidiary (popularly known
as Walmex) obtained approval from the Mexican Finance Ministry to
organize a full-service bank in Mexico. The new bank—to be called
Banco Wal-Mart de Mexico Adelante—intends to open retail branches
offering deposits, loans and other financial services in hundreds of WalMex stores.32 Wal-Mart’s success in obtaining a retail banking franchise in
Mexico provides further support for those who claim that Wal-Mart’s longterm plan is to establish a full-service banking operation in the United
States.33 Indeed, Wal-Mart’s Chief Executive Officer stated in 2003 that
“financial services is [an area] we would like to be in. . . . There’s
probably a place for us in mortgages.”34 Accordingly, this Article
considers the policy issues surrounding the proposed Wal-Mart Bank based
on the assumption that Wal-Mart’s ILC, if approved, would eventually
seek to exercise the full range of powers granted by its Utah charter.
B. The FDIC’s Moratorium on Acquisitions of ILCs by Commercial
Firms
On July 28, 2006, the FDIC imposed a six-month moratorium on the
processing of Wal-Mart’s application and other applications by ILCs for
deposit insurance.35 A few weeks later, the FDIC issued a request for
public comment on twelve policy issues related to acquisitions of ILCs.36
The FDIC’s request for comment noted that many opponents claimed that
Wal-Mart’s application contravened a general U.S. policy against mixing
31

Thompson, , supra note 26, at 14.
See Anna Gelpern, Wal-Mart Bank in Mexico: Money to the Masses and the Home-Host Hole,
39 CONN. L. REV. 1513 (2007); Joe Adler, In Brief: Wal-Mart to Open Mexican Bank in ’07, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 28, 2006, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File; Elisabeth Malkin,
Wal-Mart Will Offer Retail Banking in Mexico, an Underserved Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, at
C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
33
See Joe Adler, Wal-Mart Bank Discusses Branch Plan for Mexico, AM. BANKER, Aug. 4, 2006,
at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (observing that “opponents of Wal-Mart’s ILC
application said that the Mexican initiative is another sign that the company wants to engage in retail
banking here.”).
34
Abigail Goldman, The Wal-Mart Effect: Proud to Be at the Top, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at
A32, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (quoting H. Lee Scott, Jr.).
35
FDIC Moratorium Notice, supra note 13, at 43,482.
36
FDIC Request for Comment, supra note 2, at 49,456–57.
32
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37

banking and commerce. The federal Bank Holding Company Act (BHC
Act)38 has established a general separation of banking and commerce by
prohibiting commercial firms from owning FDIC-insured “banks.”39
However, the BHC Act exempts an ILC from the definition of “bank,” and
thereby permits a commercial firm to own an ILC, provided the ILC
satisfies two criteria.40 First, the ILC must be chartered in a state that, on
March 5, 1987, had in effect or under consideration a law requiring ILCs to
obtain deposit insurance.41
ILCs currently operate in seven states—
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada and Utah—that
authorize the chartering of FDIC-insured ILCs.42 Second, the ILC must
either have assets of less than $100 million or must refrain from accepting
demand deposits (i.e., checking accounts payable on demand).43
ILCs with assets of more than $100 million may not offer demand
deposits, but they can offer negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts to individuals and nonprofit organizations.44 NOW accounts are
functionally equivalent to interest-bearing checking accounts.45
Accordingly, ILCs of all sizes can offer deposit accounts with checkwriting features to all of their customers except for-profit businesses.46
ILCs chartered under Utah law may use the title “bank” in their names and
may exercise powers comparable to those of a state-chartered commercial
bank, including the acceptance of deposits (except for demand deposits)
and the making of consumer and commercial loans.47
37

See id. at 49,458; see also FDIC Moratorium Notice, supra note 13, at 5292–93.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–50 (2000).
39
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET
GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 15, 65–
67 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-621 [hereinafter GAO-ILC
Report]; infra Part III.B.3 (discussing BHC Act).
40
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2000); see infra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (discussing
exemption for ILCs).
41
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i).
42
See FDIC Moratorium Notice, supra note 13, at 5291; On Industrial Loan Companies: A
Review of Charter, Ownership and Supervision Issues, Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 2 (July 12,
2006) (statement of Douglas H. Jones, Acting General Counsel of the FDIC) (on file with Connecticut
Law Review), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2006/chairman/spjul
1107.html [hereinafter Statement of Douglas H. Jones].
43
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i). An ILC is also exempt from treatment as a “bank” under the
BHC Act if it has not undergone a change of control since August 10, 1987, or if it does not engage,
either directly, indirectly or through an affiliate, in any activity in which it was not engaged as of
March 5, 1987. Id. According to the FDIC, only twelve ILCs that are currently in operation were
insured by the FDIC prior to August 10, 1987. Thus, only a small number of ILCs could potentially
rely on these grandfathered authorities. See Statement of Douglas H. Jones, supra note 42.
44
12 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000); see GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 23–24.
45
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1156–57, n. 99 (1990).
46
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 6 n.5.
47
See Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-701(3)(a)(iv) (2006) (authorizing industrial banks to use the word
“bank” in their names); Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies: Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5221 n.32 (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed Rule on
Consolidated Supervision] (stating that “Utah industrial banks have essentially the same powers as
38
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In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) grants to
ILCs the same powers and privileges that it provides to other FDIC-insured
state banks.49 For example, an ILC may “export” the interest rates
permitted by the state in which it is “located” when the ILC makes loans to
borrowers residing in other states.50 An ILC may also establish interstate
branches based on the same terms that apply to other FDIC-insured state
banks that are chartered by the ILC’s home state.51 Under current law, a
Utah-chartered ILC—such as the proposed Wal-Mart Bank—could
establish interstate de novo branches in thirty-four states.52 In addition, a
Utah ILC could operate branches throughout the nation if it was willing to
acquire (and merge with) banks in the sixteen states where it could not
open de novo branches.53
In sum, under applicable state and federal law, a commercially-owned
Utah ILC can conduct a nationwide banking business as long as it refrains
from accepting demand checking accounts and thereby maintains its
exemption from treatment as a “bank” under the BHC Act. Currently,
fifty-eight ILCs are in operation, including forty-five institutions chartered
Utah commercial banks except that industrial banks have more limited securities powers and less
specific investment authority than commercial banks”); GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 21–22,
24–25.
48
12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1835(a) (2000).
49
Under the FDI Act, a state-chartered ILC that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits
other than trust funds is considered to be a “State bank.” 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2).
50
See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d; GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 21–22; Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The
Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending
Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 544–69 (2004) (discussing the legal doctrine permitting FDICinsured banks to “export” interest rates).
51
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(d)(4), 1831u; GAO-ILC Report, supra note 39, at 78–79; PATRICIA A.
MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 9.04 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing statutes authorizing interstate
expansion by FDIC-insured banks).
52
Currently, FDIC-insured banks may establish interstate de novo branches in seventeen states
that permit banks from any state to open such branches. In addition, banks headquartered in Utah can
establish interstate de novo branches in seventeen additional states that have branching laws that are
reciprocal with Utah’s branching statute. See MCCOY, supra note 51, § 9.04[2][b](ii) (discussing
restrictions on interstate de novo branching under current law); GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at
78–79 (discussing interstate de novo branching rights available to Utah-chartered ILCs).
In 2003 and 2004, the House considered a regulatory relief bill that would have granted
nationwide de novo branching powers to all FDIC-insured banks, including ILCs. However, due to the
controversy over commercially-owned ILCs, the bill passed by the House in 2004 withheld nationwide
de novo branching powers from any ILC that was not in existence before October 1, 2003, or whose
parent company generated more than 15% of its revenues from nonfinancial activities. See Christine E.
Blair, The Future of Banking in America: The Mixing of Banking and Commerce, 16 FDIC BANKING
REV. 97, 97, & n.2 (2004) (discussing House action on H.R. 1375, 108th Congress (2004)); Siobhan
Hughes, House Passes Banking Bill Despite Feud Over Regulation of Industrial Loan Companies, CQ
WEEKLY, Mar. 20, 2004, at 702, available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?
id=weeklyreport108-000001067771&type=hitlist&num=23& (discussing the controversy surrounding
the House banking bill). The provision regarding expanded de novo branching powers was omitted
when Congress finally adopted regulatory relief legislation for banks in 2006. See Satish M. Kini &
Kay E. Bondehagen, The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006: A Modest But Important
Step Toward Regulatory Burden Reduction, 124 BANKING L.J. 3, 5 (2007).
53
MCCOY, supra note 51, § 9.04[2][b](ii).
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by Utah and California with the remainder chartered by Colorado, Hawaii,
Indiana, Minnesota and Nevada. Commercial firms own fifteen of those
ILCs.54
As indicated above, California and Colorado have enacted laws barring
commercial firms from acquiring ILCs chartered in those states.55
Consequently, Utah has become the primary focus for commercial firms
seeking to acquire ILCs. During 2006, the FDIC received eighteen
applications to organize or acquire control of ILCs.56 Eight applications
were withdrawn after the FDIC imposed its six-month moratorium in July
2006.57 On January 31, 2007, ten applications remained pending for action
by the FDIC.58 Commercial firms—including Wal-Mart (the world’s
largest retailer) and Home Depot (the second largest U.S. retailer)—filed
nine of those applications.59
The FDIC received more than 12,600 written submissions in response
to its request for comment on policy issues related to acquisitions of ILCs.
Over 80% of those submissions opposed any further acquisitions of ILCs
by Wal-Mart or other commercial firms.60 In addition, more than a
hundred members of Congress sent a letter to the FDIC on December 7,
2006, requesting that the FDIC extend its moratorium until Congress could
act on legislation to prohibit commercial firms from acquiring or
exercising control over ILCs.61 On January 29, 2007, more than thirty
members of Congress introduced such legislation in the House of
Representatives.62
54
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5291 & n.6; see also GAO-ILC REPORT,
supra note 39, at 55–56 (reporting that, as of December. 31, 2004, fifty-seven ILCs were actively
operating, of which Utah chartered twenty-nine, California chartered fifteen, and Nevada chartered
five).
55
See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
56
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5291.
57
Id.
58
Id.; Price Waterhouse Coopers, FDIC Extends Moratorium on ILC Applications, 9 FIN. SERVS.
REG. HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2007).
59
See FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5291. In addition, three of the six
ILCs approved by the FDIC during 2004 are owned by commercial firms (GMAC, Target and Toyota).
Those recent approvals provide additional evidence of the strong interest of commercial firms in
acquiring ILCs. See GAO-ILC Report, supra note 39, at 8 (“Three of the six new ILC charters
approved by FDIC during 2004 are owned by nonfinancial, commercial firms”); Statement of Douglas
H. Jones, supra note 42, at Attachment 1.
60
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5292. The FDIC also received more than
800 comment letters with regard to Home Depot’s application to acquire EnerBank, and “almost all” of
those letters opposed the acquisition. Id. at 5291.
61
Id. at 5293; Joe Adler, In Brief: Extension Supported for ILC Moratorium, AM. BANKER, Dec.
8, 2006, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
62
See H.R. 698, 110th Cong. § 51(c)(1)–(3) (2007) (prohibiting any “commercial firm,” defined
as an entity that derives 15% or more of its annual gross revenues from non-financial activities, from
exercising control over an ILC, subject to certain grandfathering provisions); Joe Adler, In Brief:
House Bill Would Limit ILC Ownership, AM. BANKER, Jan. 30, 2007, at 5, available at LEXIS, News
Library, File AMBNKR. By mid-February 2007, the proposed House bill had attracted forty-nine co-
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On January 31, 2007, the FDIC extended its moratorium on
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms for an additional year. At the
same time, the FDIC lifted its moratorium with respect to acquisitions of
ILCs by financial companies.63 The FDIC also issued a proposed rule that
would give the FDIC consolidated supervisory powers over financial
companies that acquire ILCs if such companies are not already subject to
consolidated supervision by the FRB or the OTS.64
The FDIC extended its moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by
commercial firms because it concluded that such acquisitions raise special
policy issues warranting consideration by Congress. The FDIC noted that
federal law does not permit commercial firms to acquire other types of
FDIC-insured depository institutions.65
The FDIC concluded that
Congress should be given a “reasonable period” to decide whether to adopt
new legislation governing acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms.66
The FDIC also stated that it had “continuing concerns about commercial
ownership” of ILCs because
the current supervisory process and infrastructure may not
produce the safeguards that the FDIC believes could be
helpful in identifying and avoiding or controlling, on a
consolidated basis, the safety and soundness risks and the
risks to the Deposit Insurance Fund that may result from that
kind of company-ownership model.67
According to the FDIC, the comments submitted on the ILC policy
issues raised three major questions: (i) whether commercial ownership of
ILCs produces a mixing of banking and commerce that is contrary to an
established U.S. policy, (ii) whether such ownership creates undue risks for
the U.S. financial system and the broader economy, and (iii) whether the
FDIC has adequate supervisory powers to control such risks, despite the
FDIC’s lack of consolidated supervisory authority over the commercial
owners of ILCs.68 Those three questions are analyzed in the next part of
this Article.

sponsors. Joe Adler, Gillmor on ILCs, GSEs, and What He Brings to the Table, AM. BANKER, Feb. 13,
2007, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, File AMBNKR.
63
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5290. The FDIC’s extended moratorium
applies to acquisitions of ILCs by companies that engage in “non-financial activities” (i.e., activities
other than those that are permissible for financial holding companies, bank holding companies, or
savings and loan holding companies). Id. at 5290 & n.2.
64
FDIC Proposed Rule on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47.
65
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5293.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 5291–93.
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III. ADDRESSING THE POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY THE FDIC REGARDING
OWNERSHIP OF ILCS BY COMMERCIAL FIRMS
A. Does Commercial Ownership of ILCs Conflict with a U.S. Policy of
Separating Banking and Commerce?
Economists and legal scholars have debated whether the United States
has followed a general policy of separating banking institutions from
commercial enterprises.69 As discussed below, there have been times when
banks invested in, or formed affiliations with, commercial enterprises.
Indeed, failures of depository institutions involved with commercial
activities triggered serious financial crises on several occasions. Each
crisis led to legislation that sought to establish a stricter separation between
banks and commercial firms. Congress also enacted laws on several
occasions in order to close perceived “loopholes” in statutes that were
designed to keep banks from becoming closely intertwined with
commercial businesses. Thus, the clear trend in federal banking policy has
been to separate banking from commerce, a trend that has grown stronger
over time. The federal statute permitting commercial ownership of ILCs
appears to be the most significant remaining exception to that policy.
1. Restrictions on Bank Activities Prior to 1900
Scholars who believe that the United States has followed a general
policy of separating banking and commerce point to federal and state laws
that required banks to refrain from engaging in commercial activities
during the first half-century of the nation’s existence.70 For example, in
1782 the Pennsylvania legislature granted the first bank charter in U.S.
history to the Bank of North America (BONA). BONA was strongly
opposed by advocates for agrarian interests, who claimed (among other
things) that BONA favored the interests of Philadelphia merchants. In
1785, representatives from farming districts gained control of the
Pennsylvania legislature and repealed BONA’s charter.71 The legislature
restored BONA’s charter in 1787, but the new charter expressly forbade
the bank from trading in merchandise or from holding real estate except for
use as the bank’s business premises or as collateral for its loans. Thus,
69

See generally Blair, supra note 52 (providing an overview of the debate).
See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE 36, 54–59 (1994); Bernard Shull, Banking and Commerce in the United States,
18 J. BANKING & FIN. 255, 257–59 (1994) [hereinafter Shull, Banking and Commerce]; Bernard Shull,
The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United States: An Examination of the Principal
Issues, 8 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS Aug. 1999, at 1, 7–9 [hereinafter Shull,
Separation Issues]; John R. Walter, Banking and Commerce: Tear Down This Wall?, 89 FED. RES.
BANK RICH. ECON. Q., Spring 2003, at 7, 7–8.
71
See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 48–63 (1957).
70
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BONA’s 1787 charter expressed a clear policy of separating banking from
commercial activities.72
Similarly, the charters for the First (1791) and Second (1816) Banks of
the United States prohibited those banks from dealing in commodities or
merchandise.73 State “free banking” laws, beginning with New York’s
Free Banking Act of 1838, typically authorized state-chartered banks to
“carry on the business of banking” by engaging in a specified list of
banking functions and, in addition, to exercise “incidental powers” that
were “necessary to carry on such business.”74 However, New York’s
banking statute and similar laws of other states did not permit banks to
engage in “mercantile enterprises.”75
Scholars who are skeptical of the strength of the policy separating
banking and commerce have noted that a number of early banks did engage
in commercial activities.76 For example, in 1799 Aaron Burr persuaded the
New York legislature to grant a charter to the Manhattan Company, a
company organized to provide drinking water to New York City. The
Manhattan Company’s charter contained a provision that allowed the
company to employ its surplus capital “in the purchase of public or other
stock or in any other monied transactions or operations” permitted by
law.77 Burr relied on that provision to create the Bank of the Manhattan
Company (the predecessor of Chase Manhattan Bank, which eventually
became part of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.).78 However, Burr’s political
opponents alleged that he had used an ambiguous charter provision to trick
the New York legislature into giving unintended banking powers to the
Manhattan Company. The resulting political controversy undercut Burr’s
attempt to secure the Presidency when the election of 1800 was thrown
into the House of Representatives.79
Despite the controversy created by the Bank of the Manhattan
Company, it was not the only bank to engage in commercial activities
during the first half of the 19th century. The most notable early bank with
commercial interests was the Bank of the United States of Philadelphia
(BUSP). BUSP was organized in 1836 to carry on the nongovernmental
72

Id. at 63.
See HERMAN E. KROOSS & MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 21,
44 (1971).
74
Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 676, 690 (1983) (quoting ch. 260, § 18, 1838 N.Y. Laws 245, 249).
75
Shull, Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 9; Symons, supra note 74, at 697–98.
76
See, e.g., Joseph G. Haubrich & Joao A.C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking and
Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, May
2003, at 121.
77
HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 152 (quoting the New York statute granting a charter to the
Manhattan Company).
78
Id. at 149–54, 156; Haubrich & Santos, supra note 76, at 121–22; Symons, supra note 74, at
687–88.
79
HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 152–57.
73
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business of the Second Bank of the United States after President Andrew
Jackson vetoed congressional legislation that would have renewed the
Second Bank’s federal charter.80 Nicholas Biddle, the Second Bank’s
president, obtained a charter for BUSP from the Pennsylvania legislature.
BUSP’s state charter required the bank to underwrite bonds issued by the
Pennsylvania state government and to invest in various enterprises
sponsored by the state government for the purpose of building public
improvement projects. The charter also gave BUSP a broad power to
purchase government securities and bank stocks.81
Under Biddle’s leadership, BUSP used its investment banking powers
to become “what amounted to a universal bank.”82 By 1840, BUSP owned
stock in more than twenty banks, including a controlling interest in the
Morris Canal and Banking Company of New Jersey (Morris Bank) and
shares in several southern banks. BUSP also held stock in companies
engaged in a wide array of public works projects (including bridges,
canals, railroads and turnpikes) and manufacturing enterprises.83
Together with Morris Bank, BUSP became the primary marketing
agent for the sale of state government bonds to investors in New York,
Philadelphia and London. Both banks helped state governments to issue
bonds to provide financing for state-sponsored banks and public
improvement projects during the late 1830s.84 BUSP also became the
largest financing agency for the production and international sale of cotton
(a commodity that was America’s largest export and Great Britain’s most
significant import during the 1830s). Biddle and his fellow officers took
out large loans from BUSP, purchased massive amounts of cotton, and
effectively controlled the sale of American cotton to Britain during 1837–
1839.85
By 1841, BUSP held over $30 million of state bonds and corporate
stocks, representing more than a third of its assets. BUSP also incurred
heavy liabilities from its trading activities in foreign exchange and its
80

See id. at 405–12, 439–40 .
See id. at 439–42; 2 FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS
339 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1951); Namsuk Kim & John Joseph Wallis, The Market for
American State Government Bonds in Britain and the United States, 1830–43, 58 ECON. HIST. REV.
736, 753 (2005); Symons, supra note 74, at 688–89.
82
John Joseph Wallis, What Caused the Crisis of 1839? 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 133, 2001).
83
See HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 441; REDLICH, supra note 81, at 340–41; Wallis, supra note
82, at 20.
84
See VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2–3 (1970);
HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 441; REDLICH, supra note 81, at 340–42; Kim & Wallis, supra note 81, at
742–45, 753–55; Wallis, supra note 82, at 18–21, 23, 25–27, 33; see also John Joseph Wallis, Richard
E. Sylla & Arthur Grinath III, Sovereign Debt and Repudiation: The Emerging-Market Debt Crisis in
the U.S. States, 1839–1843, at 1, 5–12, 34 tbl.3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10753, 2004) (showing that states issued more than $100 million of bonds in 1837–1841 in response to
a boom in land values, primarily for the purpose of sponsoring banks and public improvements).
85
HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 467–74; Wallis, supra note 82, at 22–25.
81
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financing arrangements for the production and export of cotton. Due to its
speculative activities in securities, foreign exchange and commodities,
most of BUSP’s assets proved to be illiquid and non-marketable when
cotton prices fell and the domestic economy slumped in 1839. BUSP
suffered devastating losses, suspended specie payments on its circulating
notes in 1839, and closed its doors in 1841. For similar reasons, BUSP’s
affiliate, the Morris Bank, became insolvent in 1839 and failed in 1841.86
The collapse of BUSP and Morris Bank caused severe problems in
several states. Both banks failed to make payments on bonds that they had
purchased as underwriters for the Indiana and Michigan state governments
but had not been able to resell. As a result of BUSP’s and Morris Bank’s
failures, both Indiana and Michigan defaulted on their bond obligations in
1841. BUSP’s failure also deprived Pennsylvania of a vital source of
credit, without which the state could not pay its outstanding bonds.
Pennsylvania therefore defaulted on its bonds in 1842.87 In addition,
because BUSP played a crucial role in financing the cotton trade, the
bank’s collapse caused a sharp decline in cotton exports to Britain and
contributed to a severe recession in the south.88
Economic dislocations in both the midwest and south produced a steep
drop in land values and undermined many state-sponsored projects to build
and operate canals, highways and railroads. Several midwestern and
southern states had sponsored banks to promote land development schemes
and to finance public improvements. The state governments issued bonds
to capitalize the banks, and the banks were obligated to repay the bonds out
of the income they earned from their land mortgages and their investments
in public improvement projects. Due to widespread defaults on land
mortgages and the collapse of public improvement ventures, many statesponsored banks failed when they could not meet their bond obligations.
Failures of state-sponsored banks caused Arkansas, Florida, Illinois,
Louisiana and Mississippi to default on their outstanding bonds.89
Alabama incurred heavy costs in dealing with the collapse of its statesponsored banks, but the state imposed new taxes and succeeded in paying
off the bonds it had issued to the banks.90
The collapse of BUSP, Morris Bank and numerous state-sponsored
banks, and the associated bond defaults by state governments, produced
86

CAROSSO, supra note 84, at 2–3; HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 441, 500–12, 535–40; REDLICH,
supra note 81, at 341–43; Wallis, supra note 82, at 22–28, 42 tbl.6.
87
Kim & Wallis, supra note 81, at 743–45, 753–56, 758–59; Wallis, Sylla & Grinath, supra note
84, at 17–20, 22–24.
88
See Wallis, supra note 82, at 10–12.
89
Wallis, Sylla & Grinath, supra note 84, at 5–16, 20; see also HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 612,
680–81, 686 (discussing failures of state-sponsored banks in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and New
Orleans); Wallis, supra note 82, at 15–20, 28–34 (discussing relationship between the collapse of the
land boom and the failures of state-sponsored banks that invested in land development projects).
90
Wallis, Sylla & Grinath, supra note 84, at 16.
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widespread public outrage against the banks. Critics argued that banks
should never have been allowed to engage in speculative securities
activities or to make long-term investments in business firms, land
development programs, and public improvement projects. Accordingly,
banking statutes adopted by New York and other states after 1837 did not
permit banks to engage or invest in such enterprises. Instead, those state
laws generally required banks to limit their activities to issuing circulating
bank notes, accepting deposits, providing short-term credit based on
negotiable instruments, and making longer-term loans that were secured by
land mortgages, high-grade government bonds or other qualifying assets.91
When Congress decided to establish a new system of national banks in
1863, Congress used New York’s Free Banking Act of 1838 as its model
for defining the powers of national banks.92 As amended in 1864, the
National Bank Act authorized national banks to exercise “all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking,” including five specified functions—discounting negotiable
instruments; receiving deposits; buying and selling exchange, coin and
bullion; lending money on personal security; and issuing circulating
notes.93 The narrow scope of powers granted by the National Bank Act
was confirmed in four decisions issued by the Supreme Court between
1870 and 1910. Those decisions held that national banks were prohibited
from acquiring ownership interests in commercial enterprises, except for
the limited purposes of compromising bona fide creditor claims and
obtaining security for debts previously contracted.94
As a consequence of the limitations on bank powers contained in the
National Bank Act and state banking laws, very few commercial banks
engaged in investment banking activities between 1841 and the end of the
19th century. Until 1900, investment banking was primarily the domain of
private banks, which were organized as partnerships in order to avoid
being regulated under the statutes governing commercial banks.95

91
See CAROSSO, supra note 84, at 3; HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 674–84, 698–704; KROOSS &
BLYN, supra note 73, at 78–81; ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 17 (1987); Symons,
supra note 74, at 689–90, 697–98.
92
See HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 724–25, 727–28; Symons, supra note 74, at 689, 698–700.
93
Symons, supra note 74, at 700 (quoting Act of June 3, 1864 § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101).
94
See Symons, supra note 74, at 703–04, 707–09 (discussing Merchants Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati
v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295 (1906); First Nat’l Bank of Ottawa v. Converse, 200 U.S. 425 (1906);
California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897); and First Nat’l Bank of Charlotte v. Nat’l Exchange
Bank of Baltimore, 92 U.S. 122 (1875)).
95
See, e.g., CAROSSO, supra note 84, at 5–97; HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 703–04; see also
Haubrich & Santos, supra note 76, at 127–30 (acknowledging that most of the banks involved in
commercial activities during the second half of the 19th century were private investment banks). The
First National Bank of New York was the most prominent commercial bank (and one of relatively few
such banks) that provided investment banking services to business enterprises during the late 19th
century. REDLICH, supra note 81, at 389–90.
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2. Limitations on Bank Powers and Affiliations, 1900–1933
In 1900, most banking scholars adhered to the real bills doctrine,
which held that commercial banks should engage primarily in accepting
deposits and making short-term loans to finance the production and sale of
goods. Adherents of the real bills doctrine believed that banks should not
invest in illiquid assets like corporate securities and real estate nor should
they make long-term loans secured by such collateral.96 The “real bills
doctrine” was broadly consistent with the limitations on bank powers
imposed by the National Bank Act of 1864 and most of the state banking
laws adopted after 1837.97
However, during the first two decades of the 20th century, and to a
much greater extent after the First World War, national banks and state
banks expanded their operations far beyond the traditional boundaries
marked by the National Bank Act of 1864 and 19th century state banking
statutes. Commercial banks established bond departments and securities
affiliates that traded in securities, underwrote securities, and made longterm investments in commercial enterprises. Banks also established
affiliates that pursued other types of commercial ventures, including the
development of commercial real estate.98
a. The Great Depression and the Banking Crises of 1930–
1933
During the 1920s, large urban financial institutions grew rapidly and
established extensive networks of nonbank affiliates.99 Unfortunately,
several of those financial conglomerates did not survive the economic
downturn that followed the Crash of 1929. The collapse of those
organizations helped to trigger a series of banking panics during the Great
96

See W. NELSON PEACH, THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 9–12, 169, 177
(1941); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s
Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33? A Preliminary Assessment, in 4 INT’L MONETARY FUND, CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 559, 564–66 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=838267; see also Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 485, 501–03 (1971) (describing the “real bills” doctrine as strongly
affecting monetary policy during this period).
97
PEACH, supra note 96, at 9, 169; see also HAMMOND, supra note 71, at 698–704 (describing the
primary activities of banks circa 1857); Shull, Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 9–10.
98
See CAROSSO, supra note 84, at 96–100, 271–79; PEACH, supra note 96, at 16–21, 28–42, 53–
112; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 569–73, 579; see also Operation of the National and Federal Reserve
Banking Systems: Hearings on S. 4115 before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong.,
391–92 (1932) (testimony of Governor Eugene Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board) (providing a list
of 770 nonbanking subsidiaries and affiliates of national banks, including 192 securities companies and
155 realty companies).
99
See, e.g., RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN BANKING
108–10, 131–58 (1933); W. RALPH LAMB, GROUP BANKING: A FORM OF BANKING CONCENTRATION
AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 55–58, 80–90 (1962) (explaining the development of various
types of multi-office banking organizations); PEACH, supra note 96, at 53–112 (describing the
development and activities of security affiliates).
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Depression. Congress responded to those disasters by adopting legislation
in 1933 that imposed a series of new restrictions on bank powers and bank
affiliations.100
For example, Caldwell and Company (CAC) and Bank of United
States (BUS) expanded aggressively during the 1920s and established large
conglomerate organizations.
CAC, an investment banking firm
headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee, created a financial and commercial
empire that covered much of the southeast.101 By 1929, CAC was the
leading underwriter of municipal bonds, industrial revenue bonds and real
estate bonds in the southern states.102 CAC underwrote securities issued by
more than twenty southern companies and acquired controlling interests in
most of those firms.103 CAC also purchased numerous banks and insurance
companies.104 By 1930, CAC controlled a large chain of banks with $213
million of assets, several insurance companies with $230 million of assets,
and commercial firms and newspapers with $50 million of assets.105 CAC
became the “dominant investment banker of the South” and was called the
“Morgan of the South.”106 CAC formed a political alliance with Governor
Henry Horton of Tennessee during the late 1920s, an alliance that
produced significant financial benefits for CAC.107
CAC’s financial structure was heavily leveraged, because it financed
most of its acquisitions with debt. In order to obtain funding for its
operations CAC sold large amounts of low-quality securities to its
principal affiliated bank, the Bank of Tennessee (BOT). BOT paid for
those securities by using funds deposited in BOT by state and municipal
governments and companies controlled by CAC. In addition, CAC took
out large loans from its other affiliated banks. CAC’s affiliated banks
greatly increased their transfers of funds as CAC’s financial position
deteriorated in 1929–1930.108 The economic downturn that followed the
100

See infra Part III.A.2.b.
See generally JOHN BERRY MCFERRIN, CALDWELL AND COMPANY: A SOUTHERN FINANCIAL
EMPIRE 8–47 (Vanderbilt University Press 1969) (1939) (providing background on Caldwell and
Company’s early development and expansion).
102
See id. at 11, 21, 23, 29, 47.
103
Id. at 37, 39–40.
104
See id. at 24–28.
105
Id. at 79–80, 117.
106
Id. at 117, 119.
107
See id. at 103–15, 162, 248–49. In 1928, CAC provided extensive financial support that
enabled Horton to win a narrow victory in the Democratic primary and a comfortable victory in the
general election. Id. at 104–07. In return, Governor Horton provided many favors to CAC. For
example, Horton instructed the Tennessee state highway commissioner to issue large contracts on a nobid basis to an asphalt company controlled by CAC, and he caused the Tennessee state government to
deposit more than $8 million in CAC’s affiliated banks. Id. at 103–04, 113. More than $6 million of
state funds were still on deposit when the banks closed in November 1930. Id. at 162.
108
See id. at 62–63, 67, 119–25, 150–62, 235. For example, before CAC collapsed it sold $12.6
million of securities to BOT. CAC had acquired those securities in connection with underwriting
commitments but could not resell them to the public. CAC agreed to repurchase the securities on
101
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Crash of 1929 proved fatal for CAC. By 1930, CAC held very little cash
or marketable securities, and most of its assets consisted of illiquid
investments in the stock of its affiliates and other securities that CAC had
agreed to underwrite but could not sell to the public.109 As rumors of
CAC’s problems spread, depositors and other creditors made heavy
withdrawals from CAC and its affiliated banks.110
The collapse of CAC in November 1930 precipitated a regional
banking panic that resulted in the failure of all but two of CAC’s affiliated
banks and many of their correspondent banks. Scholars have linked
CAC’s demise to the failure of more than 120 banks in Arkansas,
Kentucky, North Carolina and Tennessee.111 In addition, most of the
insurance companies, commercial firms and newspapers controlled by
CAC were forced into receivership, and most of the corporate and real
estate bonds underwritten by CAC went into default. The contagious
effects of CAC’s collapse inflicted a severe shock on the southern
economy.112
BUS was a New York state-chartered bank that expanded rapidly
during the 1920s by acquiring several other banks. By May 1929, BUS
operated nearly sixty branches in Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx and
Queens and held more than $300 million in assets. BUS was a member of
the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and ranked among the thirty largest
banks in the United States. BUS also controlled three securities affiliates,
an insurance company and more than twenty real estate affiliates.113 BUS
established its securities and real estate affiliates for the specific purpose of
evading restrictions imposed by New York’s banking laws on securities
underwriting and long-term real estate investments.114
BUS made large loans to real estate developers, both directly and
indirectly through its real estate affiliates. BUS also invested in real estate
bonds that were issued to finance apartment buildings and other
commercial real estate projects. By August 1929, BUS held more than $70
BOT’s demand, but CAC defaulted on that obligation. Thus, CAC effectively used BOT as a
“dumping ground for nonsalable Caldwell securities.” Id. at 232, 235.
109
See id. at 119–23, 141–42, 231. In addition, during 1927–1929, CAC made aggressive but illtimed short sales of popular stocks on Wall Street with the expectation that the stock market boom was
about to end. CAC’s short sales produced losses that wiped out one-fifth of its net worth by mid-1929.
CAC stopped its short-selling campaign in June 1929, a few months before it could have produced
significant profits. Id. at 122.
110
Id. at 178–80.
111
CAROSSO, supra note 84, at 308–09; GOLDSMITH, supra note 99, at 225–26; MCFERRIN, supra
note 101, at 176–88, 230–40; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 594; Gary Richardson, Bank Distress During
the Great Contraction, 1929 to 1933, New Data from the Archives of the Board of Governors 7–8, 18–
21, 25–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12590, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12590.
112
See MCFERRIN, supra note 101, at 238–45.
113
M.R. WERNER, LITTLE NAPOLEONS AND DUMMY DIRECTORS: BEING THE NARRATIVE OF THE
BANK OF UNITED STATES 6–7, 13–63, 125–26 (1933); Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 594–95.
114
See WERNER, supra note 113, at 24–28, 125–26.
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million in loans and investments related to real estate, and most of those
assets were classified by New York state bank examiners as “frozen.”115
BUS also made substantial loans to its officers and its securities
affiliates in order to finance trading operations in its stock units, each of
which consisted of one BUS share combined with one share of its principal
securities affiliate. By 1930, BUS had committed $16 million (equal to
one-third of its capital) to support the market price of its stock units. BUS
had a strong incentive to maintain a high market price for its stock units,
because it had agreed to repurchase those units at guaranteed minimum
prices from many of its shareholders, including depositors to whom BUS
had actively marketed its units.116
BUS was doomed when the stock market and real estate values
slumped after the Crash of 1929. By the time BUS failed in December
1930, its securities and real estate affiliates owed more than $20 million to
the bank. BUS also held $11 million of loans secured by its stock units
and $8 million of real estate bonds. “Large amounts of BUS’s real estate
loans were either in default or likely to default.”117 BUS collapsed after the
New York state banking commissioner and the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York failed to persuade members of the New York Clearing House
Association (NYCHA) to provide financial support for an emergency
merger between BUS and two other New York City banks.118 In response
to BUS’s failure, depositor runs occurred at three New York City banks
that were associated with BUS. The smallest of the three banks failed, but
members of the NYCHA intervened to save the larger two banks, thereby
averting a more widespread banking panic.119
Most scholars have concluded that the failures of CAC and BUS
represented serious blows to the U.S. banking system and set the stage for
subsequent and more serious banking crises during 1931–1933. CAC’s
demise triggered a regional banking panic, and BUS’s collapse represented
the largest bank failure up to that time. Because of BUS’s name, its size
and its status as an FRS member bank, BUS’s failure received wide
coverage in domestic and international newspapers. BUS’s collapse also
created growing doubts about the Federal Reserve’s ability to prevent
115
See id. at 21–23, 125–30, 135; Paul B. Trescott, Rejoinder, The Failure of the Bank of United
States, 1930, 24 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 384, 391, 394 (1992).
116
See WERNER, supra note 113, at 55, 59–60, 97–109, 112–17; Trescott, supra note 115, at 390–
91, 393.
117
Trescott, supra note 115, at 393–94; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 595.
118
See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 309–10 n.9 (1963); HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND & THOMAS F.
HUERTAS, CITIBANK 1812–1970, at 166, 395–97 nn.28–35 (1985); BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE CRASH
AND ITS AFTERMATH: A HISTORY OF SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1929–1933, at
123–25 (1985).
119
See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 118, at 310 n.9; GOLDSMITH, supra note 99, at 227;
WIGMORE, supra note 118, at 125, 128, 250.
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major bank failures. In combination, the failures of CAC and BUS
produced a substantial outflow of currency from the banking system as
depositors converted their deposits into cash. That outflow indicated a
significant loss of public confidence in the banking system.120
Financial conglomerates continued to encounter significant problems
during the remainder of the Great Depression. Bank of America, the third
largest U.S. bank, and its parent holding company, Transamerica
Corporation, suffered crippling losses due to speculative investments in
stocks, defaults on loans made to investors in securities, and
nonperforming real estate loans. In order to survive, Bank of America sold
its New York banking and securities affiliates in 1931 and obtained a $65
million loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in
1932.121 Similarly, the RFC extended a $90 million loan in 1932 to finance
an emergency reorganization of Central Republic Bank, the third largest
bank in Chicago. The RFC acted after depositor runs took place at
numerous banks in Chicago and it became clear that a banking panic with
regional and potentially nationwide effects would occur if the RFC failed
to protect Central Republic’s depositors.122
However, the RFC was unable to prevent the collapse of the two
largest bank holding companies in Detroit—Guardian Detroit Union Group
and Detroit Bankers Company—in early 1933. Both holding companies
expanded rapidly during the 1920s, established securities affiliates, and
held extensive investments in securities and real estate. By early 1933,
heavy losses from their securities and real estate operations left both
banking groups insolvent, and the RFC could not marshal sufficient
resources to prevent their failure. The collapse of the leading Detroit
banking organizations precipitated a nationwide banking panic that

120
See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 118, at 308–12; VAN B. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS,
supra note 118, at 166–67, 395 n.28, 397 nn.34–35; Richardson, supra note 111, at 7–8, 21–22, 25–28.
Elmus Wicker agrees that CAC’s collapse had a significant negative impact on the banking system, but
he questions the importance of the BUS failure. See ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE
GREAT DEPRESSION 29–38, 52–59 (1996).
121
GOLDSMITH, supra note 99, at 198–200; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 599; see also VAN B.
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 118, at 169, 399 n.46 (describing Bank of America as the third
largest bank and Transamerica as its holding company).
122
JESSE H. JONES, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: MY THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE RFC 72–79
(1951); WICKER, supra note 120, at 112–14; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 597–98 (noting that Central
Republic had suffered devastating losses from its real estate operations and its financial support for the
Insull utility empire). Subsequently, in 1933 and 1934, the RFC purchased $150 million of preferred
stock from National City Bank, Chase National Bank, and Continental Illinois Bank to help them
recover from severe losses, including heavy losses incurred by their securities operations. See VAN B.
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 118, at 159–61, 191, 211 tbl.10-5, 391 n.4 (discussing National
City Bank); JONES, supra, at 35–36, 47–49 (describing purchases from all three banks); WIGMORE,
supra note 118, at 468–70 (same); Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 602–03 (same).
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culminated in the national bank holiday declared by President Franklin
Roosevelt on March 6, 1933.123
b. The Banking Act of 1933
Congress responded to the banking crises of 1930–1933 by adopting
the Banking Act of 1933 (1933 Act), popularly known as the “GlassSteagall Act.”124 During the hearings and debates that led to the passage of
the 1933 Act, members of Congress frequently referred to the disastrous
consequences of the downfall of CAC, BUS, and the two largest Detroit
banks.125 Congress identified speculative operations involving securities
and real estate—factors that had doomed all four banks—as important
contributing causes to the generalized collapse of the banking system and
the national economy. Congress also criticized banks for using affiliates to
circumvent existing statutory restraints on investment banking activities
and real estate investments.126
Several provisions of the 1933 Act imposed restrictions on bank
ownership of interests in commercial enterprises. Sections 5(c) and 16,
which still remain in effect, prohibit national banks and state banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System from underwriting, dealing or
investing in equity securities or in debt securities (except for investmentgrade, “bank-eligible” debt securities issued by qualifying issuers).127
Section 21, which also remains in effect, prohibits state nonmember banks
and all other persons engaged in the business of accepting deposits from
underwriting, selling or distributing any type of securities (except for bankeligible securities).128 In addition, as discussed below, a 1991 statute
extended section 16’s prohibition on equity investments to reach FDICinsured state nonmember banks. That statute generally prevents insured
state nonmember banks from holding equity investments that are not
permissible for national banks.129
123
GOLDSMITH, supra note 99, at 168–69, 204–05, 235–36; JONES, supra note 122, at 17–20, 54–
69; WICKER, supra note 120, at 117–29; WIGMORE, supra note 118, at 51, 120–21, 324–25, 434–46;
Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 600–02.
124
Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 560, 564–65.
125
Id. at 568.
126
Id. at 564–69, 576–69, 611–12; see also, e.g., S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 3–10 (1933); 77 CONG.
REC. 3725–26 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Glass); id. at 3835–36 (remarks of Rep. Steagall); 75 CONG.
REC. 9887–89 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass); id. at 9904–05 (remarks of Sen. Walcott); id. at 9909–13
(remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
127
1933 Act §§ 5(c), 16, 12 U.S.C. §§ 335, 24 (2000); see MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES
ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 4.03[A] (3d ed. 2007) (discussing section 16 of the 1933 Act); MCCOY, supra
note 51, § 7.02[1] (discussing sections 5(c) and 16 of the 1933 Act). State banks that are members of
the Federal Reserve System are hereinafter referred to as “state member banks” and other state banks
(including ILCs) are called “state nonmember banks.”
128
1933 Act § 21(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2000); see FEIN, supra note 127, § 4.03[B]
(discussing section 21 of the 1933 Act); MCCOY, supra note 51, § 7.02[1] (same).
129
See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(c), (f); FEIN, supra note 127, § 4.03[B] (discussing § 1831a); see infra
notes 239–41 and accompanying text (discussing 1991 statute).
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Sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Act prohibited national banks and state
member banks from affiliating with securities underwriters and dealers.
As explained below, Congress repealed those provisions in 1999.130
However, Congress adopted four additional restrictions on bank affiliates
in 1933, and those restrictions remain in effect. First, Congress imposed
limits on financial transactions between FRS member banks and their
affiliates by adopting a new section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.131
Second, Congress placed limitations on the authority of national banks and
state member banks to provide equity capital or loans to corporations
holding real estate used as bank premises.132 Third, Congress required
state member banks and national banks to separate their stock certificates
from the stock certificates of their nonbank affiliates.133 Fourth, Congress
authorized bank regulators to examine affiliates to evaluate their effect on
the affairs of their affiliated banks.134 Thus, the 1933 Act reflected
Congress’s determination to “separate as far as possible national banks and
[state] member banks from affiliates of all kinds,” and to “install a
satisfactory examination of affiliates, working simultaneously with the
present system of examination applicable to the parent banks.”135
Congress also responded in 1933 to the rapid growth of bank holding
companies and the problems that many of those companies encountered
during the Great Depression. Since 1900, bank owners had organized
holding companies in order to create networks of jointly-owned banks
while avoiding restrictions on branching under federal and state law.136
Bank holding companies expanded rapidly during the economic boom of
the 1920s.137 However, during the Great Depression, 200 banks that were
130

Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, repealed in 1999, prohibited national banks and
state member banks from affiliating with, or having interlocking directors or officers with, any firm that
was “engaged principally” in the issuance, underwriting, public sale or distribution of bank-ineligible
securities. 1933 Act §§ 20, 32, 48 Stat. 188, 194; see also FEIN, supra note 127, § 4.03 [C], [D]
(discussing sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Act); infra notes 244–46 and accompanying text (discussing
1999 statute).
131
1933 Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000). Section 23A limits the total amount of “covered
transactions” between a bank and any one affiliate to 10% of the bank’s capital and surplus. The
statute also limits the total amount “covered transactions” between a bank and all of its affiliates to
20% of the bank’s capital and surplus. “Covered transactions” include extensions of credit by the bank
or purchases of securities or assets by the bank. In addition, section 23A requires all extensions of
credit by a bank to an affiliate to be secured by qualifying collateral. Id. As enacted in 1933, section
23A applied only to FRS member banks, but Congress subsequently extended the statute to reach state
nonmember banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (2000); see also FEIN, supra note 127, § 2.02[B][2] (discussing
section 23A of the 1933 Act).
132
1933 Act § 14, 12 U.S.C. § 371d (2000).
133
1933 Act §§ 5(c), 18, 12 U.S.C. §§ 336, 52 (2000).
134
1933 Act §§ 5(c), 28, 12 U.S.C. §§ 338, 481 (2000). In 1966, Congress gave the FDIC parallel
authority to examine affiliates of FDIC-insured state nonmember banks. Act of Oct. 16, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-695, § 203, 80 Stat. 1028, 1053 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1820 (2000)).
135
S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10 (1933).
136
LAMB, supra note 99, at 8–11, 28–35, 80–82, 86–87.
137
Id. at 82–90.

1566

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1539

subsidiaries of holding companies failed. The most devastating failures
resulted from the collapse of CAC and the two Detroit holding
companies.138 Twenty-four bank holding companies became insolvent and
dissolved during 1931–1936, resulting in a significant reduction in the
number of bank holding companies and the amount of their assets.139
In response to concerns about the lack of federal rules governing bank
holding companies, Congress included two provisions in the Banking Act
of 1933. Those provisions required bank holding companies to register
with the FRB, to submit to examinations by the FRB, to maintain required
reserves, and to obtain voting permits if such companies wished to vote the
stock of state member banks or national banks.140 However, most bank
holding companies avoided these provisions by refraining from voting the
stock of their subsidiary banks.141
3. Restrictions on Bank Affiliations, 1956–1987
a. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
Bank holding companies expanded again after the Second World
War.142 Transamerica was the most aggressive of these companies and
acquired numerous banks and commercial enterprises.
By 1956,
Transamerica controlled banks in ten states as well as several insurance
companies and commercial businesses engaged in oil and gas
development, fish canning and processing, frozen foods, and a variety of
manufacturing ventures.143 Several other bank holding companies also
controlled commercial firms involved in oil and gas development, real
estate development, home construction and manufacturing.144
Congress adopted the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act) in
1956145 in order to control the growth of bank holding companies and to

138

Id. at 92–94.
Id. at 97–99. Between 1931 and 1936, total loans and investments held by bank holding
companies fell from $8.7 billion to $5.5 billion. Id. at 98.
140
1933 Act, §§ 5(c), 19, 48 Stat. 162, 166, 186–87. Congress repealed these provisions in 1966.
Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 13(c), (g), 80 Stat. 236, 242–243; see also S. REP. NO. 891179 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385, 2396 (discussing repeal of voting permit
requirement).
141
H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 5, 7–9 (1955); S. REP. NO. 84-1095 (1955), as reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2483; LAMB, supra note 99, at 173–77. In 1956, there were 163 companies
controlling one or more banks, but only eighteen of those companies had registered with the FRB.
H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 10; 102 CONG. REC. 6755 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Robertson).
142
LAMB, supra note 99, at 99–103, 117–23.
143
H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 4 (1955); 102 CONG. REC. 6755 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Robertson,
stating that Transamerica controlled banking assets of $2.5 billion and nonbanking assets of $1 billion);
id. at 6859 (remarks of Sen. Douglas) (stating that Transamerica purchased ten banks in 1956).
144
H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 10.
145
Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84–511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841–1849).
139
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146

force them to divest their nonfinancial activities.
The original BHC Act
(1956 Act) applied to all companies controlling two or more banks
(multibank holding companies). Section 4(a) of the 1956 Act prohibited
multibank holding companies from acquiring nonbanking firms and
required such holding companies to divest all nonbanking subsidiaries
within two years after becoming subject to the BHC Act.147 The
prohibition and divestment mandates in section 4(a) were subject to several
exceptions contained in section 4(c). The most important of those
exceptions was set forth in section 4(c)(8), which permitted multibank
holding companies to own nonbanking subsidiaries if their activities were
found by the FRB to be “so closely related to the business of banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.”148
Thus, the 1956 Act was intended, among other things, to prevent
companies from controlling both banks and commercial firms.149 The
1956 Act therefore represented a powerful statement of Congress’s
intention to separate banking and commerce.150 However, the 1956
legislation contained a major loophole, because it did not apply to onebank holding companies.151
b. The 1970 Amendments to the BHC Act
Until the mid-1960s, the one-bank loophole was not considered
significant, because most one-bank holding companies were small firms
that controlled small banks and did not have a significant presence in either
banking or nonbanking markets.152 Beginning in the late 1960s, however,
large banks began to organize one-bank holding companies in order to
engage in nonbanking activities that were prohibited to multibank holding
146
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 84-1095 (1955), as reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2482
(“[P]ublic welfare requires the enactment of legislation providing Federal regulation of the growth of
bank holding companies and the type of assets it is appropriate for such companies to control. . . .
[B]ank holding companies ought not to manage or control nonbanking assets having no close
relationship to banking.”).
147
BHC Act § 4(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2000)).
148
BHC Act § 4(c)(8) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000)).
149
See 102 CONG. REC. 6755 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Robertson) (stating that the 1956 Act was
intended to ensure that bank holding companies should only be permitted to engage in “banking
activities” and “functions closely related to banking which are essential for their efficient operation”).
As required by the 1956 Act, Transamerica divested all of its subsidiary banks in 1958 because it
decided to retain its commercial businesses. LAMB, supra note 99, at 124–25.
150
MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.01 (stating that the 1956 Act “cemented the wall between banking
and commerce by limiting nonbank activities by bank holding companies to activities that are ‘closely
related to banking,’ thereby making it impossible for banks to acquire significant equity stakes in
American industry”); ROE, supra note 70, at 98–99, 191–93 (discussing the impact of the 1956 Act in
separating banking and commerce); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1084 (1970), as reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5520 (stating that the 1956 Act was adopted to prevent “a departure from the
established policy of separating banking from other commercial enterprises”).
151
LITAN, supra note 91, at 30; Shull, Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 11.
152
S. REP. NO. 91-1084 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5520–21; Shull,
Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 11.
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companies under section 4 of the 1956 Act. By 1970, the six largest banks
in the nation had formed one-bank holding companies.153 In addition,
“many significant nonbank corporations, including major conglomerates,
began acquiring one bank, thus mixing banking and nonbanking in
complete contravention of the purpose of both Federal banking laws going
back to the 1930’s and the [1956 Act].”154 Two large conglomerates that
acquired banks and attracted Congress’s attention were Sperry &
Hutchinson, which owned three department stores and companies that
manufactured carpets, furniture and textiles, and Montgomery Ward,
which operated one of the largest chains of retail stores in the nation.155
In 1970, Congress amended the BHC Act to extend its provisions to
one-bank holding companies.156 Congress amended section 4(c)(8) of the
Act, but the revised statute maintained the prohibition on ownership of
nonbanking companies that were not “closely related” to banking.157
Congress determined that the 1970 amendments were necessary “to
continue our long-standing policy of separating banking and commerce.”158
The 1970 amendments reflected Congress’s view that a strict separation of
banking and commerce was needed for two principal reasons:

153
S. REP. NO. 91-1084, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5521; see also 116 CONG. REC.
14819 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Brooke, stating that 397 one-bank holding companies were engaged in
ninty-nine nonfinancial activities, including mining, oil and gas development, manufacturing, real
estate, and retail and wholesale sales of goods); LITAN, supra note 91, at 31 (recognizing that in the
mid-1960s many banks and nonbanking firms organized one-bank holding companies and that by 1970
over 700 such companies had been formed); Shull, Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 11–12.
154
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1747 (1970) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5561, 5562
(statement of House managers); see also LITAN, supra note 91, at 31 (noting the expansion of BHCs
into the nonbanking sphere).
155
115 CONG. REC. 32895 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Patman); id. at 32903 (remarks of Rep.
Moorhead); id. at 33127 (remarks of Rep. Reuss); 116 CONG. REC. 32105–06 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
Proxmire).
156
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, §§ 101–103, 84 Stat.
1760, 1760–63 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1843); see LITAN, supra note 91, at 31
(discussing 1970 amendments). With certain limited exceptions, the 1970 amendments required all
one-bank holding companies to bring their nonbanking activities into conformity with section 4 of the
BHC Act and to divest all nonconforming activities by December 31, 1980. See H.R. REP. NO. 911747, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5661, 5562, 5573–79 (statement of House managers); 116
CONG. REC. 42423, 42425–26 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman).
157
As amended in 1970, section 4(c)(8) provided that bank holding companies could own
companies “the activities of which the [FRB] . . . has determined . . . to be so closely related to banking
or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.” Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970 § 103(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). The 1970 amendment eliminated the words
“the business of” that previously appeared before the clause “banking or managing or controlling
banks.” The removal of those words was intended to make clear that nonbanking activities would be
permissible as long as they were “closely related” to banking in general. Under the revised statute,
nonbanking activities did not have to be “closely related” to specific activities that were conducted by
subsidiary banks within the same holding company. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1741 (1970) (Conf. Rep.),
as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5566–67; 116 CONG. REC. 42425–26 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
Sparkman).
158
S. REP. NO. 91-1084 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5522.
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(1) to prevent undesirable concentrations of economic and
financial power,159 and
(2) to prevent banks affiliated with commercial firms from
engaging in activities that would threaten the financial
system or distort the economy, such as (A) making unsound
loans to support their commercial affiliates, (B) refusing to
make loans to competitors of their commercial affiliates, or
(C) requiring borrowers to do business with their commercial
affiliates as a condition of obtaining loans.160
c. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
Although the 1970 amendments to the BHC Act brought one-bank
holding companies within the scope of the Act, the amendments also
created a new loophole by changing the definition of “bank.” Prior to
1970, the definition of “bank” in the BHC Act included all banks that
accepted demand deposits.161 The 1970 amendments narrowed that
definition to include only banks that both accepted deposits and made
commercial loans.162 It was anticipated that this definitional change would
exempt only one institution from the BHC Act—viz., the Boston Safe
Deposit and Trust Co., which accepted demand deposits but did not make
any commercial loans.163 During the 1970s, few other institutions sought
to take advantage of this “nonbank bank loophole.”164
However, commercial conglomerates, securities firms and insurance
companies acquired FDIC-insured banks in the 1980s and caused those
banks to stop engaging in one of the designated functions, thereby avoiding
regulation under the BHC Act. By 1987, two major retailers—Sears and
J.C. Penney—and many other large commercial firms owned FDICinsured “nonbank banks.”165 Congress responded to the nonbank bank
159
See, e.g., id. (quoting 1969 testimony of FRB chairman William Martin, who warned that “[i]f
we allow the line between banking and commerce to be eased, we run the risk of cartelizing the
economy”); H.R. REP. NO. 91-617 (1970) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of House managers), as reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5561, 5562 (quoting President Nixon’s message to Congress on Mar. 24, 1969,
requesting extension of the BHC Act to one-bank holding companies in order to prevent “the formation
of a relatively small number of power centers dominating the American economy”).
160
S. REP. NO. 91-1084, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5521–22 (quoting testimony by
FRB chairman Martin); 115 CONG. REC. 32891 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Bennett); id. at 32894
(remarks of Rep. Patman); id. at 32903 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead); 116 CONG. REC. 14818 (1970)
(remarks of Sen. Brooke).
161
See S. REP. NO. 89-1179 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385, 2391 (discussing
the definition of “bank” in the BHC Act as amended in 1966).
162
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 § 101(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).
163
S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 5 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 489, 495; 116 CONG. REC.
25848 (1970) (article by Frank V. Fowlkes, published in the National Journal on July 18, 1970,
appended to remarks by Rep. Gonzalez); Shull, Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 12–13 n.47.
164
See S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 5, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 495.
165
Id. at 5–6, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 495–96; see also 133 CONG. REC. S3810
(daily ed. Mar. 25, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Graham) (stating that 169 “nonbank banks” were in
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movement by passing the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA),166 which closed the nonbank bank loophole as of March 5,
1987.167 CEBA redefined the term “bank” in the BHC Act to include all
FDIC-insured banks (with certain limited exceptions discussed below), as
well as other institutions that both accept demand deposits and engage in
commercial lending.168 Thus, companies acquiring FDIC-insured banks
after March 5, 1987, were required to comply with the BHC Act, including
the limitations on non-banking activities under section 4.169
Congress grandfathered companies that owned nonbank banks as of
March 5, 1987, but Congress imposed severe restrictions on those
companies and their subsidiary banks. For example, grandfathered holding
companies could not acquire any additional banks, and grandfathered
nonbank banks could not engage in any new activities or enter into any
new cross-marketing arrangements with their affiliates for nonbanking
products or services that were not permissible under the BHC Act. In
addition, grandfathered nonbank banks were subject to a growth limitation
of 7% per year.170 Due in part to the operational constraints imposed by
CEBA, the number of “nonbank banks” declined from 169 in 1987 to 28 in
1992, 20 in 1995 and only 8 in 2005.171
The Senate committee report on CEBA declared that “[n]onbank banks
undermine the principle of separating banking and commerce, a policy that
has long been the keystone of our banking system. . . . The separation of
banking from commerce helps ensure that banks allocate credit impartially,
and without conflicts of interest.”172 The committee report also expressed
concern about the possibility that a large retailing firm might acquire a
nonbank bank and then deny credit to competing dealers.173 The report

existence and applications had been filed to acquire more than 200 additional nonbank banks); LITAN,
supra note 91, at 46–47 (discussing the ability of nonfinancial companies to conduct banking activities
by using “the nonbank bank loophole”); Shull, Separation Issues, supra note 70, at 12–13.
166
Competative Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA), Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
167
S. REP. NO. 100-19 (1987), at 2–3, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 492–93; H.R. REP.
NO. 100-261, at 119–20 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 588, 589.
168
CEBA § 101(a)(1) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)); H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at
119–20 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 589.
169
S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 2–6, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 492–96.
170
Id. at 11–13, 31–35, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 501–03, 521–25; see also H.R. REP.
NO. 100-261, at 123–29, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 593–99.
171
See 133 CONG. REC. S3810 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Graham, providing
figure for 1987); GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 69 (providing figure for 2005); Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, A Unified Federal Charter for Banks and Savings Institutions, FDIC BANKING
REV., 1997 No. 1, at 1, 14–15 (providing figure for 1995); William Jackson, Mixing Banking and
Commerce Using Federal Deposit Insurance: Industrial Banks and Nonbank Banks, CONG. RES. SERV.
REP. 93-769 E, Aug. 26, 1993, at n.15 and accompanying text (providing figure for 1992).
172
S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 8, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 498.
173
The Senate committee report explained that commercial ownership of nonbank banks “raises
the risk that the banks’ credit decisions will be based not on economic merit but on the business
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maintained that the nonbank bank loophole must be closed in order to
“minimize the concentration of financial and economic resources” and to
enhance “the safety and soundness of our financial system.”174 By closing
that loophole, CEBA strongly reaffirmed the general policy in favor of
separating banking and commerce that Congress had implemented in 1956
and 1970.175
CEBA also added a new section 23B to the Federal Reserve Act,
which imposes additional restrictions on transactions between FDICinsured banks and their affiliates.176 Section 23B requires a broad range of
transactions between a bank and its affiliate to be conducted in accordance
with terms and conditions that are (i) at least as favorable to the bank as
those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions involving
nonaffiliated companies or (ii) in the absence of comparable transactions,
those that would be offered in good faith to nonaffiliated companies.177
CEBA excluded limited-purpose trust companies and credit card banks
from the definition of “bank” under the BHC Act, thereby exempting the
parent companies of such institutions from compliance with that Act.178
However, CEBA imposed stringent limitations that effectively preclude
such trust companies and credit card banks from engaging in a retail
banking business or from making commercial loans.179
strategies of their corporate parents.” Id. The report then quoted the following hypothetical posed by
FRB chairman Paul Volcker:
[s]uppose the local appliance dealer comes in to ask for loans from a bank run by a
large retail chain. I suspect the branch manager isn’t going to be very happy to
provide the money. . . . If he does [make the loans], I suspect he is going to find
himself selling shoes . . . before long.
Id. The report also quoted a similar concern expressed by the same committee in 1970 about the risk
that banks controlled by merchandising firms would engage in discriminatory lending to (i) penalize
competing dealers and (ii) pressure borrowers into doing business with the banks’ affiliates. Id. at 9, as
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 499.
174
Id. at 2, 9, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 492, 499.
175
During the floor debates over CEBA, members of Congress emphasized that the nonbank bank
loophole must be closed in order to preserve the general policy of separating banking and commerce
and to ensure parity of regulatory treatment for all companies that controlled FDIC-insured banks. See,
e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S3800–01 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); id. at S3810
(remarks of Sen. Graham); id. at S3816–17 (remarks of Sen. Heinz); id. at S3957 (remarks of Sen.
Cranston); 133 CONG. REC. S4051–52 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); id. at
S4057 (remarks of Sen. Durenberger); id. at S4058 (remarks of Sen. Glenn); id. at S4059–60 (remarks
of Sen. Leahy); 133 Cong. Rec. H6944–02 (Aug. 3, 1987), available at 1987 WL 943889 (Cong. Rec.)
(remarks of Reps. Vento, Parris, Wylie, Vento and Wortley).
176
CEBA § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (2000).
177
For discussions of section 23B, see H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 132–33 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), as
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 588, 601–02; FEIN, supra note 127, § 2.02[B][3].
178
CEBA § 101(a)(1) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D), (F) (2000)).
179
Id. In order to qualify for CEBA’s exemption, a trust company must accept all or substantially
all of its deposits as trust funds, may not allow its insured deposits to be marketed by or through an
affiliate, may not accept demand deposits or transaction deposits similar to NOW accounts, may not
make commercial loans, and may not obtain payment-related services or discount window borrowing
privileges from the FRB. H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 120 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 589. Similarly, in order to rely on CEBA’s exemption a credit card bank may not
accept demand deposits, transaction accounts, or time deposits in amounts smaller than $100,000, may
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In contrast, CEBA exempted ILCs from treatment as “banks” as long
as they are chartered in a qualifying state and either do not accept demand
deposits or maintain total assets of less than $100 million.180 Thus, the
parent companies of ILCs do not have to comply with the BHC Act even if
their ILCs provide retail banking services (except for demand deposits) and
make commercial loans. The legislative history of CEBA does not explain
why Congress gave ILCs much more leeway than trust companies or credit
card banks.181 However, former Senator Jake Garn of Utah, a co-sponsor
of the ILC exemption, explained his personal view of that exemption when
he testified during the FDIC’s public hearings on Wal-Mart’s application.
Senator Garn declared that he would strongly oppose any attempt by WalMart to “expand their application” to offer retail banking services at WalMart stores because
it was never my intent, as the author of this particular section,
that any of these industrial banks be involved in retail
operations . . . . I would be the most vociferous opponent of
that because that was not my intent at the time CEBA was
passed.182
Senator Garn’s testimony indicates a congressional understanding in
1987 that ILCs would not be used as a platform for large commercial firms
to offer full-service banking to consumers at the parent companies’ retail
outlets. In 1987, ILCs were small, state-chartered institutions that had
limited deposit-taking powers and engaged principally in making consumer
loans to middle-income and lower-income individuals. Thirteen ILCs
failed during 1982–1984, and Utah imposed a moratorium on chartering
new ILCs in 1987.183 The total assets of all ILCs in 1987 were only $4.2
not maintain more than one office that accepts deposits, and may not make commercial loans. Id. at
121, as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 590.
180
CEBA § 101(a)(1) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2000); see also supra
notes 40–43 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of ILCs to avoid coverage under the BHC
Act if they meet certain conditions).
181
The current exemption for ILCs was contained in a manager’s amendment, which was cosponsored by Senators William Proxmire and Jake Garn and was approved during the Senate floor
debates on CEBA. 133 CONG. REC. S3810, S3813 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1987) (remarks of Sen.
Proxmire). Senators who discussed the ILC exemption and the conference committee report simply
summarized the statutory terms of the ILC exemption and did not explain its underlying purpose or
intended scope. See id. at S3813 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); 133 CONG. REC. S3957 (daily ed. Mar.
26, 1987) (colloquy between Sen. Inouye and Sen. Proxmire); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 121,
as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 592 (explaining the exemption for ILCs in section 2(c)(2)(H) of
the BHC Act).
182
Testimony of Sen. Edwin J. “Jake” Garn, Wal-Mart Hearings, supra note 12, at 8, 12 (Panel 8,
Apr. 10, 2006) (transcript of oral testimony of Sen. Edwin J. “Jake” Garn).
183
Hearing on Industrial Loan Companies Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer
Credit and the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Scott G. Alvarez, General
Counsel, Federal Reserve Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony
/2006/20060712/default.htm; As Good as Their Word, FORBES, Feb. 25, 1985, at 52, available at
LEXIS, News Library, FORBES File; Bill McConnell, Utah to End Freeze on Charters for Industrial
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billion, and the largest ILC had less than $420 million of assets.
In
1993, a Congressional Research Service report stated that ILCs played
only a “minor” role in the U.S. financial system.185
However, ILCs have expanded rapidly in recent years, due in part to
the liberalization of laws governing ILCs in Utah and California. Those
laws effectively give ILCs parity with state-chartered commercial banks
(except for the ability to offer demand deposits).186 In addition, a 1999
federal statute encouraged commercial firms (including Wal-Mart) to seek
ILC charters, because that law barred commercial firms from making any
further acquisitions of thrift institutions.187 Between the end of 1987 and
2006, total assets held by ILCs grew from $4.2 billion to $155 billion.
Currently, the largest ILC (owned by Merrill Lynch) holds more than $60
billion of assets, and commercial firms own eighteen ILCs.188
Thus, the ILC industry has changed dramatically since Congress
enacted CEBA in 1987. The FDIC recently stated that the business plans
submitted by Wal-Mart, Home Depot and other proposed or existing
commercial owners of ILCs “differ substantially from the consumer
lending focus of the original industrial banks.”189 Like the one-bank
loophole left open in 1956 and the nonbank bank loophole left open in
1970, it appears that Congress did not appreciate the potential impact of
the ILC exemption when it passed CEBA in 1987.
4. Limitations on Bank Affiliations and Powers, 1989–1999
a. The Thrift Crisis and the 1989 Rescue Legislation
Many factors contributed to the collapse of the thrift industry during
the 1980s. Most commentators have agreed that a combination of events
caused the thrift crisis to become much worse in the mid-1980s. During
1979–1982, inflationary pressures and the FRB’s monetary policy created
an interest rate mismatch, which forced savings associations to pay interest
Loan Companies, AM. BANKER, Apr. 3, 1997, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File
(stating that Utah imposed a “freeze” on new ILC charters in 1987 “following a wave of failures”).
184
FDIC Moratorium Notice, supra note 13, at 43,482.
185
Jackson, supra note 171, at n.7 and accompanying text (stating that ILCs had only $7 billion of
assets at the end of 1992, while U.S. commercial banks and trust companies held $3.5 trillion of assets).
186
Utah liberalized its ILC statutes and authorized the chartering of new ILCs in 1997. See
McConnell, supra note 183. California passed a statute in 2000 that gave ILCs virtual parity with
state-chartered commercial banks (except for the ability to accept demand deposits). GAO-ILC
REPORT, supra note 39, at 24. For discussions of the Utah and California laws governing ILCs, see id.
at 21–22, 24–25; FDIC Proposed Rule on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, at 5221 n.32.
187
See infra notes 263–69 and accompanying text (discussing 1999 legislation and its impact in
barring Wal-Mart from acquiring a thrift institution); see also Blair, supra note 52, at 97–98, 112–13
(noting impact of 1999 legislation in establishing the ILC charter as the only means for a commercial
firm to acquire an FDIC-insured depository institution).
188
Statement of Douglas H. Jones, supra note 42 (providing information regarding Merrill
Lynch’s ILC); FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5291.
189
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 5, at 5291.
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on their deposits that exceeded the interest they earned on their residential
mortgage loans.190 During 1981–1982, most thrift institutions recorded
losses.191 By the end of 1982, the thrift industry’s tangible net worth was
“virtually zero,” having declined from 5.3% in 1980 to 0.5% in 1982.192
Congress responded to the plight of the thrift industry by passing
statutes in 1980 and 1982 that deregulated interest rates on deposits,
reduced capital requirements, increased deposit insurance coverage from
$40,000 to $100,000 per account, and expanded the powers of federal
savings associations.193 Some of the new or expanded powers were helpful
(e.g., the ability to offer adjustable-rate mortgages),194 but others were
highly risky. For example, the 1982 statute expanded the commercial real
estate lending authority of federal savings associations from 20% to 40%
of their assets, allowed them to make commercial loans up to 10% of their
assets, and permitted them invest up to 3% of their assets in service
corporations that could engage in any type of activity.195 Unfortunately,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) failed to exercise strict
supervision over these new powers. Instead, the FHLBB followed a
general policy of laxity and forbearance because it hoped that the newlygranted powers would enable thrifts to grow out of their problems.196
The increase of federal deposit insurance coverage to $100,000 per
account and the FHLBB’s removal of limitations on brokered deposits
enabled thrifts to raise huge amounts of funds by offering deposits
nationwide through securities firms and other deposit brokers.197 Brokered
deposits in the thrift industry grew from $3 billion to $30 billion during
1982–1984.198 The thrifts that grew most rapidly during the mid-1980s
190

MARTIN LOWY, HIGH ROLLERS: INSIDE THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 14–17 (1991);
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT
REGULATION 67–71 (1991).
191
LOWY, supra note 190, at 14; WHITE, supra note 190, at 70–71.
192
1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 169
(1997). Lawrence White argues that the thrift industry was in fact deeply insolvent by the end of 1982.
WHITE, supra note 190, at 71, 94–95.
193
KATHLEEN DAY, S&L HELL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POLITICS BEHIND THE $1 TRILLION
SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL 61, 67, 124 (1993); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 192, at 174–
75 (discussing the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982); LOWY, supra note 190, at 19–20, 47; WHITE,
supra note 190, at 74.
194
WHITE, supra note 190, at 72–73.
195
DAY, supra note 193, at 122–24; WHITE, supra note 190, at 73.
196
S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 4, 9 (1989); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 192, at 172–81; DAY,
supra note 193, at 88–102, 125–26; LOWY, supra note 190, at 44–45, 50–52, 55–57, 90–98; WHITE,
supra note 190, at 75–93, 112, 117. For example, in 1983 the FHLBB “issued a rule . . . [stating that
federal savings associations could] invest up to 11% of their federally insured assets in high-yield,
high-risk [debt] securities known as junk bonds.” DAY, supra note 193, at 125.
197
DAY, supra note 193, at 152; MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 65–66 (1990) (discussing the changes that occurred
to brokered funds and deposits).
198
Day, supra note 193, at 153–54.
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were also the institutions that tended to rely most heavily on brokered
funds.199
In response to federal deregulation of the thrift industry, many states
liberalized their own laws in order to keep state thrift charters attractive.200
State laws in California, Florida and Texas removed virtually all limits on
the authority of state-chartered thrifts to make commercial real estate loans
and allowed them to invest (either directly or through service corporations)
in real estate, junk bonds, derivatives, corporate stocks and a myriad of
non-financial businesses such as casinos, hotels, ski resorts, thoroughbred
horses, and windmill farms.201 The expansion of federal and state powers
and the availability of brokered deposits spurred a dramatic growth in the
thrift industry. During 1982–1985, hundreds of new thrifts were chartered
and total thrift assets increased by nearly 60%, more than twice the rate of
asset growth for commercial banks.202 Much of this growth took place in
nontraditional assets, which thrifts acquired by exercising their newlygranted powers.203 “By 1986, [residential mortgages accounted for] only
56 percent of total [thrift industry] assets . . . compared with 78 percent in
1981.”204
Thrift institutions that aggressively expanded into nontraditional lines
of business had a significantly higher failure rate compared to thrifts that
maintained their primary focus on home mortgage lending. A 1989
General Accounting Office (GAO) study determined that twenty-six of the
most costly thrift failures prior to October 1987 involved institutions that
engaged in nontraditional activities, including loans for the acquisition,
development and construction of real estate (ADC loans), investments in
equity securities and junk bonds, and investments in service corporations
that conducted non-financial activities.205 Three other studies similarly
found that the asset portfolios of failed thrifts contained higher-thanaverage percentages of commercial real estate loans, ADC loans and direct
equity investments.206 Many thrifts also failed after entering into illegal or

199

WHITE, supra note 190, at 103–04.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, pt. 1, at 297 (1989), as reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 93 (“By
1984, more than one third of all states had granted their state-chartered thrifts investment powers
beyond those permissible for federally-chartered institutions.”).
201
S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 8–9, 21 (1989); DAY, supra note 193, at 124–25; FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., supra note 192, at 176–77, 179–80, 400–01; LOWY, supra note 190, at 52–53; WHITE, supra
note 190, at 73.
202
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 192, at 178 & tbl.4.3, 179; WHITE, supra note 190, at
100–04.
203
WHITE, supra note 190, at 103–04.
204
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 192, at 179.
205
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES: COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED FROM
REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 26–30 (1989).
206
WHITE, supra note 190, at 113–15, 116 tbl.6-12, 259–60.
200
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unsound loans or other transactions with directors, officers, principal
shareholders and their affiliates.207
Some of the largest and most costly thrift failures occurred at
institutions that invested heavily in junk bonds underwritten by Michael
Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert. During the 1980s, Milken and
Drexel sold $28 billion of junk bonds to forty-four thrifts that subsequently
failed.208 Milken and Drexel provided capital to many of those thrifts by
underwriting offerings of junk bonds and other securities.209 In return,
Milken expected the same thrifts to buy junk bonds that Drexel underwrote
for the purpose of financing hostile takeovers of large conglomerates and
other publicly-traded companies.210 After Drexel declared bankruptcy in
1990, federal regulators alleged that junk bonds sold by Milken and Drexel
had inflicted $11 billion of losses on failed thrifts.211 Losses on junk bonds
were the primary cause of Columbia Savings’s demise and also contributed
to the failures of Centrust Bank, Imperial Federal Savings and Lincoln
Savings.212
Nontraditional activities, junk bonds and abusive transactions with
affiliates played major roles in the collapse of Lincoln Savings, the fourth
most costly thrift failure.213 Charles Keating and his holding company,
American Continental Co. (ACC), bought Lincoln Savings in 1984 with
funds provided by Milken and Drexel.214 Keating quickly transformed
207

S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 9–10 (1989); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 206, at 19–
20 (“Examiners found that 21 of 26 failed thrifts violated the regulation governing transactions with
[insiders and other] affiliates . . . [and] 20 of 26 failed thrifts violated [rules] governing conflicts of
interest . . . .”); WHITE, supra note 190, at 115–16; see also Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F.
Supp. 901, 909 & n.10, 910–11, 919 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding that a “tax sharing agreement” between
Lincoln Savings and American Continental Company (ACC) violated a federal regulation restricting
affiliate transactions and was used by ACC to extract more than $90 million in illegitimate payments
from Lincoln Savings); MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.02 (stating that “[l]oans to affiliates played a major
role in the 1980s thrift crisis”).
208
DAY, supra note 193, at 391.
209
Id. at 208, 330–31, 391; MAYER, supra note 197, at 172–73, 175; ROY C. SMITH, THE MONEY
WARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT BUYOUT BOOM OF THE 1960S, at 226–27 (1990).
210
EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 256–62, 271–80 (1999); LOWY, supra note 190, at 152–53, 156–58; MAYER, supra note
197, at 76-77, 172–75, 182–85, 280–81. According to Martin Mayer, thrift institutions provided “at
least 15 percent of the [junk bond] buying power Drexel had controlled” during the 1980s. MAYER,
supra note 197, at 281.
211
1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE, 1980–
1994, at 282 (1998). Milken and Drexel ultimately settled the claims asserted against them related to
thrift failures by agreeing to pay federal regulators and a class of private litigants more than $2.2
billion. Id. at 283. Milken and Drexel had previously paid $1.25 billion to settle criminal and civil
charges filed against them based on alleged securities law violations. DAY, supra note 193, at 391.
212
DAY, supra note 193, at 330–31; LOWY, supra note 190, at 155–59; MAYER, supra note 197,
at 183–85, 280–81; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 356
n.591.
213
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 192, at 282, 863 tbl.C.16.
214
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 906–07 (D.D.C. 1990).
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Lincoln from a traditional $1.1 billion thrift that had focused on home
mortgages into a $6 billion institution that invested heavily in
nontraditional assets, including ADC loans, unimproved real estate, hotels,
casinos, stocks of companies that were targets of Drexel-financed
takeovers, and junk bonds.215 Lincoln financed much of its spectacular
growth by selling brokered deposits.216
After acquiring control of Lincoln, Keating and ACC engaged in a
series of manipulative transactions that resulted in (i) the creation of phony
“profits” for Lincoln based on sham sales of assets to “straw” buyers, and
(ii) the transfer of 40% of those “profits” from Lincoln to ACC pursuant to
an abusive “tax sharing agreement.”217 Keating created Lincoln’s fictitious
“profits” by causing Lincoln to sell unimproved real estate and securities to
“straw” buyers at artificially inflated prices.218 In most cases, Lincoln
funded the purchase price, either by making a reciprocal purchase of assets
from the buyer (or its affiliate) or by making a loan, typically on a nonrecourse basis, to the buyer (or its affiliate).219 Lincoln’s sham sales
produced “profits” equal to the difference between the inflated sales price
for each asset and its cost basis on Lincoln’s books.220
Keating also caused Lincoln to enter into a tax sharing agreement with
ACC. That agreement required Lincoln to transfer 40% of its accounting
profits to ACC, even if Lincoln would not have owed any taxes on a standalone basis.221 Lincoln transferred $94 million to ACC under the tax
sharing agreement, even though Lincoln would have owed little or no taxes
based on the results of its stand-alone operations during 1984–1987.222
Thus, the agreement enabled ACC to extract large amounts of funds from
Lincoln without any legal justification.223
By 1986, ACC and Lincoln were in deep financial trouble and
desperately needed a new source of funds. To meet this need, ACC sold
unsecured subordinated notes (in denominations of $1000) to Lincoln’s
215
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 906–08; DAY, supra note 193, at 207–10; MAYER, supra note 197, at
165-66, 169–86; see also LOWY, supra note 190, at 219 (citing a 1987 examination report stating that
“sixty-two percent of Lincoln’s assets . . . [consisted] in vacant land, hotels, ADC loans, junk bonds
and equity securities.”).
216
The percentage of Lincoln’s liabilities represented by brokered deposits rose from 2.6% in
1983 to 35% in 1988. DAY, supra note 193, at 210. “Because it was growing so fast . . . Lincoln paid
more for its [brokered deposits] than almost any other S&L in the country.” MAYER, supra note 197, at
182.
217
See infra notes 218–23 and accompanying text.
218
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 911–12; LOWY, supra note 190, at 150; MAYER, supra note 197, at
179–80.
219
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 912–15; MAYER, supra note 197, at 179–80.
220
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 911–13; MAYER, supra note 197, at 179–80.
221
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 908–09; LOWY, supra note 190, at 149–50; MAYER, supra note 197,
at 204–05.
222
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 909–10; MAYER, supra note 197, at 205.
223
Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 909–11; MAYER, supra note 197, at 204–05.
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customers at Lincoln’s branches. ACC’s and Lincoln’s employees urged
customers to buy ACC’s uninsured notes instead of insured certificates of
deposit, and successful employees received bonuses. Some 23,000
individuals purchased more than $230 million of ACC’s notes, which
became worthless when ACC declared bankruptcy in April 1989.224 The
FHLBB finally seized control of Lincoln on April 14, 1989, at least two
years too late in the view of some analysts.225 Lincoln’s failure ultimately
cost the federal government $2.7 billion.226
Congress responded to the thrift debacle by enacting the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).227
FIRREA authorized a taxpayer-funded bailout of the thrift industry228 and
also mandated sweeping changes in the supervision and regulation of
thrifts.229 In addition, several provisions of FIRREA strictly limited the
authority of thrift institutions to engage in commercial lines of businesses
or to be associated with commercial firms. First, because commercial real
estate loans were a major cause of thrift losses, Congress restricted the
authority of federal savings associations to make such loans.230 Second,
because nontraditional activities inflicted heavy losses on state-chartered
savings associations, FIRREA generally barred state-chartered thrifts from
engaging in activities or from making investments that exceed the authority
of federal savings associations.231 Third, because of losses resulting from
224

DAY, supra note 193, at 341–42, 346–48; MAYER, supra note 197, at 167–68, 203–06, 287.
DAY, supra note 193, at 338–49; LOWY, supra note 190, at 147–52, 218–21; MAYER, supra
note 197, at 206–24. In Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990), the
court dismissed Lincoln’s and ACC’s challenge to the federal takeover of Lincoln. The court found
that the FHLBB “acted properly in placing Lincoln first in conservatorship and then in receivership.”
Id. at 906. The court noted, however, that the FHLBB probably should have taken vigorous
enforcement measures against Lincoln much earlier. Id. at 920 n.31.
226
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 211, at 863 tbl.C.16.
227
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
228
During 1980–1994, 1295 thrifts with total assets of $621 billion either failed or received
federal financial assistance. FIRREA originally budgeted $50 billion to complete the rescue of the
thrift industry, on top of the $38 billion that had been committed prior to 1989. However, the total cost
of resolving failed thrifts ultimately grew to $161 billion, of which about $132 billion was paid by
taxpayers. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 192, at 187; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, supra note 211,
at 4, 28–29, 851 tbl.C.8; WHITE, supra note 190, at 176, 183–84, 196–97.
229
Among other things, FIRREA abolished the FHLBB (which had been an independent agency)
and transferred its supervisory functions to the OTS, a bureau of the Treasury Department. In addition,
FIRREA abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporations (FSLIC) and transferred to
the FDIC the responsibility for insuring the deposits of thrifts. For descriptions of FIRREA’s
supervisory and regulatory provisions, see H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 393–408 (1989) (Conf. Rep.);
MAYER, supra note 197, at 261, 280–83; WHITE, supra note 190, at 178–80.
230
FIRREA § 301, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B) (2000) (limiting commercial real estate loans to
400% of a thrift’s capital); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 408 (1989) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO.
101-19, at 8, 18–19 (1987).
231
Under FIRREA, state-chartered thrifts are generally barred from engaging as principal in
activities or from making investments that are not allowed to federal savings associations. However,
the FDIC may permit a state-chartered thrift to engage in an activity or to invest in a service
corporation that exceeds the authority of a federal thrift, if (i) the thrift satisfies applicable capital
225
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junk bond investments, Congress prohibited both federal and statechartered thrifts from making further investments in junk bonds and forced
them to divest their existing junk bond investments by July 1, 1994.232
Fourth, because of the injuries caused by affiliates, FIRREA imposed
tighter restrictions on transactions between thrifts and their affiliates.
Congress required all thrift institutions to comply with sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act. In addition, Congress barred thrifts from
extending credit to affiliates engaged in activities that would not be
allowed to bank holding companies.233 Thus, unlike today’s commerciallyowned ILCs, a thrift may not make any loans to an affiliate engaged in
commercial activities. Fifth, FIRREA imposed more stringent limitations
on savings and loan holding companies that owned only one thrift
institution (unitary SLHCs). Among other things, Congress required any
thrift owned by a unitary SLHC to comply with an enhanced “qualified
thrift lender” (QTL) test if the SLHC engaged in activities beyond those
permitted to bank holding companies.234
b. The Treasury Department’s 1991 Financial Modernization
Plan and Congressional Responses during 1991–1999
In February 1991, the Treasury Department issued a comprehensive
plan to modernize the financial services industry.235 The Treasury issued
its plan at a time when the banking industry faced its most severe crisis
since the Great Depression.236 The Treasury report contained sweeping
recommendations for reforms in the deposit insurance system and in the
requirements and (ii) the FDIC has determined that the activity or service corporation does not pose a
significant risk to the deposit insurance fund. FIRREA § 222, 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(a)–(c) (2000); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 400–01 (1989) (Conf. Rep.).
232
FIRREA § 222, 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d) (2000); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 402 (1989)
(Conf. Rep.); MAYER, supra note 197, at 280–81.
233
FIRREA § 301, 12 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 408 (1989) (Conf.
Rep.); see also supra notes 131, 176–77 and accompanying text (discussing sections 23A and 23B).
234
FIRREA § 301, 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m). Since 1967, federal law has permitted unitary SLHCs
to engage in nonfinancial activities that are not permissible for bank holding companies. Congress did
not close this “loophole” during the 1970s or 1980s, evidently because Congress wanted to encourage
commercial firms to acquire thrifts and thereby inject additional equity capital into a troubled industry.
James B. Thomson, Unitary Thrifts: A Performance Analysis, 37 FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVE. ECON.
REV., Second Quarter 2001, at 2, 2–3. Beginning in 1987, however, Congress required any thrift
owned by a unitary SLHC to meet the QTL test if its parent holding company engages in nonfinancial
activities. In general, the QTL requires a thrift to maintain a substantial majority of its assets in
residential mortgage loans and other housing-related assets. See S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 38–40 (1987);
MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.04. For a discussion of the enhanced QTL imposed by FIRREA, see H.R.
REP. NO. 101-54, pt. I, at 351–52 (1989).
235
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991).
236
For a comprehensive overview of the banking crisis of 1980–1994, see FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., supra note 192. For additional discussions of significant aspects of that crisis, see Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 957, 964–66, 984–86, 989–94, 1000–01 (1992); Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 304–05, 313–16.
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237

supervision of banks.
Congress passed legislation in December 1991
that adopted many of the Treasury’s recommendations with regard to
deposit insurance and bank supervision.238 Among other things, the
Treasury report recommended that FDIC-insured state banks should
generally be prohibited from engaging as principals in activities or from
making investments that are not permissible for national banks.239 In
accordance with that recommendation, the 1991 statute extended to state
banks the same type of activity and investment limitations that Congress
had imposed on state-chartered thrifts in 1989.240 As a result of the 1989
and 1991 legislation, all FDIC-insured banks and thrifts are effectively
barred from engaging or investing in nonfinancial businesses.241
In addition to its reform proposals for deposit insurance and bank
supervision, the Treasury report contained three major recommendations
for modernizing the financial services industry. First, the report called for
legislation authorizing interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding
companies and interstate branching by banks. Second, the report urged
Congress to authorize financial holding companies that could own banks,
securities firms and insurance companies. Third, the report argued that
commercial firms should be allowed to own financial holding
companies.242
Congress implemented the Treasury report’s first recommendation in
1994, when it passed legislation authorizing bank holding companies to
make interstate acquisitions of banks and also authorized banks to establish
interstate branches.243 Congress adopted the second recommendation in
237

U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 235, at 16–48.
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
239
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 235, at 47. The Treasury report pointed out that
“[n]ational banks are not permitted to make direct equity investments with insured deposits in
commercial real estate and other commercial enterprises.” Id. at 48. The report acknowledged that
broader activities and investments by state banks “have not yet caused the same kind of losses as statechartered thrifts. Indeed, many state-chartered banks have exercised their broader authorities both
prudently and profitably.” Id. at 47–48. Nevertheless, the Treasury report concluded that “direct
equity investment remains a greater risk to the federal deposit insurance fund than traditional bank
loans,” and “there may be instances where unusual or additional risk is present that creates federal
exposure” when state banks exercise broader powers. Id. at 48.
240
Under the 1991 law, a state bank may not engage as principal (either directly or through a
subsidiary) in any activity that is not permissible for national banks unless the state bank satisfies
applicable capital requirements and the FDIC has determined that the activity does not present a
significant risk to the deposit insurance fund. In addition, with certain exceptions, a state bank may not
make any investment that is not allowed for national banks. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, § 303, 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (2000); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-330, at 135–
36 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1948–49.
241
See MCCOY, supra note 51, § 3.02[1]; Shull, Banking and Commerce, supra note 70, at 265–
66.
242
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 235, at 49–61; see also id. at chs. XVII–XVIII
(providing supporting analysis for the Treasury’s recommendations on financial modernization).
243
See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). For discussions of this statute and its encouragement of greater
238
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1999, when it passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). GLBA
repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act244 and authorized
banks, securities firms and insurance companies to affiliate within financial
holding companies. 245 Under GLBA, financial holding companies may
conduct activities that are permitted to bank holding companies and, in
addition, may also engage in any activity that is either (i) “financial in
nature or incidental to such financial activity,” or (ii) “complementary to a
financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.”246
Merchant banking is one of the “financial in nature” activities that are
authorized for financial holding companies. GLBA defines merchant
banking as the ownership of an interest in a company or other entity that is
engaged in one or more activities not otherwise authorized under section 4
of the BHC Act, provided (i) the interest is held “for a period of time to
enable the sale or disposition thereof on a reasonable basis,” and (ii) the
financial holding company “does not routinely manage or operate such
company or entity except as may be necessary or required to obtain a
reasonable return on investment upon resale or disposition.”247 A broad
interpretation of the merchant banking authority granted by GLBA could
potentially weaken the separation between banking and commerce,
because such an interpretation would allow financial holding companies to
maintain long-term control over entities that conduct commercial (i.e.,
nonfinancial) businesses.248

consolidation within the U.S. banking industry, see, for example, MCCOY, supra note 51, § 9.04;
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True: The Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 3–5, 9–13 (1995); Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 250–54.
244
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) § 101, 113 Stat. 1341; see supra note 130 and
accompanying text (discussing sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act).
245
Id. § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)–(o) (2000). For discussions of GLBA’s authorization of
financial holding companies and its impact in permitting affiliations among banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies, see, for example, MCCOY, supra note 51, §§ 4.03[1], [3], 5.03[2]; Wilmarth,
supra note 212, at 219–23, 306–07.
246
GLBA § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000); MCCOY, supra note 51, § 5.03[2] (discussing
“financial in nature” and “complementary” activities authorized for financial holding companies under
GLBA).
247
GLBA §103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2000). GLBA also permits national banks and state
banks to establish financial subsidiaries. Financial subsidiaries of banks have fewer powers than
nonbank subsidiaries of financial holding companies. Financial subsidiaries of banks may engage only
in activities that are “financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity” and may not engage in
“complementary” activities.
Moreover, financial subsidiaries are expressly barred from (i)
underwriting insurance or annuities, (ii) making insurance company portfolio investments, or (iii)
engaging in real estate development. Additionally, financial subsidiaries may not engage in merchant
banking activities unless the FRB and the Treasury jointly adopt rules permitting that activity. The
FRB and the Treasury have not yet adopted such rules. Thus, to date financial subsidiaries have not
been allowed to engage in any type of nonfinancial activity. Id. §§ 121–22 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
24a, 1831w, 1843 note (2000)); see also MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.06[1][a].
248
See MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.03[1].
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However, the FRB and Treasury have jointly issued regulations that
impose strict limitations on merchant banking investments.249 Those
limitations are expressly designed “to help maintain the separation of
banking and commerce” and “to ensure . . . that financial holding
companies do not use the merchant banking authority as a means of
becoming impermissibly involved in nonfinancial activities.”250 Among
other things, the regulations (i) prohibit financial holding companies from
routinely managing or operating nonfinancial entities in which they have
merchant banking investments,251 (ii) generally establish ten years (or
fifteen years, in the case of a private equity fund) as the maximum holding
period for a merchant banking investment,252 and (iii) place aggregate
limits on merchant banking investments as a percentage of a financial
holding company’s capital.253
Thus, the FRB and Treasury have so far followed a policy of
construing the merchant banking provisions of GLBA in a restrictive
manner that is designed to “further the fundamental purposes of the BHC
Act—to help maintain the separation of banking and commerce and
promote safety and soundness.”254 In addition, because of the special risks
posed by equity investments in nonfinancial companies, the FRB has
adopted rules that impose significant additional capital charges on financial
holding companies that hold merchant banking investments.255 As a result
249

12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.177 (2006) (FRB rules); id. §§ 1500.1–1500.8 (Treasury rules).
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466, 8468–69 (Jan. 31,
2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 225 and 1500).
251
12 C.F.R. §§ 225.171, 1500.2 (2006); see FEIN, supra note 127, § 8.03[A].
252
12 C.F.R. §§ 225.172, 225.173, 1500.3, 1500.4 (2006); see Fein, supra note 127, § 8.03[B].
253
12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (2006) (generally limiting merchant banking investments to 30% of a
financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% after excluding private equity funds); id. § 1500.5;
see also FEIN, supra note 127, § 8.03[C].
254
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, supra note 250, at 8466. The joint
Treasury/FRB regulations are consistent with statements in GLBA’s legislative history affirming that
(i) the statutory constraints on merchant banking are “designed to maintain the separation between
banking and commerce,” H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 1, at 122 (1999), and (ii) the Treasury and FRB
therefore have authority to impose restrictions on merchant banking investments to preserve that
separation. See 145 CONG. REC. H11529 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks by Rep. Leach, declaring
that the FRB and Treasury have authority to “impose such limitations as they deem appropriate to
ensure that this new [merchant banking] authority does not foster conflicts of interest or undermine the
safety and soundness of depository institutions or the [BHC] Act’s general prohibitions on the mixing
of banking and commerce”); 145 CONG. REC. S13788 (daily ed., Nov. 3, 1999) (virtually identical
statement by Sen. Sarbanes).
255
See FEIN, supra note 127, §§ 7.07[G], 8.05[D]. The FRB’s capital charges also apply to the
limited equity investments in nonfinancial entities that are permitted by sections 4(c)(6) and (7) of the
BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) & (7) (2000). See FEIN, supra note 127, § 7.07[G]. Sections 4(c)(6)
and (7) allow a bank holding company to own up to 5% of the voting shares of a nonfinancial company
or an investment company that invests in the shares of nonfinancial companies. As in the case of
merchant banking, the FRB has narrowly construed these exemptions from section 4’s general
prohibition on nonfinancial activities. For example, the FRB requires that any exempt investments
under sections 4(c)(6) and (7) must be completely passive and must not allow the bank holding
company to exercise a controlling influence over a nonfinancial company. The FRB’s “passivity
interpretations” are designed “to keep private economic power unconcentrated, and to put a fault line
250

2007]

THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE

1583

of the limitations imposed by the FRB and Treasury, merchant banking
investments account for only a tiny fraction of the assets held by financial
holding companies.256
Similarly, the FRB has included stringent requirements in its orders
allowing financial holding companies to engage in activities that the FRB
has determined to be “complementary” to financial activities. The FRB
has permitted financial holding companies to engage in complementary
activity only “on a limited basis” and only if each such activity “is
meaningfully connected to a financial activity such that it complements the
financial activity.”257 Thus, as in the case of merchant banking, the FRB
has taken a “gingerly” approach with regard to complementary activities.258
The FRB’s cautious approach is consistent with the agency’s view that
GLBA permits a “limited” amount of complementary activities but at the
same time, “reject[s] . . . unrestricted affiliations between depository
institutions and nonfinancial companies.”259
For at least three reasons, GLBA’s authorization of merchant banking
and complementary activities should not be viewed as an abandonment of
the congressional policy of separating banking and commerce. First, the
FRB has imposed significant limitations on both merchant banking and
complementary activities. GLBA gives the FRB a veto power over the
scope of merchant banking (as well as other “financial in nature” or
“incidental” activities), and GLBA also grants the FRB sole authority to
determine the scope of complementary activities.260 In assigning these
gatekeeping roles to the FRB, Congress presumably anticipated that the
FRB would perform those roles in a conservative fashion based on the
between banking and industry.” ROE, supra note 70, at 98, 190–93; see also PAULINE B. HELLER &
MELANIE L. FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW §§ 4.03[9], 4.03[10], 6.02, 6.04[1],
6.05[1] (2006); MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.03[2].
256
Timothy J. Yeager et al., The Financial Modernization Act: Evolution or Revolution? 12–13
(Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Supervisory Pol’y Analysis, Working Paper No. 2004–05, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=646261 (reporting that merchant banking investments never
exceeded 0.3% of total financial holding company assets during 2000–03).
257
FRB Order in J.P. Morgan & Co., Nov. 18, 2005, as reprinted in 92 FED. RES. BULL. C57,
C57 (2006). This FRB order allowed J.P. Morgan to buy and sell physical commodities in the spot
market, and to take and make deliveries of physical commodities in order to physically settle
commodity derivatives (a previously-approved financial activity). The FRB limited the approved
complementary activities to 5% of J.P. Morgan’s consolidated Tier 1 capital. Id. at C57– C59.
258
MCCOY, supra note 51, § 5.03[2].
259
FRB Order in Citigroup, Inc., Oct. 2, 2003, as reprinted in 89 FED. RES. BULL. 508, 509
(2003). During the debates on GLBA, members of Congress stated that they expected the FRB to
impose limitations on complementary activities “that are designed to maintain the separation of
banking and commerce” and to ensure that “such activities will not be significant in size.” 145 CONG.
REC. S13788 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Sarbanes); see also 145 CONG. REC. H11527
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Leach) (stating that “the American model of separating
commerce from banking should be maintained”); id. at H11529 (remarks of Rep. Leach) (stating that
“[i]t is expected that complementary activities would not be significant relative to the overall financial
activities of the organization”); id. at H11521 (remarks of Rep. Bentsen).
260
See MCCOY, supra note 51, § 5.03[2].
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agency’s longstanding policy in favor of maintaining a separation between
banking and commerce.261 Second, in adopting GLBA, Congress rejected
proposals that would have allowed financial holding companies to own a
much larger “basket” of investments in nonfinancial companies.262
Third, and most importantly, GLBA did not adopt the 1991 Treasury
report’s recommendation to allow commercial firms to own financial
holding companies. GLBA also closed the unitary SLHC “loophole,”
which previously allowed commercial firms to acquire FDIC-insured
thrifts and to avoid any restrictions on their holding company activities (as
long as each commercial firm controlled only one thrift).263 Applications
by commercial firms to establish unitary SLHCs increased significantly
after 1996, when Congress passed legislation that recapitalized the deposit
insurance fund for thrifts and liberalized QTL criteria for thrifts owned by
unitary SLHCs.264 During 1997–1999, the OTS approved more than eighty
261
See S. REP. NO. 84-1095 (1956), as reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2483 (quoting
testimony by FRB chairman William McChesney Martin, Jr., warning of dangers that would result if
Congress “permitt[ed] departure from the principle that banking institutions should not engage in
business wholly unrelated to banking”); S. REP. NO. 91-1084 (1970), as reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5521–22 (quoting similar testimony by FRB chairman Martin); S. REP. NO. 10019, at 8 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 489, 498 (quoting similar testimony by FRB
chairman Paul Volcker); S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 72 (1999) (additional views of Sen. Sarbanes et al.)
(quoting similar testimony by FRB chairman Alan Greenspan).
262
During the House debates on GLBA, Representative Bereuter praised GLBA because it did not
give financial holding companies a “commercial market basket” for nonfinancial investments. He
explained that he and other members of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee had
successfully blocked a proposed amendment that would have permitted a “five percent market basket”
for nonfinancial investments. See 145 CONG. REC. H11547 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep.
Bereuter).
In 1997, the same House committee reported a bill that would have allowed all financial holding
companies (which the bill called “qualifying bank holding companies”) to own banks, securities firms
and insurance companies and to generate up to 15% of their domestic gross revenues from nonfinancial
activities. H.R. REP. NO. 105-164, pt. 1, at 106 (1997). In contrast, GLBA included a much more
limited provision, which applies only to new financial holding companies (i.e., those that were not
previously bank holding companies or foreign banks). That provision gives new financial holding
companies a limited window period during which they can earn up to 15% of their consolidated gross
revenues from nonfinancial activities, but those activities must be discontinued or divested by 2009
(subject to a possible five-year extension with the FRB’s approval). See MCCOY, supra note 51, §
4.03[1] (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)).
263
See supra note 234 (discussing regulation of unitary SLHCs).
264
In 1989, Congress abolished the FSLIC and established within the FDIC two separate deposit
insurance funds—the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) for banks and the Savings Association Insurance
Fund (SAIF) for thrifts. Many banks subsequently acquired SAIF-insured deposits by purchasing thrift
institutions. In 1996, Congress required all thrifts and all banks holding SAIF-insured deposits to pay a
one-time special assessment to recapitalize the SAIF. MCCOY, supra note 51, § 11.06[3][a]. The
recapitalization of SAIF greatly reduced the cost of future deposit insurance premiums for thrift
institutions and maintained the credibility of deposit insurance for thrifts. In addition, Congress
liberalized the QTL by expanding the amounts of commercial and consumer loans that would qualify
for QTL treatment. Both measures made the thrift charter much more attractive, especially for
nonbanking companies that were barred from acquiring banks under the BHC Act. See Edward J.
Kane, Implications of Superhero Metaphors for the Issue of Banking Powers, 23 J. BANKING & FIN.
663, 666–67 (1999); Ira L. Tannenbaum, Federal Thrift Charter Popularity Continues, 18 BANKING
POL’Y REP. No. 3, Feb. 1, 1999, at 1, 17. In 2006, Congress adopted legislation merging the BIF and
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applications for unitary SLHCs. Most of the applicants were securities
firms or insurance companies, but a significant number were retailers and
other commercial firms.265 At the end of October 1999, more than fifty
additional applications for unitary SLHCs were pending before the OTS.
The pending applications included Wal-Mart’s proposal (filed on June 29,
1999) to acquire a federal savings association in Oklahoma.266
Wal-Mart’s proposal, which would have given Wal-Mart “the
flexibility to be able to offer a full array of financial services,”267 mobilized
political support for congressional efforts to prohibit further acquisitions of
thrifts by commercial firms.268 Consequently, GLBA included a provision
that bars any company from acquiring a savings association unless the
acquiring company and all of its subsidiaries are engaged in activities
permissible either for financial holding companies or for multiple SLHCs.
Like financial holding companies, multiple SLHCs must generally limit
their operations to financial activities. GLBA exempted unitary SLHCs
from the prohibition on commercial ownership if (i) they were already in
existence on May 4, 1999, or (ii) applications to establish them were filed
by that date with the OTS. However, GLBA prohibited commercial firms
from purchasing any of the grandfathered unitary SLHCs, thereby barring
Wal-Mart from acquiring control of any thrift.269 At the end of 2004, only
seventeen commercially-owned unitary SLHCs remained in existence.270
During the Senate and House debates on GLBA, members of Congress
and the Clinton Administration declared that closing the unitary SLHC
“loophole” was essential to maintain the separation between banking and
commerce.271 In view of GLBA’s limitations on the activities of financial
holding companies and GLBA’s closing of the unitary SLHC loophole, the

the SAIF into a unified Deposit Insurance Fund administered by the FDIC. MCCOY, supra note 51, §
11.06[3][b].
265
See Tannenbaum, supra note 264, at 1, 15–16; Alan Kline, Community Bankers Hail the
Defeat of Unitary Thrifts—and Wal-Mart, AM. BANKER, Oct. 26, 1999, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library AMBNKR File.
266
Kline, supra note 265.
267
Wal-Mart Applies for Thrift Charter with OTS, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 5, 1999, at 16
(quoting Wal-Mart spokesman Jay Allen).
268
Kline, supra note 265. During the House debates on the conference report for GLBA,
Representative Baker made clear that Wal-Mart was a specific target of Congress’s decision to close
the unitary SLHC “loophole.” See 145 CONG. REC. H11524 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of
Rep. Baker).
269
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 401 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(9) (2000)); see MCCOY,
supra note 51, § 4.04 (discussing GLBA’s impact on unitary SLHCs and also explaining the
restrictions on activities of multiple SLHCs).
270
GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 68.
271
See 145 CONG. REC. S13788 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); see also
145 CONG. REC. S13875 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Johnson); id. at S13904 (statement
of Sen. Kerry); id. at S13915 (reprinting letter from Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers); id. at
S13916 (statement of Sen. Daschle); id. at H11516 (statement of Rep. Roukema); id. at H11528
(statement of Rep. Leach).
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statute should be viewed as a reaffirmation of Congress’s policy in favor of
maintaining a division between the two fields of activity.272
5. Summarizing the History of Legal Restrictions on Bank Powers
and Affiliations, 1787–1999
Since the nation’s founding, banks have frequently tried to expand
their activities into commercial fields, and commercial firms have often
attempted to gain control of banks. In response to those efforts, federal
and state legislators have repeatedly passed laws to separate banks from
commercial enterprises. Legislators have imposed legal limitations on
bank powers and affiliations whenever it became evident that either (i) the
involvement of banks in commerce was threatening their safety and
soundness, or (ii) commercial firms were acquiring control of large
numbers of banks.
The limited charters granted by the Pennsylvania legislature to the
Bank of North America in 1787, and by Congress to the First and Second
Banks of the United States in 1791 and 1816, show that legislators were
concerned about separating banking from commerce during the Republic’s
earliest years.273 State legislatures adopted “free banking” statutes during
the mid-19th century that prohibited banks from engaging in commercial
activities, and Congress followed the same approach in the National Bank
Act of 1864. Those statutory constraints reflected a legislative revulsion
against the severe economic crisis of the early 1840s, which was
precipitated by the collapse of the Bank of the United States of
Philadelphia and Morris Canal and Banking Company following their
aggressive expansion into commercial activities.274
The failures of large financial-commercial conglomerates during
1930–1933—including Caldwell and Company, Bank of United States and
the two largest Detroit banks—helped to produce the Glass-Steagall Act,
which imposed significant restrictions on the activities and affiliations of
banks.275 Similarly, the thrift debacle of the 1980s—including the failures
of Lincoln Savings and other institutions that were heavily involved in real
estate development and other commercial activities—led to FIRREA.276
Among other things, FIRREA prohibited state-chartered thrifts from
engaging as principal or investing in commercial enterprises that were not
permissible for federal savings associations.277 After a wave of bank

272
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 15 (concluding that “GLBA generally reaffirmed the
separation of banking from nonfinancial, commercial industries”).
273
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
274
See supra notes 74–75, 91–94 and accompanying text.
275
See supra Part III.A.2.
276
See supra Part III.A.4.a.
277
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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failures in the late 1980s, Congress imposed comparable limitations on the
powers of state-chartered banks in 1991.278
On four occasions since 1950, Congress has enacted anti-affiliation
laws when it realized that commercial firms were making widespread
acquisitions of banks or other FDIC-insured depository institutions. When
Transamerica and other commercial firms purchased numerous banks
during the 1950s, Congress responded in 1956 by adopting the BHC Act,
which prohibited multibank holding companies from engaging in activities
that were not “closely related to banking.”279
When commercial
conglomerates established a large number of one-bank holding companies
in the late 1960s, Congress responded in 1970 by extending the BHC Act
to reach those holding companies.280 In 1987, after commercial firms
purchased dozens of FDIC-insured nonbank banks, Congress stopped
further purchases by adopting CEBA.281 In 1999, after commercial firms
acquired a substantial number of FDIC-insured thrift institutions, Congress
barred further acquisitions by enacting GLBA.282 On all four occasions,
Congress declared that it acted in order to maintain a separation between
banking and commerce.
Thus, the policy of separating banking and commerce has gained
strength over time and has operated with particular force since 1956. It is
true that the FRB could undermine that policy by adopting expansive
interpretations of GLBA’s provisions allowing financial holding
companies to engage in merchant banking or other activities that are
“financial in nature” or “incidental” or “complementary” to such activities.
However, given the FRB’s longstanding policy position against mixing
banking and commerce, it seems very unlikely that the FRB will allow a
broad range of commercial activities under GLBA within the foreseeable
future.283

278

See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.3.a.
280
See supra Part III.A.3.b.
281
See supra Part III.A.3.c.
282
See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text.
283
See supra notes 248–61 and accompanying text. In 2006, the FRB opposed legislative
proposals that would have allowed ILCs to offer NOW accounts to for-profit businesses and to
establish interstate de novo branches. The FRB noted that “any type of company may acquire an
FDIC-insured ILC . . . without regard to the activity restrictions that Congress has established to
maintain the general separation of banking and commerce.” Statement of Donald L. Kohn, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 15 (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
testimony/2006/20060301/default.htm. The FRB therefore argued that the proposals for expanded ILC
powers had “the potential to undermine” Congress’ policy of separating banking and commerce. Id. at
14. Congress did not include any provisions dealing with ILCs when it subsequently enacted
regulatory relief legislation. See Kini & Bondehagen, supra note 52, at 5.
279
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B. Do Commercially-Owned ILCs Pose Significant Risks to the U.S.
Financial System and General Economy?
For at least three reasons, continued acquisitions of ILCs by
commercial firms are likely to create serious risks for our nation’s financial
system and general economy. First, the ownership of ILCs by large
commercial firms is likely to spread federal safety net subsidies—
including ”too big to fail” (TBTF) bailouts—from the financial sector to
the commercial sector of the economy. The ability of commercial owners
of ILCs to gain access to low-cost, FDIC-insured funds will increase the
risks to the deposit insurance fund and will create competitive inequities
between commercial firms that control ILCs and those that do not.
Second, commercially-owned ILCs are subject to conflicts of interest
that encourage them to make loans and investments to benefit their
commercial affiliates. As shown by the financial history of the United
States and other nations, preferential transfers of funds from banks to
commercial affiliates or their customers create significant risks for the
deposit insurance fund and also increase the likelihood of a systemic
economic crisis. Additionally, such transfers provide commercial owners
of ILCs with an unfair competitive advantage over firms that do not have
bank affiliates.
Third, problems arising at commercial owners of ILCs are likely to
create public concerns about the soundness of the ILCs. Commerciallyowned ILCs will, therefore, be subject to contagious losses of confidence,
producing a greater likelihood of TBTF bailouts by federal authorities.
The potential extension of TBTF protection to commercial owners of ILCs
is likely to produce a more intrusive government role in regulation of the
commercial sector.
1. Expansion of the Federal Safety Net and TBTF Subsidies to
Commercial Owners of ILCs
During the 1990s, scholars, regulators and lawyers debated whether the
federal “safety net” for financial institutions provided a net subsidy to
banks.284 Those who denied the existence of a net subsidy argued that the
costs of banking regulation exceeded the value of any safety net subsidy.285
284

The federal “safety net” for financial institutions consists of (i) federal deposit insurance, (ii)
protection for uninsured depositors and other uninsured creditors of TBTF institutions, (iii) discount
window advances provided by the FRB as “lender of last resort” (LOLR), and (iv) the FRB’s guarantee
of interbank payments made on Fedwire. See Joe Peek & James A. Wilcox, The Fall and Rise of
Banking Safety Net Subsidies, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT
BAILOUTS 169, 179–83 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004); John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Subsidy Be
Contained?, 84 FED. RES. BANK OF RICH. ECON. REV. Quarter 1 1998, at 1, 2; Wilmarth, supra note
212, at 447 n.1033.
285
For helpful overviews of this debate, see MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.02, and Peek & Wilcox,
supra note 284, at 184–86.
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However, a more recent study concluded that safety net subsidies have
increased since the mid-1990s and probably do provide a net subsidy to
most banks.286 Similarly, a 2005 GAO report stated that the federal safety
net “provides a subsidy to commercial banks and other depository
institutions by allowing them to obtain low-cost funds,” and by “shift[ing]
part of the risk of bank failure from bank owners and their affiliates to the
federal bank insurance fund and, if necessary, to taxpayers.”287
During a systemic crisis, the safety net subsidy is likely to become
very large because the federal government, in effect, provides “catastrophe
insurance.”288 If the deposit insurance fund is inadequate to cover the cost
of resolving failed banks, the federal government has shown a willingness
to mobilize taxpayer funds to prevent a collapse of the financial system.289
For example, during the thrift and banking crises of 1980–1994, the
deposit insurance funds for banks and thrifts spent $64 billion in resolving
the failures of nearly 3000 thrifts and banks. The thrift deposit insurance
fund was wiped out, and Congress used $132 billion of taxpayer funds to
cover the full cost of resolving thrift failures. The bank deposit insurance
fund was depleted to the point of insolvency, and Congress expanded the
FDIC’s line of credit at the Treasury from $5 billion to $30 billion.290
Many other nations have similarly provided extensive liquidity assistance
to banks and generous protection to bank depositors during systemic
financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s.291 Thus, the subsidy provided by
the federal safety net increases greatly in magnitude during a financial
crisis.
Whether or not small banks enjoy a subsidy, many analysts believe
that the safety net provides significant subsidies to the largest banks that
are viewed as TBTF by the financial markets. Those analysts have found
that (i) TBTF banks—generally those with assets over $100 billion—pay
interest rates on deposits that are significantly lower than the rates paid by
non-bank companies of comparable size on short-term, uninsured debt, (ii)
TBTF banks operate with significantly higher leverage (i.e., lower capitalto-asset ratios) than uninsured financial intermediaries such as commercial
and consumer finance companies and life insurers, and (iii) TBTF banks
286

Peek & Wilcox, supra note 284, at 170, 187–89.
GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 71–72.
288
Peek & Wilcox, supra note 284, at 180.
289
Id. at 180–81.
290
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 448. Resolving the failures of 1300 thrifts cost a total of
approximately $160 billion, of which $28 billion was provided by FSLIC funds and $132 billion was
covered by taxpayer funds. Id. at 355 n.590. Resolving the failures of 1600 banks cost $36 billion, all
of which was taken from the FDIC’s bank insurance fund. That fund effectively became insolvent in
1991. At that point, Congress provided the FDIC with authority to borrow up to $30 billion from the
Treasury (an authority that the FDIC ultimately did not have to use). Id. at 313–14 & n.397.
291
See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 40, 75–77 (2004); Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 308–12; infra Part III.B.2.b (discussing
governmental responses to financial crises in Japan, South Korea and Mexico during the 1990s).
287
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achieve higher credit ratings and pay lower interest rates on their bonds as
they grow in size to achieve TBTF status.292 Indeed, the TBTF subsidy has
been an important motivating factor behind the rapid consolidation that has
taken place in the banking industry in the United States and other
developed nations over the past two decades.293
The existence of a subsidy for TBTF institutions is further indicated by
the fact that no major U.S. bank has ever surrendered its bank charter and
chosen to operate as a nonbank.294 In contrast, large nonbanking
companies have consistently sought to gain control of FDIC-insured
depository institutions. As discussed above, securities firms, life insurance
companies and commercial firms acquired nonbank banks before the
nonbank bank loophole was closed in 1987, and they also acquired thrifts
before the unitary SLHC loophole was closed in 1999.295 Each of the four
largest U.S. securities firms—Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman
Sachs and Lehman Brothers—owns a Utah-chartered ILC.296 Charles
Schwab, the largest discount securities broker, and MetLife, the largest life
insurer, purchased banks shortly after the enactment of GLBA and became
financial holding companies.297
Currently, thirty-three insurance
companies own some type of bank,298 and fifteen commercial firms own
ILCs.299 If the costs of bank regulation actually exceed the benefits
provided by the federal safety net, it is very difficult to understand why no
major bank has ever given up its charter, and why so many nonbanking
292
See, e.g., STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 291, at 30–37; Edward J. Kane, Incentives for
Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?, 32 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671, 673, 691–94 (2000); Maria Fabiana Penas & Haluk Unal, Gains in
Bank Mergers: Evidence from the Bond Markets, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 149, 150–51, 155, 159, 168–71
(2004); George Pennacchi, Deposit Insurance, Bank Regulation, and Financial System Risks, 53 J.
MONETARY ECON. 1, 14–16 (2006); Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 301–03, 445, 447 n.1033; Donald P.
Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, Bond Market Discipline of Banks: Is the Market Tough Enough? 2–3, 13–
15 (Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y. Staff Report, Working Paper No. 95, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=207148 [hereinafter Morgan & Stiroh, Bond Market]; Donald P.
Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, Too Big to Fail After All These Years, passim (Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y.
Staff Report, Working Paper No. 220, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=813967 [hereinafter
Morgan & Stiroh, Too Big to Fail].
293
See, e.g., STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 291, at 32–33, 60–79; Gerald A. Hanweck &
Bernard Shull, The Bank Merger Movement: Efficiency, Stability and Competitive Policy Concerns, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 251, 251, 273–79 (1999); Kane, supra note 292, at 673–74, 683–95; Wilmarth,
supra note 212, at 300–12. For recent surveys describing the rapid consolidation occurring within the
banking and financial services industries in the United States and many other developed nations, see
Kenneth D. Jones & Chau Nguyen, Increased Concentration in Banking: Megabanks and Their
Implications for Deposit Insurance, 14 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS 1 (2005); Gianni de
Nicolo et al., Bank Consolidation, Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications
for Financial Risk, 13 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS 173 (2004).
294
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 447 n.1033.
295
See id. at 423–24; see also supra notes 165, 264–66 and accompanying text.
296
Statement of Douglas H. Jones, supra note 42, at Attachment 1.
297
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 223.
298
See Clint Riley, Insurers Win Customers, Profits With Banking, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2006, at
C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
299
FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 13, at 5291.
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companies have been so eager for so long to acquire a financial institution
charter that will enable them to offer FDIC-insured deposits to their
customers.
In my view, banks and nonbanking companies have
indisputably proven the existence of a safety net subsidy—at least for large
financial institutions—by voting with their feet.
Merrill Lynch is a leading example of a non-bank financial institution
that has reaped significant benefits from its access to the federal safety net.
Merrill acquired a thrift institution and an ILC during the 1990s.300 In
2000, Merrill introduced a “sweep account” program in order to transfer its
customers’ cash balances from uninsured brokerage accounts into FDICinsured deposits in its subsidiary depository institutions.301 By 2006,
Merrill’s banks held $80 billion in deposits, and Merrill used those
deposits to fund $70 billion of commercial and consumer loans.302
Citigroup’s Smith Barney brokerage unit and other major securities
brokers have introduced similar sweep account programs to move
customer cash balances into FDIC-insured deposits at their affiliated
banks.303
A 2004 study estimated that sweep account programs created $350
billion of FDIC-insured deposits that otherwise would have been held in
uninsured money market mutual funds (MMMFs) at brokerage firms.304
Securities firms with bank affiliates have established these programs
because FDIC-insured deposits pay interest rates that are much lower, and
earn spreads that are much higher, than the rates and spreads applicable to
uninsured MMMFs.305 A recent comment letter submitted to the FDIC by
300
Banking in Utah: From Mormon to mammon, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2001, at 74, 75, available
at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File; Katherine Fraser, Merrill Lynch Using Thrift Charter To Build
Its Personal Trust Business, AM. BANKER, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
AMBNKR File.
301
Pennacchi, supra note 292, at 15; Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 424–25.
302
Matt Ackermann, Merrill Eyes Organic Growth But May Do a Banking Deal, AM. BANKER,
April 19, 2006, at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (reporting on Merrill’s bank
deposits and loans); see also Matthias Rieker, Merrill’s Retail Banking Strategy Seen Paying Off, AM.
BANKER, June 12, 2003, at 20, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (reporting that
Merrill’s funding from bank deposits grew from 14% to 51% during 1998–2003, while its funding from
short-term borrowing declined from 21% to 2%). In January 2007, Merrill further increased its
banking assets by agreeing to purchase a California bank, First Republic. Andrew Dowell & David
Enrich, Merrill Buys First Republic to Beef Up Banking Services, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at C5,
available at LEXIS, News File, WSJNL File.
303
Pennacchi, supra note 292, at 15 n.21; Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 424–25, 448–49.
304
Pennacchi, supra note 292, at 15 (citing study by Crane and Krasner).
305
Id. at 15–16; Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 448; Randall Smith, How Wall Street ‘Sweeps’ the
Cash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News File, WSJNL File. Unlike bank
deposits, which can be used to fund commercial and consumer loans, MMMFs may only invest in
highly-rated securities with an average maturity of not more than ninety days. Timothy Q. Cook &
Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds and Other Short-Term Investment Pools, in
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 156, 165–67 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 7th
ed. 1993), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/instruments_of_
the_money_market/.
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the Securities Industry Association (SIA) confirms the significant benefits
produced by sweep programs:
Bank subsidiaries have added significant value and
versatility to SIA member corporate groups, because SIA
member owned banks hold idle funds swept from brokerage
accounts [into] deposits. . . . This has provided a reliable and
low cost source of deposits to fund traditional banking
products and services offered to customers of the corporate
group . . . . The most cost effective way to fund bank quality
loans is with deposits.306
In addition to the subsidy offered by access to FDIC-insured deposits,
many commentators believe that GLBA has enabled large financial
conglomerates that control banks to secure presumptive TBTF status.307
Owners of major commercial firms might reasonably expect that they, too,
will receive TBTF treatment if they acquire ILCs and expand the assets of
their ILCs as rapidly as Merrill has done.308 If Wal-Mart, the world’s
largest retailer, and Home Depot, the second largest U.S. retailer, are
allowed to open deposit-taking branches in their stores, they would
probably match or improve on Merrill’s deposit-taking performance.309
306
Letter to the FDIC, from the Securities Industry Association (Oct. 10, 2006), in Comments on
Industrial Loan Companies and Industrial Banks, Comment No. 71, at 3, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2006/06comilc.html [hereinafter Comments to the FDIC
on ILCs].
307
HENRY KAUFMAN, ON MONEY AND MARKETS: A WALL STREET MEMOIR 209–10, 237–40
(2000); STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 291, at 70–77; Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 303-04, 446-50,
474-75. During the debates on the conference report on GLBA, several members of Congress warned
that GLBA had not solved the TBTF problem and that the TBTF doctrine might therefore be extended
to financial conglomerates. See 145 CONG. REC. S13888 (daily ed., Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Reed); id. at S13896–97 (statement of Sen. Dorgan); id. at S13904 (remarks of Sen. Kerry); id. at
H11542 (1999) (statement of Rep. Dingell); 145 CONG. REC. S13789 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Sarbanes). In 2000, a senior official at Moody’s Investor Services argued that
federal regulators must support all components of big financial conglomerates during “times of extreme
financial stress.” In his view, the TBTF status of major financial holding companies is undeniable,
because it is “like the elephant at the picnic—everyone is aware of it, but no one wants to mention it.”
Christopher T. Mahoney, Commentary, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Oct. 2000, at 55, 57, available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/2000n4.html.
308
In fact, the FRB has authority to extend discount window loans to any non-banking company
“in unusual and exigent circumstances.” 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2000). Section 343 would permit the FRB
to provide financial support to any non-banking firm whose survival is deemed necessary to maintain
the stability of the financial markets. See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and
Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 873–74 (2000); Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 304 &
n.369.
309
Wal-Mart operates some 3300 stores in the United States and about 6700 stores globally. Kris
Hudson, Wal-Mart Blames Short-Term Woes, But Some Expect Challenges to Linger, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 28, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. During its 2006 fiscal year,
Wal-Mart produced total sales of $349 billion, making it the largest retailer in the United States and the
world. James Covert, Earnings Digest—Retail: Wal-Mart Pegs Growth on Overseas Arm, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 21, 2007, at C6, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. Home Depot operates more
than 2100 stores in the United States and generated total sales of $91 billion in 2006, making it the
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Given the immense size of both Wal-Mart and Home Depot, it seems
inconceivable that federal regulators would allow either company to
collapse, if the company owned a major financial institution. Wal-Mart,
for example, generates annual domestic sales of about $300 billion and
accounts for 8% of domestic retail sales and 2% of the gross domestic
product.310 On several occasions since 1970, the federal government has
intervened to save or reorganize a company or industry whose survival was
deemed important to the national interest.311 On at least four other
occasions since 1970, the FRB has taken action to maintain the stability of
the financial markets after the failure of a major non-banking firm.312
Given those precedents, acquisitions of ILCs by Wal-Mart, Home Depot
and other giant commercial firms will significantly increase the likelihood
and potential costs of similar federal interventions in the future.
Based on the foregoing considerations, it seems clear that (i) large
commercial owners of ILCs will obtain substantial financial benefits from
the federal safety net, particularly in the form of low-cost deposits and
implicit catastrophe insurance, and (ii) those commercial firms will have a
significant funding advantage—and therefore an important competitive
edge—over competitors that do not own ILCs.313 Unless acquisitions of
ILCs by commercial firms are prohibited, many large commercial entities
will probably deem it essential to acquire ILCs in order to maintain
competitive parity with those firms that already own ILCs. Thus, over
time, acquisitions of ILCs by large commercial firms will almost certainly
create serious distortions within the general economy.

second largest U.S. retailer. Ann Zimmerman, Home Depot Tries to Make Nice to Customers, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2007, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Ann Zimmerman &
Mary Ellen Lloyd, Nardelli’s Flawed Strategy Hits Home Depot Profit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2007, at
A2, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
310
See Kris Hudson, Wal-Mart Scales Back Expansion, Spending as Sales Growth Slows, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Special Report WalMart: How big can it grow?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004, at 67, available at LEXIS, News Library,
ECON File.
311
See Benton E. Gup, What Does Too Big to Fail Mean?, in TOO BIG TO FAIL, supra note 284, at
29, 33–38 (discussing (i) federal support for the reorganization of railroads following Penn Central’s
bankruptcy in 1970, (ii) federal loan guarantees given to Lockheed in 1971 and Chrysler in 1980, and
(iii) federal payments and loan guarantees provided to airlines after the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001).
312
See id. at 33, 41 (discussing FRB’s interventions following the collapse of Penn Central in
1970 and Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998); KAUFMAN, supra note 307, at 208, 255–
58, 272–73, 282–84 (discussing the same two episodes as well as the FRB’s interventions following the
Hunt brothers’ failed attempt to corner the silver market in 1980 and the stock market crash of 1987);
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 236, 346–48, 370–72, 451, 472–73 (discussing the same four episodes).
313
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 71–72.
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2. Conflicts of Interest, Preferential Lending and Systemic Risk
a. Evidence from the United States
Acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms create conflicts of interest
that pose significant risks to the deposit insurance fund and increase the
likelihood of a systemic economic crisis. As shown above, ILCs enjoy a
significant funding advantage over non-banking firms, due to their ability
to attract FDIC-insured deposits at subsidized, below-market rates.314
Commercial owners of ILCs have powerful financial incentives to transfer
this funding advantage by causing their ILCs to pay generous dividends
and to make preferential loans to the parent companies and their
commercial subsidiaries. The desire to draw on funds from a bank affiliate
intensifies when the commercial parent or a commercial affiliate
encounters financial problems. For example, after Caldwell and Company
and American Continental Company (the parent of Lincoln Savings) lost
access to other sources of funds, they extracted large amounts of funds
from their depository institution affiliates.315 Similarly, Bank of United
States failed after making large loans to support its securities and real
estate affiliates.316
Commercial firms could also cause their ILCs to support their
operations in other ways. For example, a parent company could cause its
ILC to purchase doubtful customer receivables or other questionable
assets, or it could insist that the ILC encourage its depositors and other
customers to purchase the parent’s securities. As discussed above,
American Continental used the branches and employees of Lincoln
Savings to promote the sale of American’s uninsured subordinated notes to
more than twenty thousand of customers.317 Bank of United States
similarly persuaded thousands of its depositors to buy units consisting of
the bank’s stock joined with the stock of its primary securities affiliate.318
Likewise, in the early 1970s Beverly Hills Bancorp sold $12.5 million of
commercial paper to more than two hundred customers of its subsidiary
bank, Beverly Hills National Bank. After the parent company defaulted on

314

Id.; see also supra notes 292, 300–06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108, 217–23 and accompanying text. Similarly, “when Drexel Burnham was
threatened with failure in early 1990, it [made capital withdrawals] from its regulated securities
subsidiaries in excess of regulatory limits until the SEC intervened to prevent further capital transfers.”
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 456 n.1058; see also JONATHAN BROWN, THE SEPARATION OF BANKING
AND COMMERCE 25, available at http://www.public-gis.org/reports/sbc.html (quoting SEC chairman
Richard Breeden’s Senate testimony concerning Drexel Burnham’s failure, in which Mr. Breeden
acknowledged that the SEC did not fully appreciate the “risk that the broker-dealer’s capital could be
depleted in a desperate but fruitless attempt to pay the parent firm’s unsecured creditors”).
316
See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
317
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
318
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
315
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the commercial paper, the customers sued the bank and forced it into
conservatorship and liquidation.319
In addition, commercial firms may induce their ILCs to make
preferential loans to suppliers of the parent company in order to gain
concessions for the parent company.320 Commercial firms can similarly
use their ILCs to extend credit to customers to promote the sale of the
parent’s products.321 For example, Volkswagen, Target, and Toyota
acquired ILCs during 2002–2004.322 The primary business of both
Volkswagen Bank and Toyota Financial Savings Bank is to make loans to
consumers and businesses to finance purchases of automobiles produced
by their parent companies. Similarly, Target Bank issues proprietary credit
cards to business firms to facilitate their purchases of goods at Target
stores.323 Home Depot has filed an application to acquire a Utah ILC
called EnerBank. EnerBank’s proposed business plan is to make
installment loans to consumers who hire EnerBank-approved contractors
for home improvement projects. Home Depot hopes that EnerBank’s loans
will encourage approved contractors to purchase materials for home
improvement projects at Home Depot stores. Although Home Depot
claims that contractors will not be compelled to buy their materials at
Home Depot stores, contractors cannot participate in the program unless
they are approved by EnerBank as “loan program sponsors.”324 It certainly
seems doubtful whether a contractor would retain its status as an approved

319

In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 649 F.2d 1329, 1331–33 (9th Cir. 1981); see also infra notes
385–87 and accompanying text (discussing the parent company’s default and the bank’s liquidation).
320
See BROWN, supra note 315 (stating that, prior to the enactment of the 1970 amendments to
the BHC Act, federal examiners discovered that a commercial bank controlled by Sears “had a heavy
concentration of its commercial loans to firms that were Sears’ suppliers”); see also GAO-ILC
REPORT, supra note 39, at 72.
321
BROWN, supra note 315, at 5-6, 12–13; see also GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 72.
322
See Statement of Douglas H. Jones, supra note 42, at Attachment 1.
323
Id. A recent comment letter submitted to the FDIC by two ILC trade associations explained
how an ILC can provide credit to customers of its parent company in compliance with sections 23A and
23B. The comment letter stated that an ILC can lawfully make loans to its parent’s customers as long
as the parent either (i) buys the customer loans from the ILC without recourse, or (ii) maintains a cash
deposit at the ILC equal to the amount of outstanding customer loans. See Letter to the FDIC, , from
the Utah Association of Financial Services/California Association of Industrial Banks (Oct. 10, 2006),,
in Comments to the FDIC on ILCs, supra note 306, at Comment No. 109, 12, 33-34. If the letter is
correct, a commercial parent company can call upon its ILC to provide unlimited credit to the parent’s
customers as long as the parent company is willing to cover the credit risk associated with those loans.
However, that arrangement provides relatively little comfort to the federal deposit insurance fund and
taxpayers, because excessive and unsound loans to customers could inflict crippling losses on the
parent company. As discussed below, problems at parent companies of financial institutions have
frequently proven to be contagious by undermining public confidence in the subsidiary institutions.
See infra Part III.B.3.
324
See Home Depot, Inc., Change in Bank Control Notice: Public Portion of Notice, May 8,
available at 2006, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/homedepot (last visited Apr. 8, 2007); Luke
Mullins, Home Depot’s ILC-to-Be—A Look Inside, AM. BANKER, July 28, 2006, at 1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
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EnerBank “sponsor” if it failed to buy a significant portion of its materials
from Home Depot.
Thus, the existing and proposed business plans of commercially-owned
ILCs reflect a consistent strategy among commercial parent companies to
promote the sale of their products by using the credit facilities of their
captive ILCs. Advocates for commercial ownership of ILCs argue that
“firewalls” established by laws restricting affiliate transactions and insider
lending will prevent an ILC from making unsound loans or abusive
transfers of funds to benefit its commercial affiliates.325 As previously
discussed, sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act impose
quantitative limits and collateral requirements on affiliate transactions,
prohibit bank purchases of low-quality assets from affiliates, and require
affiliate transactions to be conducted on arms’ length terms.326 In addition,
federal statutes and regulations impose strict conditions on loans made by
any FDIC-insured banks to directors, executive officers and principal
shareholders and their related interests.327
However, these firewalls have often been disregarded under
circumstances of financial stress when the financial viability of a
controlling shareholder or affiliate is threatened. As noted above, a high
percentage of thrift failures during the 1980s involved violations of rules
governing affiliate transactions and insider lending.328 Similarly, a GAO
study found that unlawful insider lending and abusive affiliate transactions
occurred at a significant proportion of 175 banks that failed during 1990–
1991.329 For example, United States National Bank of San Diego failed in
1973 after making massive loans to its controlling shareholder and his
affiliates in violation of legal lending limits.330 Hamilton National Bank
also failed in 1976 after its parent holding company violated section 23A
by forcing the bank to purchase large amounts of low-quality mortgages
from the bank’s mortgage banking affiliate.331 During the 1987 stock

325
See, e.g., Blair, supra note 52, at 98–99, 103–04; Lawrence J. White, Testimony bfere Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Wal-Mart Hearings, supra note 12, at 4–11 (Panel 3, Apr. 11,
2006).
326
See supra notes 131, 176–77 and accompanying text (discussing sections 23A and 23B).
327
See MCCOY, supra note 51, § 14.04[1][d] (discussing restrictions on loans to insiders under 12
U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b, 1468(b) and 1828(j)(2) and the regulations adopted thereunder).
328
See supra notes 207, 217–23 and accompanying text.
329
Catharine M. Lemieux, Conglomerates, Connected Lending and Prudential Standards:
Lessons Learned, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 149, 157–58 (1999) (stating that the GAO
study found violations of insider lending rules at eighty-two of the 175 failed banks and also found
preferential insider loans at seventy banks and improper affiliate transactions at forty-nine banks).
330
See JOSEPH F. SINKEY, JR., PROBLEM AND FAILED INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL
BANKING INDUSTRY 218–33 (1979); see also First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1364–65 (9th
Cir. 1978); Harmsen v. Smith, 542 F.2d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1976).
331
SINKEY, supra note 330, at 198–205.
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market crash, Continental Illinois violated legal lending limits in order to
prevent its options trading subsidiary from failing.332
Two large FDIC-insured ILCs have failed since 1999, resulting in
losses to the deposit insurance fund of more than $100 million.333 In each
case, the corporate parent and the ILC operated in a unitary fashion that did
not maintain any meaningful corporate separation between them, and the
parent and the ILC also engaged in transactions that violated sections 23A
and 23B.334 While the violations of sections 23A and 23B were not the
primary reason for the ILCs’ failures, those violations were symptomatic
of fundamental inadequacies in the management policies, audit practices
and compliance procedures of both institutions.335 The foregoing evidence
from thrift, bank and ILC failures creates serious doubts regarding the
ability of existing restrictions on affiliate transactions and insider lending
to prevent abusive and unsound transactions between ILCs and their
corporate owners.336
Moreover, “the restrictions in sections 23A and 23B are complicated
and difficult to enforce, and . . . managerial evasions of those provisions”
are often subtle and difficult to detect.337 The challenges of detecting
abusive affiliate transactions are magnified when a large commercial firm
controls an FDIC-insured bank. As one analyst observed:
Given that the banking regulators are already overburdened
with the task of controlling bank soundness, it is quite
unrealistic to expect them to monitor and detect more subtle
bias in the vast array of loans that banks would make to
commercial affiliates, their suppliers and their customers if
the mixing of banking and commerce were permitted.338
332
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 456 n.1058. Continental’s rescue of its subsidiary occurred only
three years after federal regulators organized a TBTF bailout of the bank. Wilmarth, supra note 236, at
994.
333
GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 59 (discussing failures of Pacific Thrift and Loan in 1999
and Southern Pacific Bank in 2003).
334
FDIC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF THE FAILURE OF SOUTHERN
PACIFIC BANK, AUDIT REPORT NO. 03-036, at 11–13, 68, 88, app. IV (2003), available at
http://www.fdicig.gov/reports03/03-036.pdf [hereinafter SOUTHERN PACIFIC BANK MLR]; FDIC
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW—THE FAILURE OF PACIFIC THRIFT AND LOAN
COMPANY, AUDIT REPORT NO. 00-022, at 5, 8, 14, 28–29 (2000), available at http://www.fdicig.gov/
reports00/00-022.pdf [hereinafter PACIFIC THRIFT MLR].
335
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 60 tbl.5; PACIFIC THRIFT MLR, supra note 334, at 8–
19, 30–33; SOUTHERN PACIFIC BANK MLR, supra note 334, at 11–22.
336
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 62 (reporting the view of FRB officials that
“focusing supervisory efforts on transactions covered by sections 23A and 23B will not cover the full
range of risks that insured institutions are exposed to from holding companies and their subsidiaries”).
337
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 456, 457 n.1060; see also Lemieux, supra note 329, at 154–55.
338
BROWN, supra note 315, at 6–7. Under 12 C.F.R. § 223.16(a), a bank must treat a transaction
as an affiliate transaction subject to sections 23A and 23B if the proceeds of the transaction “are used
for the benefit of, or transferred to” an affiliate.” Id. at 9. However, “it is questionable whether the
[FRB] would have sufficient resources to monitor bank compliance with [section 223.16] in an

1598

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1539

The debacles at Lincoln Savings and Enron demonstrate how complex
structures can be used to conceal manipulative transactions with affiliates.
As previously discussed, the parent company of Lincoln Savings caused
the thrift to enter into complicated deals involving sham sales of assets to
“straw” buyers. Those deals generated fictitious accounting “profits,”
which Lincoln then transferred to its parent pursuant to an abusive “tax
sharing agreement.”339 Similarly, Enron entered into a myriad of
commodity swaps and sales of assets with off-balance-sheet, specialpurpose entities that were purportedly independent but were actually
controlled by Andrew Fastow, Enron’s Chief Financial Officer. Like the
Lincoln Savings transactions, Enron’s structured-finance deals were
elaborate shams that were created for the purpose of producing fictitious
profits and deceiving credit ratings agencies and institutional investors.340
The Lincoln and Enron scandals raise further questions concerning the
ability of federal regulators and market professionals to identify and
evaluate transactions that are designed to benefit affiliates but are disguised
by complex financial structures.
Perhaps most disturbing is the possibility that federal regulators might
decide to waive affiliate transaction rules so that ILCs could support their
commercial affiliates during a crisis. After the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, federal regulators suspended the application of
section 23A and encouraged major banks to transfer large amounts of
funds to their securities affiliates. The purpose of those transfers was to
prevent a liquidity crunch that could have paralyzed the securities markets
and threatened the survival of leading securities firms.341 The ownership of
ILCs by giant commercial firms like Wal-Mart and Home Depot increases
the likelihood that regulators would similarly feel compelled to waive legal
restrictions on affiliate transactions whenever a threat to the parent
company’s survival raised concerns that the parent’s failure might trigger a
serious economic crisis.
b. Evidence from Japan, South Korea and Mexico
Major financial crises occurred in Japan, South Korea, and Mexico
during the 1990s. Each of those crises was due in part to ownership and
control links that existed between banks and commercial firms. Each
environment involving extensive bank/commercial firm affiliations.” Id.; see also id. at 44 (stating that
“serious questions arise as to the [federal banking] agencies’ ability to prevent preferential lending and
unsound loans in situations where conflicts of interest or external pressures impinge on the credit
judgment process”).
339
See supra notes 217–23 and accompanying text.
340
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at
Universal Banks during the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom 9–20
(Geo. Wash. Univ. Law School Leg. Stud. Res. Paper No. 234, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=952486.
341
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 456–57, 472–73.
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episode indicates that joint control of banks and commercial firms creates
conflicts of interest, distorts economic incentives, and increases the risk of
a systemic crisis.
From the 1950s through the 1990s, the “main bank system” in Japan
was primarily responsible for allocating credit within the Japanese
economy. Under this system, a main bank acted as the lead lender and
principal outside monitor for each commercial firm in which the bank held
a significant equity stake and maintained other business relationships.
Those relationships typically were cemented by an intricate web of crossshareholding arrangements between the main bank and other members of
its corporate group (keiretsu).342 During the 1980s, the Japanese
government followed a liberal monetary policy and gradually deregulated
the financial markets to accommodate competitive pressures within the
Japanese and international economies. Large corporations were allowed to
issue bonds in the Japanese and Eurobond markets and reduced their
reliance on bank loans. In response to a declining demand for credit from
major corporations, the main banks and other banks greatly expanded their
lending to small and medium-sized businesses. Rapid growth in bank
credit helped to promote asset bubbles in the Japanese real estate market
and stock market during 1985–1989. Japanese banks responded to rising
asset values by extending additional credit to real estate developers and to
corporations and individuals for speculation in the securities markets.
Japanese banks also expanded their own investments in the stock market to
strengthen their keiretsu relationships and to improve their Tier 2
regulatory capital under the Basel Capital Accord of 1988.343
The Bank of Japan’s decision to tighten monetary policy in 1989
triggered a progressive collapse of the real estate and stock markets. Real
estate values and stock market prices fell by more than 50% during the

342
See generally Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System:
An Introductory Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING
AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 1, passim (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994); BROWN,
supra note 315, at 35–42; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Commentary: On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main
Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 J. L. & SOC. INQUIRY 425, 428–35 (2001);
Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of
Credit in Japan, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1144, 1145–46 (2005). For example, a 1996 survey found that
30.7% of the “large” shareholders of publicly-traded Japanese firms were either parent companies or
companies in the same keiretsu, and 35.6% of the “large” shareholders were financial institutions
having business relationships with the firms. Milhaupt, supra, at 429.
343
See, e.g., Aoki, Patrick & Sheard, supra note 342, at 46–48; Mitsuhiro Fukao, Japan’s Lost
Decade and its Financial System, 26 WORLD ECON., Mar. 2003, at 365, 366–68; Yoshinori Shimizu,
Convoy Regulation, Bank Management, and the Financial Crisis in Japan, in JAPAN’S FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE 57, 58–75, 81–84 (Ryoichi Mikitani & Adam S.
Posen eds., 2000); Adrian van Rixtel et al., Banking in Japan: Will Too Big to Fail Prevail?, in TOO
BIG TO FAIL, supra note 284, at 253, 254–64; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 613–14.
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1990s and did not begin to recover until 2004.
The collapse of asset
values caused a wave of business bankruptcies and inflicted massive losses
on Japanese banks. Two city banks, two long-term credit banks and
several regional banks failed or were nationalized during 1995–2003.345
By 2003, Japanese banks had suffered loan losses of about $750 billion.346
Between 1995 and 2003, the Japanese government spent at least $450
billion to assist banks and recapitalize the deposit insurance fund.347 The
government provided a full guarantee for time deposits until 2002 and for
demand deposits until 2003.348 The government spent an additional $1
trillion on economic stimulus programs, but the Japanese economy
remained mired in a deep slump until a recovery finally began in 2004.349
Analysts have offered many reasons for the severity and prolonged
nature of Japan’s economic crisis. Three of those reasons are relevant to
this Article. First, the cross-shareholding and lending relationships
between Japanese banks and their business customers meant that the
financial and commercial sectors in Japan were closely linked in 1989.
Problems arising in one sector inevitably spilled over into the other. Thus,
the tightly interwoven ownership and credit linkages between banks and
their commercial customers significantly increased Japan’s vulnerability to
a systemic economic crisis.350
Second, due to the tremendous financial and political costs of dealing
with the banking crisis, Japanese regulators and politicians adopted a
variety of forbearance measures designed to postpone the day of
reckoning. In this regard, they acted in a manner that was very similar to
the actions of U.S. regulators and politicians during the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s. Japanese officials did not directly confront the banking
industry’s problems until large banks began to fail in 1997–1998.351
344
See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION
205 (12th ed. 2005); Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Japan’s Financial Crisis and Economic
Stagnation, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. No. 1, Winter 2004, at 3, 5–6; Shimizu, supra note 343, at 71–76.
345
See SCOTT, supra note 344, at 210–15, 222–24; Fukao, supra note 343, at 370–72; van Rixtel
et al., supra note 343, at 267–78.
346
See Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 344, at 12 (reporting cumulative loan losses of 91.5 trillion
yen). The exchange rate between the yen and the dollar was approximately 120 yen to $1 dollar during
1995–2003. Id. at 10 n.6.
347
See Fukao, supra note 343, at 369–72 (stating that the Japanese government spent 27 trillion
yen to support banks and 27 trillion yen to recapitalize the deposit insurance fund); compare SCOTT,
supra note 344, at 215 (estimating that the Japanese government may have spent more than 90 trillion
yen for those purposes).
348
See Fukao, supra note 343, at 372.
349
See SCOTT, supra note 344, at 205, 210–11, 239–40; Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 344,
passim; Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 451–52; Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 614.
350
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 451–52; see id. at 453 n.1048 (citing additional sources for the
reader’s reference).
351
SCOTT, supra note 344, at 210–15, 220–24; Benjamin M. Friedman, Japan Now and the
United States Then: Lessons from the Parallels, in JAPAN’S FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 343, at 37,
47–53; Fukao, supra note 343, at 368–72; van Rixtel et al., supra note 343, at 268–75.
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Third, in order to avoid recognizing loan losses and to support their
most important borrowers, Japanese banks followed a policy of
“evergreening”—i.e. banks kept rolling over or restructuring loans that
were in default. A recent study found that, during 1993–1999, Japanese
banks were more likely to evergreen loans if (i) they had a large credit
exposure to the borrower, (ii) the borrower was a member of the bank’s
keiretsu, (iii) the borrower was in weak condition, or (iv) the borrower did
not have access to the bond markets and was therefore dependent on bank
loans. In addition, main banks were more likely than secondary banks to
help their borrowers, especially if the borrowers belonged to the main
bank’s keiretsu.352 Thus, a major reason for the Japanese economy’s
failure to improve during the 1990s was that main banks focused their
lending on borrowers that were in the weakest condition and were most
closely connected to the banks. As a consequence, bank credit was
misdirected toward “zombie” firms, and credit was denied to more
profitable firms that did not have close connections to banks.353 In sum,
Japan’s experience indicates that control linkages between banks and
commercial firms seriously distrort the allocation of credit, increase the
economy’s vulnerability to systemic crises and impede the economy’s
ability to recover from an economic downturn.
South Korea’s financial crisis of 1997–1998 offers striking parallels to
Japan’s travails. Like Japan, South Korea maintained a bank-centered
financial system from the 1950s through the 1990s, and South Korea’s
system contained similar cross-sharing networks and lending relationships
between main banks and dominant corporate groups (chaebol).354 South
Korea began to deregulate its financial system in the early 1980s by
transferring commercial banks from government to private ownership.
Even though the banks were privatized, they continued to make loans to
chaebol firms and other businesses in accordance with government policies
that funneled credit to heavy industries and producers of goods intended
for export markets. As the government progressively liberalized its
financial regulations during the 1990s, Korean commercial banks and
newly-organized merchant banks continued to expand their lending to

352

See Peek & Rosengren, supra note 342, at 1150–65.
See Ricardo J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan passim,
(Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 06-06, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889727;
Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 343, at 14–15; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 342, at 1164–65.
354
The Korean Fair Trade Commission defines a chaebol as “a group of companies, more than 30
percent of whose shares are owned by some individuals or by companies controlled by those
individuals.” Eduardo Borensztein & Jong-Wha Lee, Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea:
Evidence From Firm-Level Data, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 853, 862 n.17 (2002). The top-30 chaebol
produced about 16% of GDP and 40% of manufacturing output in Korea in the mid-1990s. Id. at 862.
353
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355

Korean businesses.
Bank credit to private sector borrowers in South
Korea increased from 36.3% of GDP in 1980 to 65.6% of GDP in 1997.356
By the mid-1990s, the thirty largest chaebol were highly leveraged, as
their average debt-equity ratio exceeded 500%.357 The chaebol relied on
overly-generous bank credit to build up excess capacity in steel,
shipbuilding, automobiles and semiconductors—industries that were
vulnerable to competition from lower-cost foreign suppliers.358 Korean
banks were also fragile, because they relied heavily on loans from foreign
banks. By 1997, foreign banks had extended $104 billion of credit to
Korean borrowers, including $68 billion in loans to Korean banks. Thus,
both the chaebol and their Korean bank sponsors were highly vulnerable to
a sudden withdrawal of international credit.359
The economic crisis that struck Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia in
1997 led to increasing concerns among foreign investors and foreign banks
about the solvency of Korean banks and businesses. Foreign banks
reduced their credit lines to Korean borrowers, and foreign investors began
to liquidate their Korean investments.360 The Korean stock market crashed,
leading to a wave of corporate failures. Eight chaebol declared bankruptcy
in 1997, along with more than 17,000 Korean firms. In 1998, over 36,000
Korean firms declared bankruptcy. Daewoo, one of the five largest

355
For descriptions of the South Korean financial system before the 1997 crisis, see Bernard
Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International
Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 540–42, 550–52 (2001); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and
Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 199, 205–08 & tbl.1 (2001) (reporting that
families and affiliated firms owned 43% of the shares of publicly-traded companies in the thirty largest
chaebol in 1997); Joseph Bisignano, Precarious Credit Equilibria: Reflections on the Asian Financial
Crisis 11–19, 32 tbl.4, 34–35 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 64, 1999), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=850072; Joonho Hahm, The Korean Model of Corporate Governance: Issues
and Lessons in Reform of Bank Governance 2–4 (Hills Governance Ctr. at Yonsei Univ., Working
Paper No. 05-01, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799644.
356
Bisignano, supra note 355, at 9 tbl.1.
357
See id. at 35.
358
Catherine H. Lee, To Thine Ownself Be True: IMF Conditionality and Erosion of Economic
Sovereignty in the Asian Financial Crises, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 875, 889–91 (2003); Doowoo
Nam & Benton E. Gup, The Economic Crisis of South Korea, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING CRISES:
LARGE-SCALE FAILURES, MASSIVE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 107, 116–17 (Benton E. Gup ed.,
1999).
359
Bisignano, supra note 355, at 29, 31, 34–35, 41–42; see also Borensztein & Lee, supra note
354, at 858 tbl.1 (showing that the liabilities of Korean commercial banks to foreign creditors doubled
during 1995–1997).
360
See id. at 5, 10–11, 24 tbl.3, 38–42; Black et al., supra note 355, at 553; Graciela L. Kaminsky
et al., The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. NO. 4, Fall 2003, at 51, 59–63,
68–70; see also Borensztein & Lee, supra note 354, at 858 tbl.1 (showing that the liabilities of Korean
commercial banks to foreign creditors fell by 30%during 1997–1998); id. at 861 (explaining that “as
foreign lines of credit dried up, [Korean] banks had no choice but to repay their short-term foreign
debts, or later repay the emergency support that the Bank of Korea had provided on a temporary
basis”).

2007]

THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE

1603

361

chaebol, collapsed in 1999.
Two large banks failed and were
nationalized by the South Korean government in January 1998. The
government also provided support for five acquisitions of failing banks in
June 1998.362 The government protected all depositors and ultimately
spent about $100 billion to restructure and recapitalize the Korean banking
system.363
Thus, the Korean crisis of 1997–1998, like the Japanese debacle, can
be traced in substantial part to incestuous ownership and credit links
between banks and large corporate groups. Korean banks, like Japanese
banks, continued to extend credit to their principal corporate borrowers
long past the point of prudence. A recent study of the stock market
performance of Korean firms during the 1997–1998 crisis found that the
greatest losses in share value occurred among firms that either (i) were
members of chaebol in which owner-managers and affiliated firms had
high levels of share ownership, or (ii) were more dependent on bank loans,
especially from main banks.364 Another study found that, compared to
non-chaebol firms, publicly-traded companies that were members of the
thirty largest chaebol (i) received loans with preferential terms during
1996–1997, (ii) had significantly higher debt/asset ratios in 1997, and (iii)
produced substantially lower earnings after the onset of the crisis.365 The
foregoing studies confirm that preferential lending by Korean banks to
chaebol firms played a key role in planting the seeds of South Korea’s
financial crisis.
Similarly, preferential lending by banks to related entities was an
important factor in the Mexican financial crisis of 1994–1995. In 1982,
Mexico nationalized its banks when the government defaulted on its
sovereign debt. During the 1980s, Mexico recapitalized and consolidated
361
Black et al., supra note 355, at 541–42, 553; Borensztein & Lee, supra note 354, at 854; Nam
& Gup, supra note 358, at 114–16, 121; see also Borensztein & Lee, supra note 354, at 854 (stating
that GDP fell by 6.7% and fixed investment declined by 40% in Korea during 1998).
362
Sungho Choi & Iftekhar Hasan, Ownership, Governance, and Bank Performance: Korean
Experience, 14 FIN. MKTS, INSTITS. & INSTRUMENTS 215, 217–18 (2005).
363
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 308–09.
364
Jae-Seung Baek et al., Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence From the Korean
Financial Crisis, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 265, 269, 272, 294–97, 301–02 (2004).
365
See Borensztein & Lee, supra note 354, at 855, 863, 864 tbl.2, 869–70, 873 (2002). The same
study found that publicly-traded chaebol firms lost their preferential access to bank credit after the
Korean financial crisis began. Id. at 867–70, 873. Thus, Korean banks (unlike Japanese banks)
evidently did not engage in widespread “evergreening” to prop up their principal borrowers during or
after the crisis. See id. at 861, 873. This difference in bank lending behavior may result from the fact
that Korean regulators and Korean banks were subject to stricter international scrutiny after the crisis
began. Unlike Japan, Korea was obliged to accept a $58 billion financial support package coordinated
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF package included conditions that required Korea
to make fundamental reforms in a number of areas, including a restructuring of its financial sector and
improvements in its corporate governance rules. See Lee, supra note 358, at 892–94; see also Black et
al., supra note 355, at 542–44, 554–58 (describing the Korean government’s corporate governance
reforms).
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its banks, reducing their number from fifty-eight to eighteen.366 The
government also sold the banks’ non-banking lines of business (including
insurance and securities brokerage units) to private parties. During 1991–
1992, the government conducted auctions and sold the eighteen banks to
private parties for $12.4 billion.367 Although the privatization law
prohibited corporations from owning banks, the government sold the banks
to powerful Mexican families who also controlled the leading industrial
groups and securities firms.368 For example, the board of directors of
Banco Serfin, the third largest bank, was dominated by the Gonzáles
family and included the controlling shareholders of fifteen publicly-traded
Mexican companies.369
The newly-privatized banks aggressively expanded their lending in an
attempt to gain market share in the deregulated Mexican financial markets.
During 1988–1994, private sector lending by the banks grew by 25% per
year.370 Due to “supercompetitive” conditions created by the government’s
privatization and deregulation programs, interest rate spreads between
loans and deposits declined steadily at Mexican banks between 1990 and
1994.371 Banks and depositors had few concerns about risks, because the
newly-established Mexican deposit insurance agency (FOBAPROA)
guaranteed all deposits. In addition, bank supervision was lax and
inadequate, and banks typically rolled over delinquent loans or restructured
such loans by capitalizing past-due interest. Thus, banks expected
forbearance from their regulators, and borrowers expected forbearance
from their banks.372

366
William C. Gruben & Robert McComb, Liberalization, Privatization, and Crash: Mexico’s
Banking System in the 1990s, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS ECON. REV., First Quarter 1997, at 21, 22–
23, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/er/1997/er9701c.pdf.
367
William C. Gruben & Robert P. McComb, Privatization, Competition, and Supercompetition
in the Mexican Commercial Banking System, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 229, 244 n.14 (2003); Elizabeth
McQuerry, The Banking Sector Rescue in Mexico, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON REV., Third
Quarter 1999, at 14, 15.
368
Gelpern, supra note 32, at 1521; Gruben & McComb, supra note 367, at 230; see also Stephen
Haber, Mexico’s Experiments with Bank Privatization and Liberalization, 1991–2003, 29 J. BANKING
& FIN. 2325, 2326–31 (2005) (describing the history and process of Mexico’s bank privatization);
Rafael La Porta et al., Related Lending, 118 Q. J. ECON. 231, 244–47 (2003) (describing the acquisition
and control of banks by local families).
369
The González family and the other directors and officers of Banco Serfin controlled more than
half of the bank’s shareholder votes. Eleven of the bank’s forty-four directors were related by blood or
marriage. La Porta et al., supra note 368, at 245–46.
370
McQuerry, supra note 367, at 16 (reporting in addition that mortgage loans expanded by 47%
and credit card liabilities grew by 30% per year during 1988-94).
371
Gruben & McComb, supra note 366, at 25; Gruben & McComb, supra note 367, at 230–36.
372
Gruben & McComb, supra note 366, at 26; Haber, supra note 368, at 2331–33, 2338; La Porta
et al., supra note 368, at 246–47; McQuerry, supra note 367, at 16, 18.
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Like the Korean banks, Mexican banks relied heavily on foreign credit
to expand their loans to Mexican businesses and consumers.373 The
reckless lending practices of Mexican banks produced a sharp increase in
their nonperforming loans during 1991–1994, even before the onset of the
peso exchange rate crisis.374 In addition, the banks extended many of their
loans to controlling shareholders and their affiliates.375 Accordingly, the
banks were highly vulnerable to a downturn in the Mexican economy in
1994.376
In response to the exchange rate crisis that began in December 1994,
the Mexican government devalued the peso and imposed highly restrictive
monetary and credit policies. The government’s policies produced a
dramatic rise in interest rates. Higher interest rates and the peso’s
devaluation pushed many borrowers into insolvency (especially if they
held dollar-denominated loans) and triggered a massive wave of loan
defaults. Nonperforming bank loans doubled by 1995 and tripled by 1996,
compared to their level in 1994.377 To prevent a collapse of the Mexican
banking system, the government injected large amounts of capital into the
banks and encouraged them to sell nonperforming loans to FOBAPROA.
In addition, the government guaranteed all deposits. Thirteen of the
eighteen banks essentially failed and were either taken over by the
government or acquired by other banks in supervisory mergers. For the
first time, the government allowed foreign banks to buy controlling
interests in Mexican banks. Ultimately, foreign banks acquired four of the
five largest banks in Mexico and controlled close to 80% of Mexico’s
banking assets by the end of 2003.378 Estimates for the total cost of

373
Haber, supra note 368, at 2338 (reporting that during 1991–1994, the foreign liabilities of
Mexican banks increased from 11% to 27% of their total liabilities).
374
Gruben & McComb, supra note 366, at 26 (stating that the banks’ reported ratio of past-due
loans rose from 5.5% to 8.3% during 1992–1994); Haber, supra note 368, at 2338 (estimating that
17.1% of the banks’ loans were effectively in nonperforming status by December 1994).
375
For example, twelve of the twenty largest loans made by Banco Serfin were made to directors
of the bank or their associates. La Porta et al., supra note 368, at 246; see also id. at 247 (stating that,
as of 1993, the average Mexican bank had extended 13% of its largest 300 loans to related parties).
376
Haber, supra note 368, at 2339; McQuerry, supra note 367, at 17.
377
Haber, supra note 368, at 2335, 2339 (discussing the devaluation of the peso and the rise in
interest rates, and estimating that nonperforming bank loans rose from 17% of all bank loans in 1994 to
36% in 1995 and 53% in 1996).
378
Gelpern, supra note 32, at 1521; Haber, supra note 368, at 2332–33, 2340–44 (noting that
“[t]he entry of foreign banks into the Mexican market succeeded in recapitalizing the banking
system”); La Porta, supra note 368, at 247. Effective January 1, 2005, a new deposit insurance scheme
took effect in Mexico. In contrast to the unlimited guarantee provided by FOBAPROA, the new deposit
insurance agency, IPAB, imposes a cap of $130,000 on deposit insurance. However, IPAB “has
virtually no assets because of the obligations it inherited from the last crisis.” Gelpern, supra note 32,
at 1522; see Haber, supra note 368, at 2344.

1606

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1539

resolving Mexico’s banking crisis range between $65 billion and $104
billion.379
A study by Rafael La Porta and others determined that loans to related
parties were correlated with bank failures, were made on highly
preferential terms, and performed much worse than loans to unrelated
parties. Compared to the five surviving Mexican banks, the thirteen failed
banks had a substantially higher proportion of loans to related parties and
their percentage of related loans rose sharply between 1993 and their
respective failure dates.380 Moreover, in comparison with loans made to
non-affiliates, loans made by Mexican banks to related parties carried
significantly lower interest rates, were much less likely to be backed by
collateral or personal guarantees, had a significantly higher default rate,
and had a much lower recovery rate.381 The study concluded that “[t]he
case of Mexico in the 1990s suggests that the risk that related lending may
lead to looting is great when banks are controlled by industrial firms,
outside lending has relatively low rates of return, and corporate governance
is weak.”382 In sum, the Mexican financial crisis of 1994–1995—like the
Japanese and Korean crises—creates serious doubts about the wisdom of
permitting joint control of banks and commercial firms.383
3.

Risks of Contagion from Commercial Owners to ILCs

A further risk confronting a commercially-owned ILC is that its parent
company may encounter serious problems that cause the public to lose
confidence in the ILC itself. For example, as discussed above, the failure
of Caldwell and Company in November 1930 triggered depositor runs on
all of its affiliated banks and their correspondent banks. Because there was

379
Haber, supra note 368, at 2342 (citing an estimate of $65 billion); Wilmarth, supra note 212,
at 309 n.384, (citing Fasten Seatbelts, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1999, at 77, available at LEXIS, News
Library, ECON File (quoting estimates of $93 billion and $104 billion)).
380
La Porta et al., supra note 368, at 247, 248 tbl.1, 249 (reporting that the average percentage of
related loans among the largest 300 loans was 14% at failed banks in 1993, compared to 10% at
survivor banks, and that the average percentage of related loans rose to 27% by the time the failed
banks were taken over, compared to only 13% for the survivor banks as of June 1997).
381
Id. at 252–58. The study also found that loans made to the least transparent related parties—
i.e., privately-held companies or individuals—had the most preferential terms and the worst rates of
default and recovery. Id. at 259–61.
382
Id. at 262.
383
Foreign banking crises in the 1930s similarly indicate that ownership links between banking
and commercial firms create a higher risk of systemic financial crises. During the 1930s, nations with
prominent universal banks (e.g., Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Germany) experienced severe
banking crises because their banks were weakened by close ownership and lending connections to
troubled industries. In contrast, Canada and the United Kingdom—whose banks were barred from
securities underwriting and dealing and could not own equity interests in commercial firms—did not
experience a significant banking crisis during the 1930s. For a more complete review of this topic, see
Wilmarth, supra note 96, at 612–13, 644 & n.257 (including sources cited therein).
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no deposit insurance in 1930, only two of CAC’s affiliated banks were able
to survive those runs.384
Similarly, Beverly Hills Bancorp (BHB) destroyed public confidence
in its subsidiary, Beverly Hills National Bank (BHN Bank), when BHB
defaulted on $13 million of commercial paper in December 1973. BHB
had used the proceeds of the commercial paper to make loans to a real
estate developer. When the developer defaulted on the loans, BHB could
not pay off the commercial paper. In announcing its default, BHB assured
the public that its own problems would not affect the safety and soundness
of BHN Bank. BHN Bank’s primary regulator, the Comptroller of the
Currency, also publicly stated that the bank was “in solvent condition with
satisfactory liquidity.”385 Nevertheless, depositors soon launched “largescale runs” against BHN Bank, and the bank was sued by customers who
had purchased BHB’s commercial paper.386 To prevent BHN Bank’s
failure, regulators arranged a sale of the bank’s assets to Wells Fargo Bank
in January 1974. BHN Bank was thereafter liquidated.387
Likewise, when Drexel Burnham declared bankruptcy in February
1990, following the collapse of the junk bond market, its problems quickly
spread to two of its subsidiaries, which were securities broker-dealers
regulated by the SEC. The regulated subsidiaries were solvent at the time
of Drexel Burnham’s failure, but the SEC was soon obliged to liquidate
them after they could not obtain even short-term credit from counterparties
or banks.388 The contagion resulting from the failures of CAC, BHB and
Drexel Burnham indicates that investors, depositors and other creditors do
not believe that a regulated financial institution can be effectively shielded
from serious problems occurring at its parent company.
Problems at U.S. automobile manufacturers have repeatedly caused
credit ratings agencies to cut their ratings for the manufacturers’ captive
finance subsidiaries. During 1991–1992, credit ratings agencies reduced
384

See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing the collapse of CAC in 1930).
Douglas W. Cray, Bancorp on Coast Reveals Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1973, at 27,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting Comptroller of the Currency James E. Smith);
see also In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 649 F.2d 1329, 1331–32 (9th Cir. 1981); Anthony Cornyn et al.,
An Analysis of the Concept of Corporate Separateness in BHC Regulation from an Economic
Perspective, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION: PROCEEDINGS, MAY 14–16, 1986, at 174, 186–87 (1986).
386
Cornyn et al., supra note 385, at 187; In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 649 F.2d at 1331–32.
387
In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 649 F.2d at 1332; Cornyn et al., supra note 385, at 187.
388
See William S. Haraf, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Lessons for the Bank
Regulators, REGULATION, Winter 1991, at 22, 23–24; Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 327–28, 412, 446
n.1029 (noting that Drexel Burnham’s bankruptcy followed the crash of the junk bond market in 1990
and triggered a cutoff of credit to its solvent securities subsidiariest); see also BROWN, supra note 315,
at 23 (quoting SEC chairman Richard Breeden’s testimony before a Senate committee, in which he
stated that Drexel Burnham’s insolvency “appears to have shattered the trust and confidence of the
dealer and banking community in the subsidiary broker-dealer, even though it remained solvent with
considerable excess liquid assets”).
385
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the ratings of Chrysler Financial Corp. (CFC) to junk bond levels and
thereby cut off CFC’s ability to issue commercial paper, because of serious
financial and operational problems at CFC’s parent, Chrysler
Corporation.389 Similarly, in recent years Ford Motor Credit Company
(FMCC) lost its investment-grade rating and was downgraded to junk bond
status because of doubts among ratings agencies about the long-term
viability of FMCC’s parent, Ford Motor Company (Ford).390 General
Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), the finance subsidiary of
General Motors Corporation (GM), also saw its credit ratings fall to junk
bond levels because of the ratings agencies’ concerns about GM’s severe
challenges.391
In 2006, GM agreed to sell a majority stake in GMAC to an outside
investor group for $14 billion.392 GM needed the sale proceeds to help
finance its restructuring program, and GM also hoped that its sale of
control of GMAC would improve GMAC’s chances of regaining
investment-grade status.393 GMAC had acquired a Utah-chartered ILC in
2004, and GM therefore applied to the FDIC for permission to transfer
control of the ILC to GMAC’s new majority owner.394 In November 2006,
despite the FDIC’s initial moratorium covering all ILC applications, the

389
See Doron P. Levin, Chrysler Unit Still on Block After Rebuff by Mitsubishi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1991, at D16, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting that Chrysler Financial was
prohibited from obtaining public debt because of “its parent’s shaky financial condition”); Doron P.
Levin, Little Room for Error in Chrysler’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at D1, D5, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (attributing Chrysler Financial’s inability to borrow in the public debt
market to the downgrade of its and Chrysler Corporation’s debt to “junk bond” status); Ratings Are Cut
on $100 Billion of G.M. and Chrysler Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at D2, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File (observing that Chrysler had to pay a higher interest rate because its credit
ratings had fallen to junk-grade levels); David Siegel, Chrysler Unit Asks Bank Group to Extend $6.8
Billion Credit Line, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1992, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File
(same).
390
Cynthia Koons & Simona Covel, Ford Credit Keeps Debt Ball Rolling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
2006, at C6, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Tom Sullivan & Simona Covel, Ford
Credit Offers $2.25 Billion Debt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2006, at C5, available at LEXIS, News Library,
WSJNL File; see also Matthew Quinn, S&P Downgrades a Ford Unit, AM. BANKER, Jan. 6, 2006, at 5,
available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (reporting that Standard & Poor’s Corporation
(S&P) had lowered FMCC’s credit rating to BB-minus, “pushing it deeper into the junk category,” and
quoting S&P analyst Robert Schulz, who stated that the downgrade reflected “increased skepticism”
about Ford’s prospects).
391
Serena Ng et al., Rating Providers Remain Cautious On GMAC Bonds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,
2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
392
See Dennis K. Berman & Lee Hawkins Jr., GM to Sell GMAC Stake to Cerberus, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 3, 2006, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Lee Hawkins Jr., GMAC Hopes
to Shed “Junk” Baggage, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2006, at C3, available at LEXIS, News Library,
WSJNL File; Paul Muolo, GM Finally Sells Big Stakes in Real Estate Lending Units, MORTGAGE
SERVICING NEWS, May 2006, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, MORTSN File.
393
See Berman & Hawkins, supra note 392; Hawkins, supra note 392; Muolo, supra note 392.
394
See Statement of Douglas H. Jones, supra note 42, at 11 (Attachment 1).
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395

FDIC approved GM’s application.
In explaining its decision to exempt
GM’s application from the moratorium, the FDIC stated that “waiting to
act until after the expiration of the moratorium could have had a significant
adverse effect on GM’s restructuring and GM’s subsidiaries.”396 The
FDIC’s approval indicated that the agency felt obliged to make an
exception to its moratorium due to “unique circumstances” involving a
large and troubled commercial parent company.397
It is not inconceivable that Wal-Mart and Home Depot could someday
find themselves in positions similar to GM and Ford. The growth rate for
Wal-Mart’s domestic sales has declined sharply in recent years, because
Wal-Mart’s superstores have reached a saturation point in its traditional
rural markets, and Wal-Mart has encountered significant opposition as it
has tried to build superstores in metropolitan markets.398 Indeed, since
2005 Wal-Mart’s sales have grown at a much slower rate than the sales of
Target, its main rival.399 Moreover, Wal-Mart’s emphasis on employing
nonunionized, part-time workers to reduce its labor costs has produced
negative publicity, political opposition and many lawsuits (including a
nationwide class action) alleging employment discrimination and unfair
labor practices.400
Wal-Mart has tried to offset its slowing growth in domestic markets by
aggressively expanding its operations in foreign markets. However, WalMart’s international efforts have met with mixed success. While Wal-Mart
has profitable operations in Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the United
395
Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Board Approves Change in
Control Notice for GMAC Automotive Bank, Midvale, Utah (Nov. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06103.html.
396
Id. at 2. As part of the FDIC’s approval, GMAC and its ILC agreed to comply with “any
changes that the FDIC might make to the regulation and supervision of ILCs . . . once the moratorium
has been lifted.” Id.
397
Id. at 1 (“The FDIC acted on this change of control notice prior to the expiration of the [ILC]
moratorium because of the unique circumstances of this case.”); see also Joe Adler, Approval for GM
ILC Deal Pleases Industry, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 2006, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library,
AMBNKR File (quoting Rep. Paul Gillmor’s statement that the FDIC had followed a “pragmatic
approach” in approving the transaction, because it was “critical to the health of General Motors”).
398
See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 310, at A1; Hudson, supra note 309, at C1; The Bulldozer of
Bentonville Slows, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2007, at 70, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File.
399
Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Trips As It Changes A Bit Too Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006,
at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Hudson, supra note 309, at C1.
400
See, e.g., Jon Birger, The Unending Woes of Lee Scott, FORTUNE, Jan. 22, 2007, at 118,
available at LEXIS, News Library, FORTUN File; Abigail Goldman & Nancy Cleeland, The Wal-Mart
Effect, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File; Steven
Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart to Add More Part-Timers and Wage Caps, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; see also Gary McWilliams & Ann
Zimmerman, Wal-Mart to Fight Ruling in Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A3, available at LEXIS,
News Library, WSJNL File (reporting on a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which
upheld a district court order granting class-action status to a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination by
Wal-Mart filed on behalf of more than 1.5 million past and present female employees).
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Kingdom, it withdrew from Germany and South Korea in 2006 after
suffering heavy losses.401 Wal-Mart has made its biggest overseas push in
China, where it has acquired a substantial chain of retail stores.402 In
addition, about 70% of the products Wal-Mart sells are produced in China.
Because of its increasing dependence on China, Wal-Mart is exposed to
substantial risk from either a significant upward revaluation of the Chinese
yuan or a major disruption in the Chinese economy.403
Home Depot’s results in 2006 were even more disappointing than WalMart’s. Home Depot’s annual net profit declined in 2006 for the first time
in the company’s history.404 Like Wal-Mart, the growth of Home Depot’s
sales has slowed considerably as its rapid expansion during the prior two
decades has apparently reached a saturation point. In addition, Home
Depot pursued an ill-conceived cost reduction program that replaced
skilled, full-time employees with inexperienced, part-time workers. The
resulting decline in service quality alienated many of Home Depot’s
customers, who migrated to Lowe’s (Home Depot’s principal
competitor).405 Home Depot also launched a wholesale-supply business
that produced disappointing earnings and consumed resources that should
have been invested in Home Depot’s core home-improvement business.
As a result of these setbacks, the chairman of Home Depot was forced to
step down at the beginning of 2007.406
The recent problems experienced by Wal-Mart and Home Depot—like
the much greater difficulties confronting GM and Ford—demonstrate that
no manufacturer or retailer is “too big” to be immune from the threat of
failure in a globalized and highly competitive economy. Two of the largest
U.S. retailers—Kmart and Montgomery Ward—filed for bankruptcy
during the domestic economy’s most recent downturn during 2000–
401
See Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Profit Falls 26%, Its First Drop in 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2006, at C3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Mark Landler, Wal-Mart to
Abandon Germany, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File;
Special Report Wal-Mart: How Big Can it Grow?, supra note 310.
402
See Keith Naughton et al., The Great Wal-Mart of China, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 2006, at 50,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NWEEK File; Wal-Mart Buys a Stake in China Chain, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 28, 2007, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
403
See Tom Bliley, GLB Was Not An Invitation to Wal-Mart, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 2006, at 17,
available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
404
Zimmerman & Lloyd, supra note 309, at A2.
405
Brian Grow et al., Out at Home Depot: Behind the Flameout of Controversial CEO Bob
Nardelli, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 15, 2007, at 56, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File; Joann
Lublin et al., Moving Out: Behind Nardelli’s Abrupt Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at A1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Zimmerman, supra note 309, at D1; Ann Zimmerman, The Home
Depot Fix-Up: More Problems Remain after CEO’s Departure, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2007, at C1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
406
See Zimmerman & Lloyd, supra note 309, at A2; Ann Zimmerman & Joann S. Lublin, Home
Depot Bows to Whitworth Again: Chain May Sell or Spin Off Wholesale-Supply Unit in a Reversal of
Strategy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2007, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
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407

2002.
Fortunately, neither company owned an FDIC-insured depository
institution at the time of its failure.
In addition to the challenges confronting manufacturers and retailers in
their core businesses, their efforts to diversify into financial services have
often produced disappointing results. In 1985, Ford bought First
Nationwide, a large thrift institution, but Ford sold the thrift in 1994 after it
repeatedly generated losses rather than earnings.408 In 1989, Ford acquired
Associates First Capital, a subprime consumer lender. However, Ford
spun off Associates nine years later, after its lending operations resulted in
high delinquency rates and widespread accusations of unfair and deceptive
practices.409
Similarly, Sears built a “financial supermarket” during the 1980s by
acquiring a thrift (Sears Savings Bank), an insurance company (Allstate), a
securities broker (Dean Witter), a credit card company (Discover), and a
real estate broker and mortgage banker (Coldwell Banker). However,
Sears sold or spun off all those units by the early 1990s after they failed to

407
Danny Hakim & Leslie Kaufman, Kmart Files Bankruptcy, Largest Ever for a Retailer, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Leslie Kaufman & Claudia
H. Deutsch, Montgomery Ward to Close Its Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at C1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. Kmart emerged from bankruptcy in May 2003, when it was bought
by hedge fund investor Edward Lampert, who also acquired control of Sears in November 2004. See
Amy Merrick & Dennis K. Berman, Attention, Shoppers: Kmart to Buy Sears for $11.5 Billion, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 18, 2004, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. However, analysts have
questioned whether Kmart and Sears will be able to regain their former prominence and achieve longterm success as national retailers. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Lampert Faces a Long Shot
in Reviving Sears, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File;
Mya Frazier, Since picking up Kmart, It’s Been Tears for Sears, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 22, 2007, at 8,
available at LEXIS, News Library, ADAGE File; Gretchen Morgenson, The Sears Catalog of
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, § 3, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
408
See Jim McTague, Ex-Chairman Sees Ford in Banking for Long Haul, AM. BANKER, Oct. 25,
1991, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (reporting on losses by First Nationwide
during 1991); Sam Zuckerman, 14% Rise in Bad Realty Loans Spurs Loss at 1st Nationwide, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 31, 1990, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (stating that “the
thrift has produced a series of disappointments” since Ford bought it in 1985); Sam Zuckerman, Texan
to Pay $1 Billion for Ford’s Big Thrift, AM. BANKER, Apr. 15, 1994, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, AMBNKR File (stating that “selling First Nationwide is an embarrassing retreat for Ford,” and
Ford would incur a net loss on the sale after recording a $440 million charge).
409
See Antoinette Coulton, Aggressive Ford Unit Now a Driving Force: Portfolio Deals Have
Raised Associates’ Profile, but Picture Isn’t All Rosy, AM. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1997, at 24, available at
LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File; Ford Spins Off B&C Unit, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 13,
1997, at 1; Heather Timmons, CEO: Spinoff Won’t Change Associates, AM. BANKER, Mar. 18, 1998, at
9, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File. After Citigroup acquired Associates First
Capital in 2000, the FTC sued Associates and Citigroup, alleging that Associates had engaged in unfair
and deceptive lending and debt collection practices since 1995. In 2002, Citigroup agreed to pay $215
million to settle the FTC’s charges. Brian Collins, Citi Pays $215 Million to Settle Alleged Fraud at
Associates, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 23, 2002, at 2; Richard A. Oppel Jr., U.S. Suit Cites
Citigroup Unit on Loan Deceit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
NYT File.
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produce the profits and synergies Sears anticipated.
Subsequently, Sears
sold a large credit card business that it built up during the 1990s, after that
unit generated high rates of delinquencies and chargeoffs.411 A major
reason for the credit card unit’s problems was that Sears aggressively
expanded credit lines and eased credit terms to encourage cardholders to
buy more products from Sears.412 Sears’s problems with its credit card unit
provide further evidence of the potential dangers in allowing commercial
firms to use ILCs as sources of credit to finance the parent companies’
product sales.
The highly coordinated marketing strategies of today’s conglomerates
are yet another factor that increases the risk of contagion within holding
companies. Large financial conglomerates and their commercial rivals
have adopted unified brands as a key strategy to promote the cross-selling
of various products to their customers.413 Several of the commercial firms
that have already acquired ILCs—e.g., BMW, Target, Toyota and
Volkswagen—have applied the parent’s brand name to the ILC.414
Similarly, Wal-Mart said that it would use the name “Wal-Mart Bank” for
410
Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 425–26; Phil Roosevelt, Sears to Pull Out of Banking, Will Shed
Discover Card, Mortgage Operations, AM. BANKER, Sept. 30, 1992, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, AMBNKR File.
411
Robert Berner, Sears Stock Plunges on Credit-Card Debt Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,
1997, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (stating that “Sears has been battling a
run-up in bad debt in its proprietary credit-card business”); David Breitkopf, Sears $30.8B Portfolio is
Largest Up for Sale in Years, AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2003, at 7, available at LEXIS, News Library,
AMBNKR File (reporting on Sears’ decision to “sell its increasingly troubled [credit card] portfolio,
which has been beset by rising chargeoff rates”); Ken Brown & Amy Merrick, Towering Expectations
Grip Sears Shares, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2003, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File
(explaining that Sears sold its credit card business after being “hit [in 2002] by big losses on its credit
cards”).
412
See Joseph B. Cahill, The Softer Side: Sears’s Credit Business May Have Helped Hide Larger
Retailing Woes, WALL. ST. J., July 6, 1999, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File;
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Sears Is Said To Be Putting Credit Cards Up for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2003, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; De’Ann Weimer, Put the Comeback on My
Card, BUS. WK., Nov. 10, 1997, at 118, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File.
413
See Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 446–47, 449–50, 457; see also J. Lynn Lunsford & Brian
Steinberg, Conglomerates’ Conundrum: When It Comes to Ads Aimed at Investors, How Do You Put a
Face on the Faceless?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL
File (stating that “many successful conglomerates . . . have tried with varying degress of success . . . to
create a ‘brand’ for a parent company”). Major financial conglomerates, including Citigroup, Credit
Suisse and UBS, have recently adopted unified brand names for all or most of their important financial
service units. See Clint Riley, Citigroup Sells Red Umbrella Logo to St. Paul, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,
2007, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that “[a]ll of Citigroup’s many
businesses now will appear under a unified ‘Citi’ brand”); Edward Taylor, Credit Suisse Strategy: Be
UBS?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting
that UBS “operate[s] as a single brand”); Edward Taylor, Credit Suisse Plans to Eliminate First Boston
Name, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at C5, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (quoting
statement by Credit Suisse’s chairman that “we have decided to use one brand, Credit Suisse, for all our
banking businesses” in order “to communicate with one face to the market”).
414
See Statement of Douglas H. Jones, supra note 42, at Attachment 1.
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415

its proposed ILC.
Common brand names and cross-selling programs
aggravate the risk that consumers, investors and creditors will perceive
problems at commercial parent companies as direct threats to the safety
and soundness of their captive ILCs.
C. Does the FDIC Have Adequate Supervisory Powers to Control the
Risks Created by Commercially-Owned ILCs?
The FDIC currently does not have authority to exercise consolidated
supervision over commercial firms that control ILCs.416 Even if Congress
gave the FDIC consolidated supervisory authority over such firms, such a
grant of power would create at least four problems. First, the FDIC does
not have expertise to identify and control the risks created by commercial
firms that are affiliates of ILCs. Second, the FDIC’s designation as
consolidated supervisor might cause market participants to expect that the
federal safety net would be extended to commercial parent companies of
ILCs. Third, giving the FDIC authority to supervise the activities of
commercial affiliates would significantly increase the amount of
governmental interference in the general economy.
Fourth, large
commercial owners of ILCs are likely to enjoy substantial political
influence, which they can use to extract costly subsidies or forbearance
measures from legislators and the FDIC.
1. The FDIC’s Lack of Consolidated Supervisory Authority over ILC
Holding Companies
The GAO has provided a comprehensive analysis of the FDIC’s
authority to regulate commercial firms that own ILCs. That analysis will
not be repeated here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note three
significant limitations on the FDIC’s authority to supervise an ILC’s parent
holding company and the nonbank subsidiaries of that company. First, the
FDIC has only a limited power to examine the parent company or one of
its nonbank subsidiaries. The FDIC may examine an “affiliate” of the
ILC—a category that includes the parent company and each of its nonbank
subsidiaries—but only to the extent “necessary to disclose fully (i) the
relationship between [the ILC] and any such affiliate; and (ii) the effect of
such relationship on the [ILC].”417 Thus, the FDIC’s examination authority
over the parent company or a nonbank subsidiary is limited to identifying
the “relationship” which that company has with the ILC and determining
415

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
For a detailed discussion of the FDIC’s authority to regulate parent companies of ILCs, see
GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 27–65.
417
12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(4)(A) (2000). The term “affiliate” includes any company “that controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with, [an ILC].” 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(w)(6), 1841(k)
(2000).
416
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whether that “relationship” has the potential to harm the ILC. The FDIC
does not have authority to examine the parent holding company and its
nonbank subsidiaries for the purpose of evaluating the overall safety and
soundness of the holding company.418
Second, the FDIC cannot impose capital requirements on the parent
company of an ILC or on any of its nonbank subsidiaries. The FDIC has
authority to establish capital requirements only with respect to state
nonmember banks, including ILCs.419 The FDIC could insist, as a
condition of approving an application for deposit insurance, that an ILC’s
parent company must enter into a capital maintenance agreement with the
FDIC. Under such an agreement, the FDIC could require the parent
company to maintain the ILC’s capital at specified levels in order to
preserve the ILC’s status as an FDIC-insured bank.420 However, the FDIC
cannot dictate the capital structure of the parent company or its nonbank
subsidiaries.421
Third, the FDIC has only limited authority to bring administrative
enforcement proceedings (including actions for cease-and-desist orders or
civil money penalties) against an ILC’s parent company or its nonbank
subsidiaries.422 For purposes of its enforcement authority, the FDIC can
treat the ILC’s parent company as an “institution-affiliated party” (IAP),
because that term includes a controlling shareholder (other than a bank
holding company) of a state nonmember bank.423 However, the FDIC
cannot treat a nonbank subsidiary of the parent company as an IAP unless
it “participates in the conduct of the [ILC’s] affairs.”424 In addition, the
FDIC may not bring an enforcement action against an IAP unless that
person (i) has engaged or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound
practice in conducting the business of the ILC, or (ii) has violated or is
about to violate a law, rule or written agreement or condition imposed by
the FDIC.425 Thus, the FDIC’s enforcement authority does not extend to
nonbank subsidiaries of the parent company that are not IAPs. Moreover,
418

See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 33–35, 38–40.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(3), 1831o(c), 3902(1), 3907(a) (2000).
420
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 36–38, 41–43; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1816(2) (listing
the “adequacy of the depository institution’s capital structure” as one of seven criteria that the FDIC
must consider in deciding whether to grant an application for deposit insurance). The FDIC can
enforce a capital maintenance agreement by bringing administrative proceedings under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818 (2000), or under the prompt corrective action provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1831o.
421
See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 43 (stating that “FDIC officials told us that it has
never imposed capital requirements on a holding company”).
422
For the FDIC’s authority to bring administrative enforcement actions against state nonmember
banks, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(3), 1818(b),(c), (i) (2000); MCCOY, supra note 51, § 13.03 (discussing
the FDIC’s enforcement powers).
423
12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(1) (2000).
424
Id. § 1813(u)(3).
425
Id. § 1818(b)(1), (c)(1), (i)(2).
419
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the FDIC cannot bring action against an IAP based on alleged unsafe or
unsound practices that are not directly related to the ILC’s business.426
In contrast to the limited, “bank-centric” authority of the FDIC over
ILCs and their affiliates, the FRB enjoys consolidated supervisory powers
over bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries.427 With
certain limitations, the FRB can examine a bank holding company and all
of its subsidiaries,428 and can impose capital requirements on the holding
company and all of its nonbank subsidiaries.429 Under the “source of
strength” doctrine, the FRB may require a bank holding company to make
capital contributions to a subsidiary bank or to provide other types of
financial or managerial support.430 The FRB can bring administrative
enforcement proceedings against a bank holding company or any of its
nonbank subsidiaries.431 In addition, the FRB can require a bank holding
company to divest any nonbank subsidiary or any nonbanking activity that
presents “a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability” of
one or more of the holding company’s subsidiary banks.432 By virtue of its
consolidated supervisory powers, the FRB can take “a systemic approach”
that encompasses the bank holding company and all of its nonbank
subsidiaries, and that addresses “financial and operations risks within the
holding company system that can threaten the safety and soundness of a
bank subsidiary.”433
The recent failures of two ILCs—Pacific Thrift and Loan (PTL) and
Southern Pacific Bank (SPB)—show the potential dangers of relying on a
bank-focused approach in supervising ILCs that are subsidiaries of holding
companies. The FDIC began issuing administrative enforcement orders
against PTL in 1992, but apparently the FDIC did not attempt to examine
PTL’s parent holding company until 1998. The FDIC discovered that the
parent holding company had incurred large amounts of debt and had
transferred borrowed funds to PTL, thereby enabling PTL to keep making
426

See GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 34–37, 38 tbl.2, 46–47.
Id. at 29–31.
428
See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2) (2000); see also MCCOY, supra note 51, § 12.04[1][a][ii]
(explaining that, to the fullest extent possible, the FRB is required (i) to limit its examination to the
bank holding company and any subsidiary that could have a materially adverse effect on the safety and
soundness of the holding company’s subsidiary banks, and (ii) to accept examination reports prepared
by regulators of functionally regulated subsidiaries of the holding company).
429
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(2)(F), 1831o(c), 3902(1)(A), 3907 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 225 apps. A–
E (2006) (setting forth the FRB’s capital requirements for bank holding companies). But see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1844(c)(3) (2000) (limiting the FRB’s authority to establish capital requirements for functionally
regulated subsidiaries of bank holding companies).
430
The FRB’s “source of strength” doctrine, which is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (2007),
was implicitly endorsed by Congress in GLBA. MCCOY, supra note 51, § 4.05; GAO-ILC REPORT,
supra note 39, at 32.
431
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(2)(F), 1818(b), (c), (i) (2000).
432
Id. § 1844(e)(1) (2000).
433
GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 30, 40.
427
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high-risk loans that ultimately caused PTL’s failure in November 1999.434
Similarly, the FDIC began taking enforcement actions against SPB in
September 1996, but did not make an on-site visit to SPB’s parent holding
company until February 2001. The FDIC discovered that the parent
holding company had itself been incurring significant losses since 1998
and therefore could not provide sufficient capital support to prevent SPB
from failing in February 2003.435 The failures of PTL and SPB indicate
that
the bank-centric approach alone is not sufficient to assess all
the risks that a holding company and affiliates can pose to an
insured financial institution. . . . [In contrast,] consolidated
supervision provides [the FRB’s] examiners with both the
ability to understand the financial strength and risks of the
overall [bank] holding company . . . and the authority to
address significant management, operations, capital, and
other deficiencies throughout the organization before these
deficiencies pose a danger to affiliate insured banks and the
bank insurance fund.436
Likewise, the SEC acknowledged after the collapse of Drexel
Burnham in 1990 that it “did not have adequate information regarding the
Drexel holding company and its unregulated affiliates.”437 The lack of
such information “severely hindered” the SEC’s ability to evaluate the
threat posed to Drexel Burnham’s broker-dealer subsidiaries, including the
“ability to know of the imminence of a liquidity crisis for the parent, and
the corresponding risk that the broker-dealer’s capital could be depleted in
a desperate but fruitless attempt to pay the parent firm’s unsecured
creditors.”438 In 2004, the SEC adopted a new consolidated supervisory
approach, which applies on a voluntary basis to “supervised investment
bank holding companies” (SIBHCs) that own securities broker-dealers.439

434
PACIFIC THRIFT MLR, supra note 334, at 5–6, 9–10, 17–20, 28–30; see also GAO-ILC
REPORT, supra note 39, at 61 (discussing the involvement of PTL’s holding company in PTL’s failure).
435
SOUTHERN PACIFIC MLR, supra note 334, at 6–10, 71–73.
436
GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 61–62 (reporting views of FRB officials).
437
BROWN, supra note 315, at 25 (quoting testimony of SEC chairman Richard Breeden).
438
Id.; see supra note 388 and accompanying text (discussing collapse of Drexel Burnham and the
resulting failure of its broker-dealer subsidiaries).
439
For discussions of the SEC’s new consolidated supervisory approach for SIBHCs, see, for
example, SCOTT, supra note 344, at 32–33, 166–67 (explaining that holding companies that own
securities broker-dealers can “voluntarily register” as SIBHCs with the SEC in order to satisfy the
requirements of the European Union’s Conglomerates Directive); Jorge E. Viñuales, The International
Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A Case-Study of Equivalence as an Approach to Financial
Integration, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 3, 34–41 (2006) (describing the SEC’s program of consolidated
supervision for SIBHCs).
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In February 2007, the FDIC expressed its concern that “the current
supervisory process and infrastructure [for ILCs] may not produce the
safeguards that the FDIC believes could be helpful” in evaluating and
controlling the risks presented by ILC holding companies that are not
subject to consolidated supervision by either the FRB or the OTS.440 The
FDIC therefore issued a proposed regulation, which would apply to any
holding company that (i) is engaged solely in financial activities, (ii)
proposes to acquire control of an ILC, and (iii) would not be subject to
consolidated supervision by the FRB or the OTS. The FDIC’s proposed
regulation would require such a holding company to enter into a written
agreement with the FDIC as a condition for acquiring control of the ILC.
The agreement would require the parent holding company to (i) provide
information and reports to the FDIC concerning the operations of itself and
its nonbank subsidiaries, (ii) allow the FDIC to examine the holding
company and each of its subsidiaries, and (iii) maintain the ILC’s capital at
specified levels.441
It is not entirely clear whether the FDIC has authority to force
companies that acquire ILCs to enter into the consolidated supervision
agreement described in the FDIC’s proposed regulation.442 However, the
proposed regulation does make clear that the FDIC is no longer
comfortable in providing deposit insurance to ILCs whose parent
companies are not subject to consolidated supervision by a federal banking
agency.
2. Providing the FDIC with Consolidated Supervisory Authority over
Commercial Parent Companies of ILCs Would Have Adverse
Consequences
The problems arising out of acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms
cannot be solved simply by designating the FDIC as the consolidated
supervisor of such firms. To the contrary, the creation of a federal
consolidated regulator for commercial parent companies of ILCs would
have at least four negative effects. First, the FDIC does not have any
substantial experience or specialized expertise in evaluating the safety and
soundness of commercial conglomerates.
Naming the FDIC as
consolidated supervisor for commercial parent companies of ILCs would
greatly increase the FDIC’s supervisory burden and would compel the

440

FDIC Moratorium Extension Notice, supra note 13, at 5293.
FDIC Proposed Rule on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 43, at 5222–27.
442
Compare id. at 5223 (contending that the FDIC possesses authority to adopt the proposed
regulation), with GAO-ILC REPORT, supra note 39, at 45–46 (indicating some doubt whether the FDIC
has authority to impose consolidated supervisory requirements on applicants who seek to acquire
ILCs).
441
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FDIC to hire new personnel with expertise in many different sectors of the
U.S. economy.443
Second, designating the FDIC as consolidated regulator would have
the undesirable effect of implying that the federal government is
monitoring and assuring the overall solvency and stability of each
commercial firm that owns an ILC. That implication might lead market
participants to expect that the federal safety net would be extended to
commercial parent companies of ILCs.444
Third, federal consolidated supervision of commercial owners of ILCs
would greatly expand the scope of federal regulation within the
commercial sector of our economy. From the 1950s through the 1990s,
governmental authorities in Japan and South Korea played an extensive
role in monitoring and directing the relationships between main banks and
their commercial clients. Government regulators frequently pressured
banks to provide credit to designated high-growth industries or to provide
support for troubled commercial firms.445 Giving the FDIC a similarly
intrusive role in monitoring dealings between banks and their commercial
affiliates could significantly interfere with the market-driven dynamics of
the U.S. economy.446
Federal law currently requires the FDIC to oversee every transaction
that results in a transfer of control of an ILC or its parent company. As
shown by GM’s recent sale of control of GMAC and its subsidiary ILC,
the Change in Bank Control Act (CBCA)447 requires the FDIC to review,
and to decide whether to disapprove, any proposed change in control of a
state nonmember bank.448 The CBCA therefore provides a significant
impediment to any hostile takeover of a parent company of an ILC.449
Until recently, hostile takeovers rarely occurred in Japan and South Korea,
due to the extensive ownership links between banks and commercial firms
443
See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 315, at 4, 24–25, 42–45, 47; Testimony before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Apr. 11, 1991 (statement by
E. Gerald Corrigan, President, Fed. Res. Bank of NY), as reprinted in 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 411, 418-19
(1991).
444
Statement by E. Gerald Corrigan, supra note 443, at 418–20.
445
See Aoki, Patrick & Sheard, supra note 342, at 27, 30–35, 45–47 (discussing the role of
Japanese government officials in overseeing the relationships between main banks and commercial
firms); Black et al., supra note 355, at 540–42, 551–52 (discussing the role of the South Korean
government in overseeing the relationships between Korean banks and commercial firms); Milhaupt,
supra note 355, at 206–08 (same).
446
Statement by E. Gerald Corrigan, supra note 443, at 419.
447
12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (2000).
448
See MCCOY, supra note 51, § 10.02[1][a] (discussing the CBCA); supra notes 393–97 and
accompanying text (discussing the FDIC’s approval of GM’s sale of control of GMAC);.
449
See Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 291 (explaining that hostile takeovers of banks rarely occur
in the United States, because “[r]egulatory approval requirements for bank mergers create significant
obstacles to hostile takeovers”).
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and the government’s heavy regulatory oversight of those relationships.450
Hence, acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms are likely to impair the
effectiveness of market discipline over managers of the parent companies.
Fourth, major commercial firms that acquire ILCs are likely to use
political influence to obtain subsidies or forbearance from regulators. Big
commercial companies that own ILCs are likely to be not only TBTF but
also “too big to discipline adequately” (TBTDA).451 Major banks have
proven to be TBTDA in the past. For example, during the banking crisis of
1984–1992, Bank of America and Citicorp, the two largest U.S. banks,
each came perilously close to failure. However, federal regulators did not
take public enforcement action against either bank or insist upon a
replacement of its managers. Instead, regulators quietly entered into a
nonpublic “memorandum of understanding,” the weakest type of
enforcement action, with each bank. Regulators evidently were unwilling
to take strict enforcement measures against either bank because they feared
that public disclosure of the bank’s problems might “trigger[] a generalized
crisis of [public] confidence” in the banking system.452
A further example of special regulatory treatment, as well as the
extraordinary political influence that large financial conglomerates can
wield, was the FRB’s decision to approve the Citicorp-Travelers merger in
1998. That merger created an organization known as “Citigroup,” which
could not remain in operation under existing law for more than five years.
Nevertheless, the FRB approved the transaction, based on the assumption
(which proved to be correct) that Congress would remove the statutory
barriers to the merger before the FRB’s temporary exemption expired.
One of the most striking aspects of the merger was that it received the
advance blessing of President Clinton, Secretary of the Treasury Robert
Rubin (whom Citigroup later hired as a co-chairman) and FRB chairman
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Alan Greenspan, even before Citicorp and Travelers filed their
application.453
The FDIC’s decision in November 2006 to waive its initial moratorium
on ILC applications, and to approve GM’s sale of control of GMAC and its
ILC subsidiary, is suggestive of the type of regulatory forbearance that is
likely to be extended to large commercial owners of ILCs. The FDIC’s
decision was praised by a prominent member of Congress, but it was also
criticized by a well-known bank analyst, who “accused the FDIC of
bowing to congressional pressure and showing preferential treatment to
certain companies.”454 The FDIC may well have adopted a “pragmatic
approach” in removing an obstacle to a transaction that was viewed as
“critical to the health of General Motors.”455 However, the FDIC’s
decision strongly indicates that major companies owning ILCs will receive
special consideration from regulators if their financial stability is important
to the national economy.
Even when regulators do try to take tough action against large troubled
financial institutions, those institutions have often mobilized political
influence to extract forbearance from the regulators. During the 1980s,
federal regulators acted much more slowly in closing insolvent thrifts and
banks if those institutions were larger in size or if they were located in
congressional districts whose representative served on congressional
committees having jurisdiction over bank regulatory policy.456 Lincoln
Savings used influence from five U.S. Senators to help delay its seizure by
federal regulators for almost two years.457 The Speaker of the House of
Representatives and other members of Congress similarly intervened to
delay the closure of large troubled thrifts in Texas and other states.458
In sum, further acquisitions of ILCs by large commercial firms are
likely to introduce significant distortions in financial regulatory policy as
well as the general economy. Given the demonstrated political power of
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community into legalizing their transformation into . . . Citigroup”).
454
Adler, supra note 397 (reporting on statements by Rep. Paul Gillmor and analyst Richard X.
Bove); see also supra notes 393–97 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC’s approval of GM’s sale
of control of GMAC).
455
Adler, supra note 397 (quoting Rep. Gillmor).
456
See Wilmarth, supra note 212, at 305–06, 306 n.373, 307 & n.379 and sources cited therein.
457
See DAY, supra note 193, at 259–65, 338–48; LOWY, supra note 190, at 147–52, 218–21;
MAYER, supra note 197, at 188–224.
458
See DAY, supra note 193, at 230–58; LOWY, supra note 190, at 185–88, 193–94; MAYER,
supra note 197, at 226–42.

2007]

THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE

1621

459

financial conglomerates,
it seems highly undesirable to allow the
creation of even larger combinations of financial and commercial interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FDIC made the right decision when it imposed a moratorium on
further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms and urged Congress to
consider the need for legislation barring such acquisitions. As shown
above, commercially-owned ILCs contravene the policy of separating
banking and commerce and also present significant risks to our financial
system and our national economy. Commercial ownership of ILCs is
likely to create serious distortions and competitive imbalances in our
economy by (i) extending TBTF protection to large commercial owners of
ILCs and (ii) encouraging ILCs to use their federally-subsidized, low-cost
deposits to fund loans that will benefit their parent company’s operations.
Consolidated supervision of commercially-owned ILCs cannot control
these risks and is likely to have additional negative effects. Consolidated
supervision would increase the likelihood of TBTF bailouts, because FDIC
supervision would create the appearance of implicit federal support for
commercial owners of ILCs. In addition, consolidated supervision would
require the FDIC to monitor and evaluate the operations of all commercial
affiliates of ILCs, thereby producing an even more intrusive federal
regulatory presence in the general economy.
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Congress should therefore enact legislation to prohibit further
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms. At present, there are only
fifteen such firms, and their number should not be allowed to increase. In
1956, 1970, 1987 and 1999, Congress acted to foreclose widespread
ownership of FDIC-insured depository institutions by commercial firms. It
is time for Congress to do the same thing with respect to ILCs.

